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Murch 🥕🟩

@murchandamus

18 May

@Mario_Gibney

@Mario_Gibney 1/ Yeah, lemme try to draw it out. Let's assume it takes 6s for a block to reach other miners and compare 60s vs 600s block intervals for miners with 5% vs 30% of the hashrate. 6s is roughly the situation after Compact Blocks: dsn.kastel.kit.edu bitcoin/#propagation

@Mario_Gibney

@Mario_Gibney 2/ The propagation delay is both an advantage and disadvantage: it gives the author a headstart for the next block, but also gives time for a competing block to emerge which may oust the author's block. Let's assume half the remaining HR works on the competing block.

@Mario_Gibney

@Mario_Gibney 3/ We can calculate the chance of finding one or more blocks in a time interval by starting with 100% and deducting the chance of finding 0 blocks. The chance to find 0 blocks in a time frame where we'd expect λ blocks is `p(0|λ) = exp(-λ)*(λ^0)/(0!) = exp(-λ)*1/1 = exp(-λ)`.

Read 16 tweets

Murch 🥕🟩

@murchandamus

19 Feb

Default mempools purging txs < 6.0 sat/vB.

Since a full mempool seems to be the new normal, at least temporarily. What can _businesses_ do to lower their operation costs?

The following is mostly picked from blog.bitgo.com/utxo-managemen… if you prefer long form.

#mempoolreport

1/

1) Batch payments
You get a lot of withdrawal requests? Instead of paying each out separately, save up to 80% in fees by batching multiple payments into one transaction. It also makes UTXO management much easier!

bitcointechtalk.com/saving-up-to-8… 2/

2) Consolidate deposits
You're still getting tons of deposits and have to perform withdrawals. By funding withdrawals only with bigger UTXOs and consolidating smaller UTXOs at a lower feerate than your withdrawal transactions, you can save a ton of fees. 3/

Read 11 tweets

Murch 🥕🟩

@murchandamus

24 Oct 20

@CryptoStorm3

@CryptoStorm3 @ChartsBtc Each transaction offers miners a small amount of bitcoins to incentivize confirmation. Blocks are limited to 4M weight units, so miners cannot include everything that is waiting. Naturally, they choose the transactions that pay the highest fee per weight unit to maximize revenue.

@CryptoStorm3

@CryptoStorm3 @ChartsBtc Since a block is limited in size, and the block interval self-regulates to be roughly constant, the throughput of transaction data is limited.
OTOH, the amount of transactions that get submitted to the network is flexible.

@CryptoStorm3

@CryptoStorm3 @ChartsBtc Especially, when the price makes big swings, people get excited and want to participate in the market. As a precept in Bitcoin is to be your own bank and control your funds directly, a lot of people do not keep funds on their exchange accounts but in their own wallets.

Read 16 tweets

Murch 🥕🟩

@murchandamus

22 Oct 20

Mempool depth is still on the rise with all fee bands growing.

If we were headed into a major fee event, the #btc ecosystem would be much better prepared than in 2017. Native segwit is on the verge of wide adoption, opt-in RBF is right there for anyone that wants thrifty quick confirmations, LN maturity is coming along nicely, which…

… could at least serve as a valve for some smaller payments even when Wumbo seems a bit daunting still.

If you aren't working on all of these, you might want to consider to.

Read 7 tweets

Murch 🥕🟩

@murchandamus

23 Mar 19

@giacomozucco

@giacomozucco @CarstenBKK @BlueDelta0 @StopAndDecrypt Alright, so our threat model is a widespread effort to change the protocol rules with support of a majority hashing attack. Presumably this is incompatible with existing network rules as enforced by fully validating nodes, but compatible with thin clients.

@giacomozucco

@giacomozucco @CarstenBKK @BlueDelta0 @StopAndDecrypt a) A vast majority of FN oppose this protocol change. Attackers are banned by their peers, blocks don't propagate, most thin clients never see the blocks. Affected scrutinizing thin client discovers changed rules when first valid block is found, if it has at least 1 honest peer.

@giacomozucco

@giacomozucco @CarstenBKK @BlueDelta0 @StopAndDecrypt b) Significant count of FN support protocol change. FN topology decouples, some Scrutinizing Thin Clients (STC) are eclipsed by attack. STC will at the latest fully validate the first block that includes any transaction that concerns them. 1) Discovers invalid block if rule...

Read 10 tweets

Murch 🥕🟩

@murchandamus

22 Mar 19

@giacomozucco

@giacomozucco @CarstenBKK @BlueDelta0 @StopAndDecrypt Maybe I'm missing something, but current thin client implementations either rely on a trusted server or connect to multiple nodes. So, you'd not only need to be served a fake block, but also get verification by other nodes to follow it. That means you need to be sybilled.

@giacomozucco

@giacomozucco @CarstenBKK @BlueDelta0 @StopAndDecrypt BIP157 done right would first gather multiple filter fingerprints and compare them, then download the full filter if they agree. If they disagree, the would need to be back-off validation procedures. I don't see why such a validation couldn't include parsing the full block.

@giacomozucco

@giacomozucco @CarstenBKK @BlueDelta0 @StopAndDecrypt Obviously, a thin client doesn't have the full UTXO set, but many other rules could be checked on a single block. This would significantly reduce the attack surface and susceptibility to accepting chain tips with protocol changes.

Read 5 tweets

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