Thoughtful piece from @SusanBenesch on how to look beyond the content of individual posts to assess both impact and appropriate remedy -- a useful way to apply behavioral analysis of threat actors to more diffuse networks.
Defenders are grappling with how to adapt protocols designed for clearly delineated “bad guys” (ISIS, “The Russians”) who hide their identity online to tackle diffuse, blurred threats where witting deceivers mobilize large, authentic communities w/out hiding their identity.
@SusanBenesch’s proposal is a good way to think about this, and we need more approaches like this. But it’s important to be careful here as well. Protocols distinguish between deceptive “superspreaders” and unwitting “superjoiners” for a reason.
Sophisticated threat actors exploit this boundary — pulling content from & pushing content to unconnected users, trying to trick gov’ts and platforms into over-enforcement & drawing calls of censorship.
It makes sense to assess the network effects of an actor’s repeated posting, but we should also be careful not to paint instigators & responders with the same brush. Sharing accurate information is an important tool here, and enforcement/removal may not always be the right move.
We also have to recognize that these “operations” occur across multiple platforms and multiple media. We need linked strategies in broadcast, print, radio, and online, and much more discussion about how to strike the right balance here.

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More from @ngleicher

3 Mar
1/ This is excellent analysis from @2020Partnership on misinfo during the 2020 election. Having a team of independent researchers focused on election protection and online deception is a *huge* boon for the defender community. atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-resea…
2/ We saw many of the trends that EIP called out in this report, including cross-platform spread -- narratives often originate with a few accounts, spread across multiple platforms as they gain popularity, and are even further amplified through traditional media coverage.
3/ I particularly appreciate their calls for clarity and consistency in rules from platforms, government and legislators, and their emphasis on the importance of getting proactive accurate information out ahead of deceptive narratives.
Read 9 tweets
3 Mar
1/ Today we’re announcing 5 networks removed for Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior in February: 2 networks from Iran targeting multiple countries, and domestic networks in Thailand, Morocco, and Russia about.fb.com/news/2021/03/f…
2/ The two Iranian networks focused on the middle east, as well as the UK and Afghanistan. They engaged on a range of topics, using tactics we’ve seen from other operations, and had limited reach — one operation had less than 15K followers for their assets, the other under 500.
3/ The Thai operation exhibited links to the Thai Military’s Internal Security Operations Command. It used fake accounts posing as individuals from the southern provinces of Thailand to criticize separatist movements and support the monarchy and military.
Read 8 tweets
2 Feb
Very proud of @brittanheller for this fascinating new piece on "biometric psychography" and how our legal and policy frameworks need new concepts to address all the types of data gathering that could happen in VR and AR.
scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw/vol23/i…
What is biometric psychography, you ask? "the gathering and use of biological data, paired with the stimuli that caused a biological reaction, to determine users’ preferences, likes, and dislikes."
Put another way, biometric psychography combines the fact that a user is looking at a shiny red sports car in VR with the fact that their pupil dilation shows they *like* what they're looking at to determine their likes and dislikes -- even if they don't realize them themselves.
Read 4 tweets
22 Nov 20
An excellent read from @lawfareblog. @C_C_Krebs did a number of important things, but this one was both subtle & critical: “Yet Krebs, along with a handful of others ... retained their reputations for telling the truth on foreign threats to the integrity of American elections.”
In this age of perception hacks and IO, perception of security *is* security. And no one will believe a system is secure without a trusted source of truth. Empowering voices to serve they role will be very hard in today’s low-trust reality, but that even more important.
We need a trusted, apolitical, insulated voice that can speak with authority to the American people, giving them an accurate assessment of risk and security, and armor them against perception hacks, whether foreign or domestic.
Read 7 tweets
22 Oct 20
1/ Today we published our first Inauthentic Behavior (IB) report. This report details how we tackle various forms of IB and offers some examples of recent enforcements to illustrate notable trends and tactics we’ve seen _about.fb.com/news/2020/10/i…
2/ For 3+ yrs we’ve publicly reported our removals of CIB networks. These are like the APTs of #IO. But deceptive tactics are not limited to CIB — spammers and scammers often rely on similar behaviors. We tackle both threats, but we tackle them differently.
3/ CIB actors tend to be unrepentant deceivers — if you’re running a network of fake accounts, you know you’re being misleading. IB violators want to push the boundaries, but may not intend to break the rules.
Read 7 tweets
8 Oct 20
1/ Today we announced 10 CIB takedowns, including 6 networks we removed during the month of September, and 4 that we removed as recently as this morning. We had already announced most of the Sept networks. about.fb.com/news/2020/10/r…
2/More than half of these 10 networks targeted domestic audiences in their countries and many of them were linked to groups and people linked to politically affiliated actors in each country — the US, Myanmar, Russia, Nigeria, The Philippines and Azerbaijan.
3/ Half of the takedowns in this report began based on our own internal investigations, and the other half are based on information published/shared by external groups, including the FBI and investigative reporters.
Read 21 tweets

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