Those things are 16 infrastructure sectors, ranging from concert venues to federal buildings to wastewater plants & pipelines (& thousands of other things in between). Fundamentally, I think what we want is for state-sponsored cyber attacks against civilians to be off limits.
https://twitter.com/JenniferJJacobs/status/1405215438917750786
But it becomes more complicated when these "civilian" infrastructures are entangled w/military or regime--shared power grids, commercial data services, transportation, finance. This makes norms about state sponsored cyber attacks against civilian tgts difficult to implement.
As it stands, we are both asking too much (restraint against 16 critical infrastructures) and not expecting enough (seriously, do we think its ever ok for a state to launch campaigns targeting civilians for foreign policy objectives?).
The devil is in the details--we need to speak more concretely about what state sponsorship is in cyber, broader categories of targets and effects, and how we entangle our own civilian and military resources that incentivize cyber attacks against civilian infrastructure in crises.
And, finally, this is where the US can make strides by declaring what it will restrain ITSELF from attacking in cyberspace. This is bigger than the relationship w/Russia because it can help the international community hold Russia responsible. tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…
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