Today Flashbots releases v0.2 and introduces bundle merging. That means that Flashbots miners can now mine multiple bundles per block.
A thread digging into this huge release and what that means 👇🏻
Flashbots gives users a way to communicate their transaction ordering preferences to miners via "bundles."
Bundles are groups of transactions executed in the order they are provided. Either the entire bundle is executed, or none of it is.
Bundles are typically very sensitive to ordering: you don't want other transactions to come before you & make a transaction your bundle fail
How did we deal with that sensitivity? We limited bundles included to 1 per block placed at the top of the block
An example arbitrage at the top of the block from the inimitable @mevalphaleak
Today most Flashbots bundles are for arbitrage and sandwiches, with a small but growing liquidation population and a long tail of other interesting things
Since Flashbots launched this has been very successful!
Over 100,000 bundles have been included on chain, leading to more efficient MEV extraction and new profits for searchers and miners.
But historically a ton of value has been left on the table. For a given block if you looked at random arbitrage and liquidation bundles they probably don't conflict!
Theoretically you can include both of those bundles in any order at the top of a block.
How many bundles should be included? In what order? How do you figure that out quickly? These are tough questions. Our algorithm for this is here: hackmd.io/@flashbots/cor…
tl;dr sort by profit, try adding bundles in a sequence, build parallel blocks w/ different #s of bundles
Today bundle merging went live for the 1st time 🥳
Ethermine mined the 1st multi-bundle block which you can see below. 3 different bundles were included in this block. They came from 3 different searchers & interacted with 6 tokens, and 4 DeFi protocols
The actual "profit" will be a bit lower due to the opportunity cost of including bundles (missed gas fees), but regardless that's a massive increase in miner revenue per block.
& by the way that gets internalized by stakers in ETH2
Historically each Flashbots block has led to an average of ~0.2 ETH profit - with a big increase lately with market volatility - with the limitation of only including one bundle.
We expect that profit per block will see a substantial increase from bundle merging.
Lastly bundle merging also opens up the door to regular users getting their transactions included via Flashbots much more often!
Now you are no longer competing with bots to be the only bundle in a block🙂
As always check out our Github to learn more and get involved and thank you to the tireless and amazing Flashbots team who makes all of this possible.
Today 95% of blocks on Ethereum are built by just two parties. This centralization threatens Ethereum's neutrality and resilience.
BuilderNet provides a decentralized, neutral, and open alternative, and the first release is live today.
The first release is a big step towards decentralized building by introducing "multioperator" building - where many parties can operate the same builder in a TEE, which users can verify. The initial operators are the Beaverbuild, Flashbots, and Nethermind teams.
The most vain searcher on-chain and all the ways they flex 🧵
We're looking at 'bigbrainchad.eth' from the dark forest; a bot that exploits contracts the block after they become vulnerable
Beyond the name and the MEV extraction, they flex on chain in a few ways that you might not have ever seen before
To start, all their transaction hashes start with 0xbeef - a flex I've seen any of the other mempool monsters do where they proof-of-work style mine a transaction hash prefix!
So not only do they extract MEV, they also take the time to mine a vanity hash
A brief thread on a novel MEV searching strategy, where we chase the trail of a mysterious bot backrunning private flow and reveal how they do it.
@blairmarshall pointed out a bot that appears to have private access to user orderflow that was landing bottom-of-the-block blocks on the Flashbots builder. That didn't make sense to me. We don't run backrunning bots! So we investigated.
MEV-Boost payments were at an alltime high yesterday, totaling 7691 ETH (!) which is nearly double the previous ATH of 3928 ETH during the FTX fiasco this fall.
A few statistics on MEV on Ethereum yesterday in this thread
You can't compare stats these 1:1, but the ATH for daily miner profit from mev-geth was 6397 ETH in June 2021. That's the *profit* of running mev-geth vs a vanilla mempool mining client.
A similar metric here would be the difference in payment for validators from running mev-boost or not. There's not a great up to date estimate of this out there I think
You could derive it by looking at the value of the mempool builder we submit (0xa1defa) and the winning block