Thread: That the Fed is "fine" with the recent, tremendous ON-RRP uptake is interesting, considering what its own experts had to say about this possibility back when the facility was introduced in 2015.
What follows are some excerpts from that year's FRB working paper, "Overnight RRP Operations as a Monetary Policy Tool: SomeDesign Considerations": federalreserve.gov/econresdata/fe…
"A very large ON RRP facility" would mean "the expansion of the Federal Reserve’s intermediation in short-term funding markets, which—particularly if such a facility were permanently in place—could alter financial markets in unpredictable ways."
Furthermore, "a very rapid and unexpected expansion of ON RRP might exacerbate disruptive flight-to-quality flows during a period of financial stress and thus could undermine financial stability."
FOMC "participants expressed concerns that in times of financial stress, the facility’s counterparties could shift investments toward the facility and away from financial and nonfinancial corporations, possibly causing disruptions in funding that could magnify the stress”
"The extent of the potential secondary effects of an ON RRP facility likely would depend on both the size of the facility and its potential rate of expansion."
A permanent facility "could lead to atrophying of the private infrastructure that supports [short-term funding] markets. Partially in response to some of these concerns, the FOMC has made clear that an ON RRP facility is _not intended to be permanent_." (My emphasis.)
"The facility could affect the chance of a widespread run. ...once a run is underway, the availability of ON RRPs could allow greater flight-to-quality flows during a run and thus could exacerbate the run and its
effects."
"Without ON RRPs, opportunities to run may be constrained by a limited supply of risk-free assets, and greater demand for those assets is likely to push up their prices and make running more costly."
"By contrast, an ON RRP facility that elastically supplies a very safe asset and which has the potential to increase in size by very large amounts would provide no immediate mechanism to slow a run."
"Cash that, in the absence of ON RRPs, might have moved quickly to liquid deposits at banks could go instead into a risk-free ON RRP facility through, for example, government MMFs that invest in ON RRPs."
" The sources of flight-to-quality flows, such as prime MMFs, could experience larger outflows than in past episodes, and the availability of short-term funding for broker-dealer and nonfinancial firms through vehicles like repo and CP could decline more quickly."
"An increase in ON RRP, which absorbs cash from the private sector, has very different implications for the availability of liquidity and credit in the economy than the classic central-bank tools that augment liquidity in periods of stress."
"In contrast to classic central-bank liquidity provision, which creates reserves, increased ON RRP take-up diminishes reserves."
"For these and other reasons, it may be prudent to design an ON RRP facility with features that would mitigate the risk of sharp, potentially disruptive surges of ON RRP take-up, while preserving the facility’s usefulness in helping to control short-term interest rates."
The authors go on to consider steps that could limit the risks in question: making the ON RRP facility temporary, changes in the ON RRP rate, quantity controls, and combinations of rate changes and quantity controls. None of these safeguards is presently in place.
I suppose Fed officials must have good reasons for believing that major risks identified by Fed staff in 2015 no longer exist today. But I for one would sleep a lot better if they'd share them with us!
As a long-time proponent of free choice in currency, who also favors private-market alternatives to official currencies, I'm inclined to favor any legislation that serves to promote either.
Many of the provisions of the new law serve these laudable ends, by making it easier for Salvadorans to employ Bitcoin as a medium of exchange without incurring any penalties by doing so.
Thread: So, after much back-and-forth on this with my Bitcoin friends (and critics), Here are my further thoughts on El Salvador and all that.
I think that casting what Bukele intends to do there in terms of making Bitcoin "legal tender" has been a source of considerable confusion (and I mean mine not just others). Strictly, whether something is "legal tender" or not usually isn't of great importance.
Bukele has promised to give Bitcoin the same tax treatment as any foreign currency. This really is a tax matter, not a matter of "legal tender" status: this should be obvious enough from the fact that foreign currencies except the UDS are not legal tender in El Salvador!
"Bukele ... is working with CEO Jack Mallers to help the country legally adopt bitcoin." I'm still waiting for a coherent explanation of how making Bitcoin legal tender is supposed to "help" Salvadorans adopt Bitcoin. forbes.com/sites/carliepo… 1/
So far, the closest thing I've since is this @CaitlinLong_ thread:
But Caitlin's account is unsatisfactory in several respects. First, she say's it is "likely" to give BTC "status as 'money' so treated on par w/ foreign currency by banks." But legal tender designation is not only insufficient but unnecessary for that end. 3/
I just did a Twitter search for "master accounts" and "fintech" and it seems I'm almost alone in discussing the issue here! Yet the Fed is now seeking comments on how it should treated special-purpose bank (fintech) applications for such accounts.
Many of these fintechs wish to offer cryptocurrency exchange and custodial services, but without direct access to the Fed can only do so by partnering with ordinary banks, which is costly, especially since many banks are reluctant to deal with them.
The Fed will almost certainly get dozens of comment letters from banking-industry groups who want to deny fintechs that lack full-fledged bank charters, deposit insurance, and so on, direct access to the Fed's wholesale facilities.
The spectacle of Bitcoin fans celebrating the prospective granting of legal tender status to it by El Salvador's authoritarian President (he only just extended his executive authority over the country's central bank) must have F.A. Hayek rolling in his grave! 1/2
And despite what many may think, a currency's "legal tender status" has little bearing on its use in ordinary exchange. It is in fact neither necessary nor sufficient.* It mainly has to do with enforcement of debt contracts.
*For example, in Scotland there is no such thing as legal tender. Yet both Scottish banknotes and (less frequently) Bank of England notes are routinely accepted in payments there. On the other hand, although U.S. Notes ("greenbacks") were made legal tender during the Civil War,
I am _not_ saying that today's private digital currencies are just dandy. In fact, many have very serious serious shortcomings.
I'm saying that that isn't a lesson one can even begin to draw from US experience with private banknotes. That's so not only because of what I've said about that experience. Nor is it so just because conditions have dramatically changed.