The PJM Board of Managers announced yesterday that it has directed PJM staff to file a proposal to roll back the expanded Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR) that was put in place in response to a December 2019 FERC directive. 1/ pjm.com/-/media/about-…
The PJM proposal that will be filed with FERC removes both the pre-existing MOPR that applied to gas units and the expanded MOPR that applied to resources receiving a state subsidy, and replaces them with a much narrower MOPR. A summary is linked here: 2/ pjm.com/-/media/commit…
Basically, the PJM proposal applies MOPR to either actual exercises of buyer-side market power (determined after fact-specific investigation) or to state laws that condition the receipt of a subsidy on clearing in the capacity market. 3/
With respect to application of the MOPR to resources supported by state law, while PJM will conduct an initial screening and attestation process, *only FERC* will decide whether a state law provides subsidy support conditioned on clearing in the capacity market. 4/
If PJM, w/ advice and input from the IMM, determines a state law provides conditioned subsidy support, it will make an FPA section 205 filing at FERC declaring its intent to apply MOPR to resources supported by that state law. Or, parties can file a FPA section 206 complaint. 5/
The standard PJM will apply, and invite FERC to apply, might look familiar - it is essentially a "targeting" and "tethering" test derived from Hughes v. Talen and other recent Supreme Court precedent on preemption. 6/
In all, my personal view is that this is a reasonable outcome that gets us beyond endless MOPR wars. I also think leaving the call to FERC is the right move. Forcing PJM to arbitrate the validity of state policies was unworkable, to say the least. 7/
FERC filing is coming later this month. Also, NEPOOL (the stakeholder body in ISO-NE) just yesterday started the process of replacing its existing MOPR policies. So it looks like expanded MOPRs applied to state policies are quickly headed to the dustbin of history. 8/8
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The six independent members of the ERCOT Board of Directors have announced that they will resign after tomorrow's emergency Board meeting.
I admire their willingness to accept responsibility - the mark of true leaders. But scapegoating ERCOT's Board here is absurd. 1/
ERCOT's leaders have spent many years implementing a unified vision in Texas for electricity competition. In my experience, that unified vision among politicians, regulators, grid operators, etc., is incredible rare. No other RTO (even the other single state RTOs) has that. 2/
I'm not in Texas so maybe this is easy for me to say, but to make ERCOT's leaders targets now (including one who is unquestionably brilliant and has barely been on the Board a month) infuriates me. 3/
This Q led me to revisit Tres Amigas's 2010 request for a declaratory order from FERC that it's project (which would have connected ERCOT to the Eastern and Western Interconnections) would not threaten ERCOT's jurisdictional status. The order is here: 1/ elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/filed…
The order does a nice job explaining why ERCOT is not jurisdictional today. Energy transmitted on the ERCOT grid is not considered to be "commingled" on the interstate grid and is generally not transmitted or consumed outside Texas. 2/
The order also explains why the DC ties ERCOT has to outside regions today (why I used the "generally" caveat in the prior tweet) don't result in FERC jurisdiction applying. 3/
There have been a number of questions about whether there are any kind of standards or requirements for generator winterization at either the state or federal level. From what I can tell, the answer is a firm "not really". Again, FERC/NERC's 2011 report is instructive. 1/
I don't have the bandwidth/resources to run this all the way to ground, but I did dig up this letter that FERC sent to NERC in June 2012. It explains that the 2011 report found a gap in federal, state, and regional standards w/ respect to winterization. 2/ nerc.com/FilingsOrders/…
In that letter, FERC asks NERC for an update on "the initiative to modify the Reliability Standards to address winterization and related issues. NERC's response (linked here) explains it had opened a "Standards Authorization Request (SAR)." 3/ nerc.com/FilingsOrders/…
[Take two!] Four events this week may send us once more into the fray of FERC, state policies, and RTO/ISO wholesale markets. A thread on them, starting with a significant announcement from 5 of the New England Governors . . . 1/
1. Today, @NESCOEStates released the "Governors Statement on Electricity Reform 2020", calling for the regional ISO to become "a committed partner in [their] decarbonization efforts." 2/ nescoe.com/resource-cente…
It's a forceful statement noting the misalignment of today's "electricity market and organizational structures" with the State's clean energy mandates, and suggesting these States will seek to be more in the driver's seat going forward. Significant and important! 3/
@EnergyCommerce@HouseCommerce First, I want to reiterate our overarching message - with wind, solar, energy storage, DER, EE, and all other advanced energy technologies now the least-cost resources, transitioning to a 100% clean power sector is an economic opportunity for America, not an economic burden. 2/?
@EnergyCommerce@HouseCommerce Second, the panel was almost unanimous that we need the federal government to establish a policy objective of reaching net zero carbon emissions by 2050. We strongly support this announced goal of @EnergyCommerce leadership and look forward to working with them. 3/?
Quick take on the PURPA proposal as I understand it so far: the proposal to drop the rebuttable presumption threshold under 210(m) from 20 MW to 1 MW, and the proposal to potentially extend 210(m) relief outside the RTOs, could both significantly harm competition. 1/?
One beef I have is that FERC seems to be progressing from the notion that PURPA was all about addressing dependence on oil and the 1970s oil shortages/embargo. But as I've noted here before, that's only one of the goals PURPA sought to achieve. 2/?
Another key goal of PURPA was to encourage more competition after a period of regulated monopolies making bad investments in power projects and leaving consumers to bear the costs. PURPA birthed non-utility generation as a competitor. 3/?