1/6 This is a very good discussion by @RebeccaStropoli of the Mian, Straubb, Sufi paper on why income inequality in the US can cause household debt to rise. Rising income inequality reduces underlying demand (because the rich consume very little...
2/6 of their income), and so also reduces desired investment, which means, paradoxically, that rising income inequality increases desired savings while reducing desired investment.
But because total US savings must equal, by definition, total...
3/6 US investment minus the trade imbalance, if the savings of the rich exceed US investment, either the US must run a trade surplus (in fact it runs a large deficit), or some adjustment must occur that drives down overall savings for the whole economy.
4/6 There are many possible adjustments – higher unemployment, asset-bubble driven wealth effects, fiscal deficits, etc. – but probably for political reasons the typical adjustment comes in the form of looser consumer lending standards, the automatic consequence of which is...
5/6 a rise in household debt, typically among households at the lower end of the income distribution.
This may at first seem counter-intuitive, but it is perfectly logical. If desired savings rise faster than desired investment, something else MUST happen to bring...
6/6 the two back into balance. If it isn't a trade surplus (let alone if there is a trade deficit), that "something else" must be a reduction in savings elsewhere in the economy.
1/12
I thought in this thread I'd explain why "rebalancing" is so important for China. For 10-15 years China has been locked into a growth model in which debt must inexorably rise faster than GDP, which itself is rising faster than any meaningful measure...
2/12
of real debt-servicing capacity. At this rate if Beijing tries to keep the average GDP growth rate above 4-5%, within a decade debt will rise from 280% of GDP (the official level at the end of 2020) to anywhere from 370-410% of GDP.
3/12
Even if the real debt level wasn't higher than the official data claim, and even if GDP didn't overstate real growth in the underlying economy, this would still be an unprecedented level of debt.
2/4 One lesson from financial history (e.g. German and Austrian banks in the 1930s, US S&Ls in the 1980s, Japanese banks in the 1990s, etc.) is that as a banking sector becomes insolvent for whatever economic and credit reasons, we usually see two other things happening.
3/4 First the amount of excessive (and often hidden) risk-taking surges as managers at first think they can gamble their ways out of insolvency. Second, perhaps because of a collapse in career prospects, fraud and conflicts of interest explode.
1/4 A new financial-sector "reform" will allow Chinese banks to lower deposit rates so as to reduce their funding costs, which in turn will allow them to "lower businesses’ borrowing costs, benefiting the real economy."
2/4 But this doesn't benefit the real economy: it benefits some sectors (e.g. manufacturing and investment) at the expense of others (e.g. services). With the deposit rate already well below CPI inflation, an even lower deposit rate simply increases the...
3/4 implicit financial-repression transfer from household savers to insolvent banks and borrowing businesses (and will further encourage households to speculate in property).
Although Beijing insists that it must rebalance demand, in other words, this is yet another...
1/4 A long-term appreciation in the RMB would effectively reduce the implicit subsidy Chinese household consumers must give to Chinese manufacturers, but even though it is widely acknowledged in China that consumption needs to be supported relative to...
2/4 production, the idea of actually doing so still frightens many officials. They worry that a stronger RMB will undermine the Chinese economy by hurting exporters and causing them to fire workers, and “If there are no jobs, people will not have an income...
3/4 and there is no way to expand domestic demand.” Of course the irony is that a stronger RMB will boost manufacturing productivity and will also boost demand for domestic services, which are likely to be far more labor intensive than manufacturing.
1/6 Martin Wolf is right to note that total trade is a much lower share of the US economy than it is for many other economies (as a matter of arithmetic trade should generally be more important for smaller economies than for bigger), but while...
2/6 I usually agree with what he says (indeed I have stolen liberally from his ideas over the years), I don't think it follows that this makes trade concerns less important for the US.
As I explain in “The Great Rebalancing”, and Matthew Klein and I...
3/6 explain in “Trade Wars are Class Wars”, in a world of high ex-ante savings and weak demand, what matters to the US is not total trade but rather the size of the trade deficit. And relative to US GDP the trade deficit has been very high.
1/4 Beijing's regulators continue to worry about the problems associated with booming net foreign inflows, including domestic money expansion, rising debt, a stronger currency, and asset bubbles.
2/4 As they have been doing since last October, the regulators are trying to manage these net inflows by encouraging financial outflows.
But while this helps to reduce net inflows, it does so by burying the problem in an increasingly mismatched...
3/4 external balance sheet, and the relationship between gross outflows (assets) and gross inflows (liabilities) is likely to be increasingly inverted. As Hyman Minsky argued, when you try to suppress risk, you just switch it from one form into another.