Thread by @AndrewPRLevi

Russia’s in the news again. As is the re-emergence of a fantasy, from Germany & France, of a western “reset” with President Putin. The UK has been guilty of the same. So has the US. President Biden looks to be clearer sighted. No more wishful thinking, please. A (long)🧵 /1.

That requires a realistic assessment of Russia as it is, not as some members of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance might hope it to be. And clarity about what needs to be done, & how, to protect & promote Alliance interests. /2.

Understand what you’re dealing with. Russia is run by the people who own it. Principally an elite of a few dozen people, largely dominated by ex-KGB officials with a world view formed during Soviet days. Vladimir Putin is at the apex & calls the shots. /3.

Putin’s elite is driven by personal vested interests in money, survival & security-dominated notions of Russian greatness. They stand in opposition to the values & interests of the EU & NATO. There is only a long-term prospect of a Russian leadership aligned with the west. /4.

President Putin’s circle holds the US & the Euro-Atlantic Alliance more widely in a potentially highly volatile, visceral mixture of contempt & terror. The (comprehensively corrupt) system they run is inherently unstable & vulnerable to external shocks. They are paranoid. /5.

Far from minimising concern about Russia, that some Alliance countries are now led by groupings seeking dismantlement of our founding values, & dangerously undermining the security, prosperity & well-being of all in the Euro-Atlantic area, should be sounding loud alarm bells. /6.

The invasion of Georgia in 2008 highlighted both continuity: Russian determination to control its ‘near abroad’, & change: Russia’s use for the first time since the fall of the USSR of direct military force to impose its will on a neighbour. /7.

Since then, the Russian leadership has been increasingly assertive. The charge sheet is extraordinary. Invasion, occupation & annexation of a large part of Ukraine. Shooting down a civilian airliner over Europe. WMD attack in the UK. That’s just the (very) short list. /8.

In addition to the use of lethal force, there is widespread evidence of Russian efforts across Europe, the USA & elsewhere, to attack vital digital infrastructure & subvert the social cohesion & constitutions of Alliance members. /9.

Russia seeks to use energy dependency to exert influence over European foreign policy & to undermine countries, such as Ukraine, which it aspires to dominate. Nordstream 2 (along with its predecessor) is only the most blatant example. /10.

The hope of a strategic or broad-based partnership with Russia receded in 2008, at the latest, into the distant future. And has stayed there. The Alliance policy must act accordingly. Or fail. Potentially disastrously, for most of the European continent. /11.

The most likely scenario for the medium term (a decade or more) remains a Russian leadership similar, or even harsher, in foreign policy outlook & behaviour to the current one. Not hoped-for, more benign scenarios. /12.

The Euro-Atlantic Alliance, pursuing clear, forcefully articulated common interests, needs a concerted, multi-layered approach to Russia. That’s been true for the better part of 20 years. /13.

It remains true. Fortunately, the Biden administration broadly sees it that way. Less fortunately, some Alliance members don’t. The coordination challenge is significant. As is the tendency to submit to magical thinking & often narrow economic interests. /14.

First, protection. Build resilience to contain threats & challenges. /15.

Second, radically limit Russia’s room for manoeuvre. Shape their options, exerting both soft & hard influence. /16.

Third, co-operate, if essential & possible. Work with Russia in areas where interests overlap & co-operation will promote, not undermine, Alliance interests. /17.

The US & Alliance members must put much increased, sustained effort into promoting & shaping multilateral unity on key issues. /18.

Once, the UK could have been central to that. But it’s been busy writing itself out of the script by its tactically & strategically dreadful mishandling of European relationships & its miscalculation aligning with the losing side in a highly consequential US election. /19.

The key informal grouping will be the Transatlantic 3: USA, Germany, France + EU Council & Commission. For old times sake & if of particular utility – eg some intelligence sharing, military planning & sanctions coordination – the Quad (T3+UK) or E3 (E2+UK) will also be used. /20.

Informal coordination, done with appropriate care & sensitivity to others, will help drive coherent, effective decision making in the larger, multilateral groupings of which some or all of the T3 are members. /21.

This in turn will require a significant increase in & development of political & senior official level attention given to key Russia-related issues, & effective delivery mechanisms & structures for T3 & Alliance policy. /22.

The most important issues are: territorial integrity & the future stability of Europe, in the face of illegal Russian violence & invasion; Russian espionage, subversion & assassination activities; nuclear arms control; the climate emergency & energy security; human rights. /23.

US nuclear deterrence is once again necessary, if by no means sufficient, to assure European security. Given Putin’s revanchist actions, no one’s territorial integrity can be assumed without it. Absent that, nothing else is possible. Absent human rights, little is worthwhile./24.

Nuclear arms control & renewal must proceed in parallel. Along with major, rapid Alliance investment in non-nuclear (including cyber) capability. And coordinated legislative (eg Magnitsky acts), policy (eg sanctions, energy) & operational (eg counter-subversion) measures. /25.

China as a Russian alternative to Europe is a mirage. Russia needs help to counter China in central & north east Asia, & globally. Alliance narrowing of Russia’s options won’t be prevented by a Putin-Xi axis, much as both might find it convenient to pretend otherwise. /26.

Nordstream 2, unless strong compensating measures are put in place by the EU & US, will destabilise eastern Europe. For environmental & geopolitical reasons, a radical EU shift away from fossil fuels needs to accelerate. /27.

The Alliance may need to accept Russia’s a lost cause on climate for the foreseeable future. The same isn’t true of the territorial, international legal & human rights order. It’s essential to its own future that the Alliance both cleans house & rolls back Russian violations./28.

Internally, that requires significant interventions regarding (or containment of) Hungary, UK &, possibly, Poland. Externally, painfully increasing the personal, tactical & strategic prices for continuing Russian violations. Setting a signal for potential future violations. /29.

It also requires unprecedented internal counter-subversion & enforcement action against threats to the constitutional order in several Alliance countries, not least the US itself. The justice & internal security systems have a huge job. /30.

That will only sustainably succeed if accompanied by a broad-based political renewal which ejects, marginalises & punishes the proto-dictatorial groupings which have, in many cases, captured core state institutions. /31.

This to do list will necessarily involve a very difficult relationship with Russia’s leadership. The T3’s ability to influence Russia in line with Alliance interests will require Mr Putin & his associates to understand they’ve been left no choice but to deal on T3 terms. /32.

That in turn will depend on a reality, which must now become an unshakeable priority of the heads of state & government: that the T3 are, & will remain in, lockstep. And that they are consistently leading & shaping a unified approach in the Alliance &, where possible, beyond./33.

Given the background, direct T3 contacts with Russia will frequently & unavoidably be unpleasant & difficult. But every US, German & French representative from President & Chancellor down, must recognise a fundamental truth, which also applies to other, similar regimes. /34.

The Russian leadership will deal with us & listen to us if they know they have to. Not because we are pleasant or because we would like them to. /35. End

Correction: in tweet 11 the sentence should read, ‘The Alliance must act accordingly’.

Ernst-Jörg von Studnitz’s article from earlier this year may also be of interest 👇

https://twitter.com/andrewprlevi/status/1388094476619554818