Some scientists are worried that the lab leak hypothesis, even if unproven, could lead to new regulation of research (& research orgs).
I heard that there is a petition letter being circulated asking scientists to add their names to reject these possible new changes in advance.
Needless to say, I think this is a terrible mistake and a trap that scientists are setting for themselves again.
It implies that the signatories are not taking lab origins seriously and their names will be on the line if and when a lab leak causes a future outbreak.
Why not write a letter calling for a public forum where both scientist & non-scientist stakeholders can reason with each other in a transparent way about what needs to be done to make research safer.
This cannot be an issue that is decided by just scientists in relevant fields.
To paraphrase experts who have dedicated years to warning against a lab-based outbreak, the outcomes of a lab escape do not affect only scientists but everyone in society.
Conversely, scientists do not have magical immunity against pandemics. We should fear a lab-based pandemic.
If we are rightly making efforts to prevent natural spillover, why not also make efforts to prevent lab-based outbreaks?
Why do we need confirmation that Covid-19 came from a lab to be sufficiently motivated to protect against unnecessary loss of life?
Some scientists are asking: how can we establish an international body and mechanism to surveil and regulate risky pathogen research?
It was an agenda item at this year's World Health Assembly, but there's no authority that can enforce biosafety globally. apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_f…
What can be done is regulation and a cultural shift within one's own country. The US still plays a leadership role and many countries look to the US to set the tone of their own research directions and policies.
These efforts for safer, responsible research should start locally.
If another country wants to become a consistent source of lab-based outbreaks, devastating their own communities, we can't do anything about that besides being a role model for not doing that to our own country and citizens.
In the US, there were, on average, more than 4 accidental releases per week (not necessarily leading to infections) of select agents in 2019. However, many animal/human pathogens, e.g., MERS, are not considered select agents.
There also seems to be no mandatory reporting of lab-acquired infections, regardless of pathogen or BSL, in the US.
This means we don't know how many research personnel are infected each year while conducting research activities, and if non-research staff are getting infected.
It is difficult to find many virologists/infectious diseases experts who consider research a plausible source of outbreaks & call for regulation of their own field in response to pandemics. It's difficult for them to suddenly see their lifesaving work as a potential risk to life.
I'm not saying they're evil - just human.
It's very hard to remove biases even when you're aware of them. It's the way you perceive and think about the world and how it works.
If you've spent years fighting natural spillover, almost every outbreak looks natural by default.
To end the 🧵 I ask the organizers of the petition letter to please reconsider the consequences of publishing your letter + signatories.
How will the public perceive the letter? What will happen in the event of a lab-based outbreak? Will your letter undermine trust in science?
One more tweet. People are asking if the petition letter exists. Yes, I’ve read it and taken screenshots of it. I can also share it with journalists who I think can be responsible and not put the organizers of the letter in danger of threats.
Having difficulty following this timeline:
December 30, 2019.
Shi is called by WIV director to investigate novel SARSrCoV causing atypical pneumonia in Wuhan.
Hops on train back to Wuhan.
Goes through her lab’s records. “I had not slept a wink for days.” scientificamerican.com/article/how-ch…
Within first days of Jan 2020, the WIV had obtained the full genome of SARS2. They were investigating the ICU cases, worried about SARS2 evolving to become more transmissible among humans. They knew little about the virus, source or specific treatment. biorxiv.org/content/10.110…
This is happening next Wednesday: @DavidRelman will be speaking to the Investigations and Oversight subcommittee of the House Science Committee on "Principles for Outbreak Investigation: COVID-19 and Future Infectious Diseases". science.house.gov/hearings/princ…
I wish more experts were invited to give a balanced and clear-minded assessment of the existing evidence surrounding the #OriginsOfCovid
I think @DavidRelman is one of the best scientists to speak on this topic - finding the source of a pandemic that could’ve arisen naturally or involved research activity. pnas.org/content/117/47…
The danger in insisting on the 'natural spillover' idea with no solid evidence is that it could lead to initiatives that limit our capacity to make dangerous virus research safer and get ahead of lab escapes. The amount of risky pathogen research is rapidly expanding globally.
I understand that a lot of scientists have an unshakeable faith in the leak-proofiness of BSL4s (still not accident-proof; SARS1 escaped once from a BSL4 lab in 2003).
But the live virus SARSrCoV work at WIV was performed at BSL2!
There are cell culture hoods and good ventilation in BSL2 TC rooms. But just ask any scientist who works at BSL2 how frequently they hear about someone else touching door handles with their gloves on or cleaning up spills in the centrifuges. Or how often they get contamination.
I'm getting requests for comment on the new preprint review on #OriginsOfCovid
This new review is slightly better than the Proximal Origin correspondence (and has a more impressive authorship list) but sticks to the same key points as Proximal Origin.
The first author did not disclose his 2014-present Guest Professor position in the Chinese CDC. This was also not disclosed in Proximal Origin. So my understanding is that this appointment was and still is not considered a competing interest. api.profiles.sydney.edu.au/AcademicProfil…
The preprint ultimately urges a comprehensive investigation of the zoonotic origin of the virus, ideally through collaborative studies. 💯agreed.
But I disagree that "there is substantial body of scientific evidence supporting a zoonotic origin for SARS-CoV-2."
“Even the headline on The Lancet article — Science, not speculation, is essential to determine how SARS-CoV-2 reached humans — seems designed to gaslight their critics, given their previous stance.”
By @ianbirrell unherd.com/thepost/why-wo…
@ianbirrell 1st Lancet letter:
"We stand together to strongly condemn conspiracy theories suggesting that COVID-19 does not have a natural origin"
2nd Lancet letter:
"intent of our original Correspondence was to express our working view that SARS-CoV-2 most likely originated in nature"
@ianbirrell 1st L:
"Scientists.. overwhelmingly conclude that this coronavirus originated in wildlife.. supported by a letter from the presidents of the US NASEM"
2nd L:
"We believe the strongest clue from new, credible, and peer-reviewed evidence.. is that the virus evolved in nature"
@DisInfoChron@thackerpd@ianbirrell It is somehow ok for an expert to first fail to declare their conflicts of interest, consider taking their name off a letter they wrote, and then one year later say they have reasonably perceived competing interests but are acting in a "private capacity".