1/4 The constraint depends on how an increase in debt causes businesses, consumers, producers, lenders and investors to respond. If an increase in debt undermines credibility by increasing uncertainty about how the real cost of the debt...
2/4 will be allocated – and so causes businesses to disinvest, creditors to raise the cost of funding, consumers to reduce spending, policymakers to shorten time horizons, workers to become more militant, farmers to hoard, etc. – more debt means a worsening economy.
3/4 Just because there is no legal constraint on the ability of a government to create money or debt in its own currency doesn't mean that there is also no economic constraint. If debt is used directly or indirectly to fund productive investment, there is no economic...
4/4 constraint (although there still may be balance sheet constraints). If it is used to fund non-productive activity, there is.
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1/8 John Cochrane asks about Japan during the past three decades: "If massive deficits, including lots of 'infrastructure' are going to boost the US economy, why did they not do so for Japan?"
2/8 He suggests that if it didn't work in one case it is unlikely to work in the other, but there are obvious differences between the two economies that make their responses incomparable. First, Japan entered this period massively overinvested in infrastructure, whereas most...
3/8 analysts agree that the US is underinvested.
This means that while infrastructure spending in the US is likely to be productive, and so will boost GDP (and, with it, the economy's real debt-servicing capacity) by at least as much as it boosts debt, in Japan much of it...
1/4 Unlike many analysts who thought the 17+1 grouping was a major geopolitical initiative, I've always wondered what its point was beyond political showboating. In today's world of excess savings and weak demand, finding capital to fund profitable...
2/4 investments wasn't likely to be a major problem, in which case the "investment" these countries wanted from China was likely to be non-economic and something China — or anyone else — would be reluctant to provide.
Policymakers act as if we were still in the 1950s, when...
3/4 a major impediment to development is scarce capital. But capital isn't scarce and hasn't been for decades, which is why so many of these bilateral (e.g. the UK) and multilateral deals that promise cross-border investment have been so disappointing (and unnecessary).
1/4 This strikes me mostly as an ideological string of empty cliches that doesn't really mean much one way or the other, although proposing that government spending must be bad because China does it is an argument even a high-school debater would probably avoid.
2/4 For one thing, we were doing it long before they were, and very successfully. He is also just flat out wrong in claiming that government support for scientific and technological research necessarily crowds out private-sector support.
3/4 This may have been true in some limited cases, but it has more often been the case that it has spurred rather than repressed a private-sector response, and some of the private sector's greatest successes in research and development — the internet, computers, airplanes, jet...
1/4 The RMB was up 4% against the CFETS index in the past year. Regulators are considering allowing the RMB to strengthen further in order to reduce the inflationary pressure of imported commodities, but if they do, as some have already...
2/4 warned, we’re likely to see further financial inflows, which will in turn worsen domestic asset bubbles and increase the potential for financial instability. What’s more, a higher RMB could weaken exports, and while this might be partially balanced by stronger...
3/4 consumption, the net impact must be either slower GDP growth or more property/infrastructure investment, and hence a worsening debt burden.
My best guess is that we’ll see a stronger RMB and more debt. Earlier this year I argued that China could manage 6-7% GDP growth...
1/4 "While the state-owned financial firm’s longer-term bonds are sinking toward record lows amid expectations investors will be forced to take on losses as part of an overhaul, notes maturing over the next few months trade at much higher levels.
2/4 That suggests bondholders remain confident the company will continue to repay its debts on time and any restructuring is a way off."
That's an interesting development, but except for the perpetuals, which are seen as a kind of equity, I wouldn't expect the regulators to...
3/4 decide to pay off short-term bonds at the expense of longer-term bonds. If they have decided that Huarong must restructure, it wouldn't seem to make much sense for to allow it to use its limited resources in that way. That just means rewarding one group of bondholders for...
1/7 Chinese regulators are putting ever more pressure on property developers to constrain the debt needed to fund their activity. Why? it must be because they don't think this activity contributes to real growth in the...
2/7 economy, even though it is a major contributor to reported GDP. As the article points out, "real estate contributes to about 29% of China’s economic output if its wider influences are factored in, according to a joint research by Harvard University and Tsinghua University".
3/7 This is the part that I think most analysts still fail to grasp. After all these years they treat this activity as if it continued to be as economically valuable in China as it had been two decades ago, and as it would be in other countries, and yet Beijing clearly isn't...