1/7
This very interesting article by @greg_ip argues that “Latin America, which led developing nations in adopting a market-friendly model of economic development, may now be leading them away from it.”

wsj.com/articles/latin… via @WSJ
2/7
This certainly seems to be happening, but I’d add that it was probably quite predictable. In 1996 I published an article that tracked nearly 2 centuries during which Latin American countries had embraced classic capitalist reforms far more strongly...
foreignaffairs.com/articles/south…
3/7
than other countries – including the US – ever had, only to reject them a few decades later in favor of a much more interventionist model. This has happened several times in the 19th and 20th centuries and there is no reason to assume that it won’t happen in the 21st.
4/7
So which set of policies has been more successful, free markets or heavy intervention? Neither, it seems. During periods of great global liquidity, when money is pouring into risky developing countries, whichever set of policies Latin America countries are following seems...
5/7
to be the right set (for example, both the Washington Consensus years in the 1990s as well as the ISI years in the 1960s and early 1970s). During periods of major capital outflows, however, growth collapses, and the previous set of policies quickly loses its prestige.
6/7
I assume we are going through another such round. What this suggests to me that the main problem afflicting the region has perhaps less to do with which economic ideology dominates and more to do with its low savings rate – or the ease with which domestic savings...
7/7
can flee the country. Successful East Asian countries were much better at forcing up domestic savings rates and deploying these savings into domestic investment.

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More from @michaelxpettis

14 Jun
1/8
According to this article: "The US buys a lot more stuff from the rest of the world than the world buys from the US. That difference has to be financed; as a matter of mathematical identity, there has to be an inflow to match that outflow."

ft.com/content/dbb77b…
2/8
This actually gets it wrong. The implicit assumption is that accounting identities imply a direction of causality, in this case from trade to finance: because the US runs a trade deficit, in other words, it must also run the corresponding capital account surplus to finance...
3/8
the trade deficit.

But this implicitly assumes that the US capital inflows consist primarily of trade finance, which is clearly false. Too many analysts assume as axiomatic that the B-o-P accounting identity tells us that the capital account adjusts to balance the trade...
Read 8 tweets
12 Jun
1/8
I think too few of the senior finance officials in Beijing fully understand the relationship between domestic financial stability and closed financial markets with significant government intervention and moral hazard.

scmp.com/economy/china-… via @scmpnews
2/8
Chairman Hu Xiaolian of China Exim Bank, for example, is proposing that “By the middle of this century, China might have the world’s biggest, and most open financial market to function with the world’s most inclusive rules and norms promoting international cooperation.”
3/8
But this is unlikely, especially because he also says later that “Instead of being driven by financial speculation in the offshore market, China places an emphasis on a stable exchange rate combined with stable macroeconomic and monetary policies, and this will boost...
Read 10 tweets
11 Jun
1/6
TSF rose by 0.6%, or RMB 1.92 trillion, in May, below market expectations. In April it also grew by 0.6%. Most analysts report this as an 11% increase over May 2020, but given last year’s disruptions this is a pretty useless way of measuring it.

scmp.com/economy/china-…
2/6
The headline here says that credit is growing more slowly than expected, and this seems to be the consensus, but I disagree. Why? Consider that TSF year to date is up by just over 12% on an annualized basis. If it continues to grow at roughly 0.6% a month on average...
3/6
for the rest of this year, TSF will grow 9.3% in 2021. This is roughly equal to consensus nominal GDP growth expectations, in which case we will have seen a stabilization of China’s debt-to-GDP ratio – something Beijing has promised will happen this year.
Read 6 tweets
10 Jun
1/8
John Cochrane asks about Japan during the past three decades: "If massive deficits, including lots of 'infrastructure' are going to boost the US economy, why did they not do so for Japan?"

johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2021/06/what-a…
2/8
He suggests that if it didn't work in one case it is unlikely to work in the other, but there are obvious differences between the two economies that make their responses incomparable. First, Japan entered this period massively overinvested in infrastructure, whereas most...
3/8
analysts agree that the US is underinvested.

This means that while infrastructure spending in the US is likely to be productive, and so will boost GDP (and, with it, the economy's real debt-servicing capacity) by at least as much as it boosts debt, in Japan much of it...
Read 9 tweets
9 Jun
1/4
The constraint depends on how an increase in debt causes businesses, consumers, producers, lenders and investors to respond. If an increase in debt undermines credibility by increasing uncertainty about how the real cost of the debt...
2/4
will be allocated – and so causes businesses to disinvest, creditors to raise the cost of funding, consumers to reduce spending, policymakers to shorten time horizons, workers to become more militant, farmers to hoard, etc. – more debt means a worsening economy.
3/4
Just because there is no legal constraint on the ability of a government to create money or debt in its own currency doesn't mean that there is also no economic constraint. If debt is used directly or indirectly to fund productive investment, there is no economic...
Read 4 tweets
8 Jun
1/4
Unlike many analysts who thought the 17+1 grouping was a major geopolitical initiative, I've always wondered what its point was beyond political showboating. In today's world of excess savings and weak demand, finding capital to fund profitable...

scmp.com/news/china/dip…
2/4
investments wasn't likely to be a major problem, in which case the "investment" these countries wanted from China was likely to be non-economic and something China — or anyone else — would be reluctant to provide.

Policymakers act as if we were still in the 1950s, when...
3/4
a major impediment to development is scarce capital. But capital isn't scarce and hasn't been for decades, which is why so many of these bilateral (e.g. the UK) and multilateral deals that promise cross-border investment have been so disappointing (and unnecessary).
Read 4 tweets

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