One of my primary interests for a while has been online pro-Islamic State supporter networks. Why? Because I believe they're important and gives unique insight into what resonates among supporters. The Islamic State agrees. This week's editorial in al-Naba is about these networks
The editorial explains how the military battle against the Islamic State is accompanied by a digital battle to destroy its virtual component. No surpriser here, the Islamic State claims to have won this digital battle.
[My comment] This is partly true, partly wrong. Online supporter networks still exist and they perform an increasingly importante duty of the Islamic State's online battle. Yet, operationally the environment is much more restricted than just a few years back.
The editorial highlights intelligence efforts to dismantle these networks, captured their leading figures and stir internal suspicion. This too failed, it claims.
[My comment] the above is not quite so true. IS supporters have been feeling the pressure and networks (like muntasir) have closed down while leading figures have been arrested (e.g. ATP leader Carpenter)]
The editorial calls on supporters to continue their dedicated work that is like an arrow against the enemies and asks them to be cautious to avoid capture. They should close ranks, work together for their common goals.
[My comment] The above is happening as we speak as we see how official and unofficial media outlets are starting to work closer together. This is a highly interesting development that is taking place right now.
Finishing the piece, the al-Naba editorial lays out that this is not simply a voluntary action for the virtual fighters of the Islamic State but a duty that they must commit to.
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On Monday, 1 July 2019 Kenyan national Cholo Abdi Abdullah was in his room in the Rasaca Hotel in the city of Iba, northwest of Manila, when he was arrested. In his possession, police found a pistol, a homemade bomb and a hand grenade. Yet Abdullah's primary aim involved a plane
Reminiscent of 9/11, Abdullah's plan was to hijack an airplane and crash it into a skyscraper, prosecutors speculate. In preparation he had been training for years in the Philippines and already obtained his pilot license. The attack was to be carried out on behalf of.. Al-Shabab
Abdullah's trajectory to become a terrorist started already back in 2012 when he pledged allegiance to the Somali group al-Shabab. At the time, the group had just been accepted into the fold of al-Qaida.
After 5 years and 3 months of work I finally defended my PhD thesis earlier this week. It was an extremely emotional experience and I am overly happy and proud with the result.
The thesis tells the much neglected story of Jihadis' internal conflict and here's what it is about.
First about the defence. Defending in front of a committee comprised of all my academic idols Olivier Roy, Stéphane Lacroix, Thomas @Hegghammer and Virginie Collombier was in itself rather frightening but also the most incredible way to conclude the research. Thank you!
During these 5 years I have learned a lot and I got to know a great group of people and I am truly grateful for all the help I received along the way. Not least from all the Jihadis that were willing to speak to me and with some I established a relationship.
The idea that led to 9/11 as narrated by al-Qaida: The original idea came from an Egyptian pilot who migrated to Peshawar and stayed at one of the Jihadi guest houses. In an informal sitting, he would first air his idea to hijack airplanes to strike iconic building in the US
This idea was shared with AQ's military leader at the time Abu Ubaydah al-Banshiri (also Egyptian) and later recounted by senior AQ figures Abu Hafs al-Masri and Abu al-Khayr. When in Sudan, UBL arranged for two AQ members to attend flight training.
However, plans speeded up after Khalid Sheikh Muhammed approached AQ to air his own idea of hijacking airplanes. AQ was located in Sudan at the time and the country was not considered an appropriated launching pad for such a major attack.
On 21 Nov, @Europol strongly assisted by @telegram initiated a campaign to ban and delete Jihadis and their material on the platform in the hitherto most successful online counter-offensive. But, as described by several of my colleagues, it also kickstarted several new dynamics!
At first, the crackdown was mainly focused on Telegram and targeted both AQ and IS elements - official and supporter accounts.
This led Jihadis to experiment with and migrate to new platforms: @tamtamchat, Hoop, Rocket.chat etc..
None of these migrations were particularly successful, however, but for various reasons. @tamtamchat was extraordinarily effective beginning its own crackdown on IS accounts, while the other two platforms appear rather inappropriate for mass consumption.
Ét spørgsmål disse dage er, hvorvidt vestlige foreign fighters skal hjemtages til retsforfølgelse. Et andet spørgsmål er forholdene for terrordømte, som blomstrede op efter det seneste angreb i London. Denne tråd omhandler sidstnævnte.
Et andet perspektiv som kommer fra Simon Cottee, som plæderer for mindre overbærenhed over for terrordømte. Argumentet er, at terrorister er en form for unikke forbrydere, som skal opfattes anderledes.
Se her: foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/04/lon…
I'm tremendously thrilled to see the publication of my report "Polemical and Fratricidal Jihadists: A Historical Examination of Debates, Contestation and Infighting Within the Sunni Jihadi Movement" by the @ICSR_Centre icsr.info/wp-content/upl…
@ICSR_Centre Some of the findings/conclusions of the report are summarised in this infograph
In 2013-14, conflict erupted between al-Qaida and the Islamic State. Since then the two groups have been engaged in a military and discursive campaign to kill and delegitimise one another.
Internal conflict is no stranger to the Jihadi movement, however.