Many security experts are familiar with compromised accounts - when someone unauthorized obtains account access.
A major issue at FB/IG was self-compromised accounts: People willingly hand over account access to others, as I write in @restofworld (1/7)
restofworld.org/2021/sophie-zh…
A major issue at FB/IG was self-compromised accounts: People willingly hand over account access to others, as I write in @restofworld (1/7)
restofworld.org/2021/sophie-zh…
Why would someone choose to give a nefarious third party access to their account?
Services known as "autolikers" are popular in much of the world. They offer the user free automatic likes. All you have to do is hand over your access token - letting them login as yourself (2/7)
Services known as "autolikers" are popular in much of the world. They offer the user free automatic likes. All you have to do is hand over your access token - letting them login as yourself (2/7)
This behavior is perhaps the main driver behind commercial fake engagement online. It's the activity @sebastian_bay at @STRATCOMCOE investigated in 2019. But it shouldn't be confused with what Facebook calls CIB - governmental style troll farms. (3/7)
nytimes.com/2019/12/06/tec…
nytimes.com/2019/12/06/tec…
Self-compromised accounts of this sort are cheaply available. But they're usually run using crude ineffective computer scripts. In analogy, newspapers using scripts can easily create a vast profusion of articles - with almost no readers or impact (pic: The Ann Arbor Times) (4/7)
Moreover, as the accounts involved are from the Global South, they're extraordinarily obvious when used in Western politics.
In this 2018 example, @ThePostRegister called out 1.3k such accounts for liking their editorial (I removed the likes prior to the 2018 election.) (5/7)
In this 2018 example, @ThePostRegister called out 1.3k such accounts for liking their editorial (I removed the likes prior to the 2018 election.) (5/7)
Despite the commonality of this activity in the Global South, self-compromise isn't understood by the public. It's often mistakenly confused for InfoOps/CIB/disinfo.
In fact, fake fans are useless for real activity, as the People's Daily Online Australia demonstrates here (6/7)
In fact, fake fans are useless for real activity, as the People's Daily Online Australia demonstrates here (6/7)
But nations like Brazil or India faced the danger of politicians with easy access to a supply of fake likes/comments/etc. provided by their own real citizens.
Those using autolikers should realize they're slowly eroding the democratic health of their own country. (7/7)
Those using autolikers should realize they're slowly eroding the democratic health of their own country. (7/7)
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