Glad to see people recognizing that when strong labor markets boost wages, this does not have to mean higher prices. Higher wages can equally well be passed on to faster productivity growth. wsj.com/articles/techn…
What's strange, tho, is how people insist on seeing faster wage growth --> faster productivity growth as a *problem*.
As a matter of logic, if you are concerned either that rising wages will lead to inflation, or that lack of labor is holding back growth, evidence that employers respond to rising wages by taking steps to raise productivity should make you less worried.
If you are worried about low productivity growth - and isn't that something we are often told to worry about? - then stories about employers substituting away from scarce labor should make you see labor supply constraints as a positive good. But somehow nobody does.
Think about the argument here. On the one hand, it's "supply, not demand" that is holding back growth. but on the other hand, faster productivity growth is also supposed to be holding back job growth. It's impossible for both of those things to be true.
If employers are hiring all the labor they can get, learning to make more stuff with that labor won't reduce hiring. If they are hiring only the workers they need to meet demand, then yes productivity growth can reduce jobs - but in that case it's not supply holding back growth.
People (and I don't think it's @greg_ip who's the problem here so much as the people he's asking to) tie themselves in knots because they want cuts to UI and "labor supply" generally to be the answer, even when the facts are 180 degrees from the ones used to support that before.
To put it another way, our big macroeconomic problem cannot simultaneously be too many jobs for the available workers, and too many workers for the available jobs.
If you are worried about jobs recovery being too slow, the answer is more demand, same as it ever was. Cutting unemployment benefits is only going to make it worse. If, on the other hand, you are worried about overheating, slower job growth is just what you should be hoping for.
What this article seems to be trying to do is somehow make the fact that this is a very good jobs market for "unskilled" workers, into an argument that those workers should accept wage cuts for their own good. But you can't square that circle.
(Scare quotes for a reason.)
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Interesting: Because data on consumption basket can't be updated as quickly as prices, changes in consumption patterns distort inflation data. This probably led to exaggerated picture of price falls last year, and exaggerated picture of price rises now. ft.com/content/abad2b…
For example, the big rise in used vehicle prices is incorporated into CPI with a weight based on share of household spending on vehicles pre-pandemic. But less household spending goes to vehicle purchases now, so contribution to overall inflation numbers should have been smaller.
(I have to mention in passing a pet peeve of mine in discussions of price indexes: The constant assumption that the only thing that causes important changes in consumption patterns is relative prices. To be clear, this article doesn't do that.)
This one is more sensible. Does anyone want to make the case that "559,000 more Americans chose to work in May" would be equally reasonable? If not, can we dispense with the idea that labor market outcomes are determined symmetrically by labor supply and demand?
The point that **employment levels are chosen by employers** is so banal and obvious there would be no reason to even mention it, if we weren't hearing so much nonsense about employment being held back by "labor supply constraints".
There are three big things to keep in mind about tomorrow's jobs numbers. First, this stuff is noisy. Wherever the numbers come in, you should not draw strong conclusions from them; whatever the picture is now, it may look very different when the revised numbers come in.
While the revisions this spring weren't that big, they changed the picture in an important way: the initial numbers suggested accelerating growth over December-March, while the revised ones are closer to linear. This is important for interpreting the relatively low April number.
Interesting figure from @dhneilson showing inventory changes over the past year. Makes clear that the initial economic impact of the pandemic was a fall in demand, no supply -- something that for some reason was controversial at the time. neilson.substack.com/p/two-price
Back in spring 2020, I insisted that the economic crisis was a fall in spending, not in potential output. In retrospect, I was right on that, tho - thanks to the extraordinary stimulus - I was wrong that the pandemic would lead to a conventional downturn. rooseveltinstitute.org/2020/03/19/how…
When the president says the goal is labor markets so tight that employers are competing for workers, and wages rise at the expense of profits - if you've followed macroeconomic debates over the past however many years, that's a big deal. whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/…
It's also important that he presents labor market tightness as important for power in the workplace. And employment and wage gaps between white and non-white workers as symptoms of less than full employment.
Minsky's big argument (which unfortunately gets overshadowed by the less interesting financial instability hypothesis) is that prices of long lived capital goods are fundamentally determined by financial/liquidity conditions in a way that prices of current output aren't.
This is one reason why money is never neutral, not even in the long run - more abundant money/credit doesn't just lead to higher spending, but spending on different things - specifically, more long-lived and illiquid ones.