Thread by @ThreshedThought

A lot has been happening in Afghanistan recently. Time, I think, for another thread, this time focussing on the Taliban(s).

I will also put some questions to Zabihullah Mujahid (@Zabehulah_M33) who is the Official Spokesman of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan AKA the Taliban

So, regular followers will know that I'm pretty sceptical of the Taliban being this organised Maoist-type insurgency that is coordinated and organised, and has this grand plan of taking over Afghanistan and organising a government.

For sure, there are some Taliban leaders (mostly from the 1996-2001 TB government, or related to them) who entertain fantasies of going back to that time.

Kind of a restoring order under Sharia and kicking out foreigners sort of thing (except would the UN mind, pretty please, delivering a whole chunk of our government services; we'll just handle crime, punishment, security and some religious education).

So this thread seeks to answer whether this is realistic, and it will also pose some questions on what the Taliban Leadership's plans are for a few aspects of government policy.

I know - policy right? - how boring. Useful if you wanna be a government though.

Before I begin - I'd like to put aside my usual argument that the Taliban leadership (e.g. in Doha) doesn't really control the fighters on the ground because most of them are fighting for hyper-local reasons like land or water or feuds.

This argument: unherd.com/2021/03/we-wil…

I still think that's true, and I think that a lot of what we see in the news about districts falling to the 'Taliban' is in fact local actors taking back control, or changing sides, or cutting deals - in short, surviving.

Afghanistan is fragmenting.

But I digress. Let's just for this thread, assume that the Taliban is advancing on Kabul district by district and that, say, by 11 Sept 2021, they will control the country. Let's also assume that the hyper-local factionalisation doesn't exist.

ok, @Zabehulah_M33, you represent the Taliban. You are claiming that large swathes of the country are coming under your control. May I please ask you some questions about how your plans for when you are in government?

Firstly, let's focus on revenue. Traditionally the major sources of Afg gov finance have been customs, and support from other countries (these days called 'aid').

Dealing with customs - this has often been a major headache for the government - because the customs are collected at the borders (by strongmen) and needed in Kabul (by the government).

So what's your policy on splitting this revenue? Will there be a percentage split between the centre and the periphery? What if the strongmen at the border reject Kabul's percentage split?

Are you going to apply this percentage split equally across all border posts? Will, for example, the fuel trade in Nimruz be treated equally to the fuel trade in Torkham?

That might piss some of your southern strongmen off - they certainly hold the tribal balance in the TBL

How about the transit trade? (This is where goods are brought into Afg without Pakistani tax, and then smuggled back into Pakistan).

This is technically illegal. Is the Taliban going to enforce the law against smuggling?

But what will the Haqqani Network, a faction within the Taliban, think about that eh? @Zabehulah_M33 maybe you'd like to discuss with @MansourHaqqani?

(Spoiler: the Haqqanis make a shit tonne from the Transit Trade)

The obvious general question that arises out of this @Zabehulah_M33 is how you plan to get all the various major factions that make up the 'Taliban' (like the Ishaqzai Mansours in the south) to give up all of the revenue that they make ...

... estimated in the US$m by the great @mansfieldintinc here:

https://twitter.com/mansfieldintinc/status/1405233545702936579?s=20

and here:

https://twitter.com/mansfieldintinc/status/1395132205261803523?s=20

(and other papers too - I strongly recommend following @mansfieldintinc for actual INFORMATION about Afghanistan rather than tittle tattle).

... and centralise that revenue in the new shiny Kabul-based Taliban government?

I could go on here .... there are literally hundreds of policy questions. I finish with one major one, and it is the assumption I mentioned at the top of the thread.

That the Taliban leadership aren't really fussed about government because they think the UN will deliver a bunch of 'government' services for them. Health, whatever.

I think the world has changed though.

The recent Turkey conference didn't agree on much, but it did agree on the fact that an Islamic Emirate was not an acceptable form of governance to Russia, China and the US.

I hardly need to point out how little those countries agree on anything.

And obviously, they are permanent members of the security council, and so if they want the UN to stop work in Afg, then the UN will stop work in Afg.

Arguably this is already happening - reports from friends state that several @UNDP offices are folding in the districts and their local staff are turning up in Kabul.

Most importantly, the US and the UN have had no strategic dialogue about what the UN presence looks like post-US withdrawal, and the UN seems to have its head in the sand about what it will be possible to do.

Could be that this is deliberate on the US's part. Who knows?

They seem to have not yet realised that the enabler of their activities over the last 20 years has been the US/NATO mission.

So as an aside, I think we may see a hasty UN withdrawal in Afg, pretty soon. And this seems to be a flaw in the TB plan. Once the UN have left, getting them back in numbers

There is of course Counternarcotics Certification as well. This is where the US President has to certify to Congress which countries around the world are pursuing CN policy with sufficient vigour.

Not doing enough? Then US development assistance can be withheld.

See here for details:

everycrsreport.com/reports/R46695…

Which brings me to another question for @Zabehulah_M33 ... what is the policy going to be on opium (cultivation, trade, etc.) and methamphetamine (possibly now bigger than opium in $ terms)?

Not only is this critical for questions of legitimacy and recognition by foreign countries, but not banning it might cut off your aid supply, which you plan to use to fund half the government.

The other side of this rock-and-hard-place question is how you plan to ban it when all the people with guns in Afghanistan make money out of it?

Not just, say, Sher Mohammad Akhundzada in Helmand (what's your plan for him by the way?) or the Noorzai smuggling networks in Farah, but your 'own' people like the Haqqanis and the Mansours?

Anyway, as I have said before, there are hundreds of policy questions for any incoming Taliban Administration. I've just touched here on some BLINDLY OBVIOUS ONES that no-one seems to be talking about.

I don't actually think it will come to all this, because I think Afghanistan is going to fragment, rather than be taken over by the Taliban.

Maybe that's why there is no communicated TBL policy on these things - maybe they realise deep down that this time it's going to be different too.

Would be fascinated to have an official response though from @Zabehulah_M33.

Oh, and, ahem, please buy my book if you find this stuff interesting.

amazon.co.uk/Intimate-War-H…

Or if you have read it, please review or rate it on Amazon.

Thanks!!!

(Next thread I think will focus on counternarcotics)