18 months into the pandemic, and after many pleadings and prodding’s, including from Congress, CDC still doesn’t have a robust system for comprehensive, near-real-time surveillance of new variants. Data on their web site is at least 3 weeks old, even as new variants move fast. 
This is a question of resources, capabilities, and mission. We don’t have the equivalent of a JSOC for public health crisis. We don’t have a heavy lift capability that can do all the tracking and deployment needed to monitor and respond to a fast moving infectious disease crisis.
What’s needed is a more operationally equipped capacity in CDC - a prospective rather than a retrospective mindset. It will require a re-thinking of the organizational structure and mission. I devote a lot of focus of my forthcoming book Uncontrolled Spread to these issues.
As for Delta, given velocity of its spread in countries with better tracking like UK, we should assume it’s far more pervasive than CDC data from mid June suggests. The concern is always the next variant: and will we spot new strains and new diseases with the lead time we need?
In January, when we suggested in @WSJ op ed wsj.com/articles/send-… that we should set as goal to sequence 5% of all SARS2 samples - as a tripwire for detecting new strains early enough - this was the response to us (on Twitter!!) from a senior @CDCgov official, to the proposal.
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