For those watching protests in Cuba: mass protest is necessary, but often not sufficient to get democratization. History/polisci/statistics tell us that a lot will hinge on elite & police/military response to the protests.
Most autocrats (65%) fall to other elites; @MilanSvolik calculated that only about 20% of dictatorships end via popular uprising or transition to democracy.
And about 1/2 of autocracies that do fall are replaced by other autocracies. Democracy is hard, y'all.
There is a lot of good work on what causes security forces (mil, police, etc) to stay loyal to regime or defect in these crises. In my book, I found that the more representative the security force is, the harder repression becomes for frontline officers: social costs are high.
Other folks who've written on this: @RisaBrooks12 @darinself @miwahman @Yuko_Sato88 @ariesarugay @PeteWhitePolSci @esdebruin Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright Tarek Masoud Jason Brownlee (help me out here guys I'm missing people?)
Also impt that Cuba is
a) a revolutionary regime (more durable than average); and
b) a single-party regime (usually better at controlling security forces - very few coups in Leninist party-armies for example).
These are average/baselines, not Cuba-specific.
Though @JayUlfelder reminds us that single-party regimes *may* be more likely to buckle to popular protest specifically:
Geddes et al find that in post-Cold War period, military dictatorships that fail are most likely to democratize; personalist ones least likely. Party regimes are in the middle in terms of chance of democratization (conditional on regime failure to begin with).
Another impt issue here is that the Cuban regime has used int'l hostility as a legitimation strategy (& justification for suppressing political opposition). 1/2
On this point, see @BertHoffmann's paper: files.ethz.ch/isn/136415/wp1…
"A steadfast pillar of regime legitimation strategy to portray itself as the only possible defendant of nat'l independence in face of US neocolonialism. Similarly, any calls for more political pluralism ...continue to be framed as playing into the external enemy’s hands" 2/2

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More from @SheenaGreitens

17 May
So @BrankoMilan your "impression," again, is sth political science has been saying since at least.... 2002? Try Levitsky & Way, which has been cited a mere 7000x (2002 article + 2010 book). This is not a new take. No-one thinks autocracy is just "failed democracy." 1/2
This is why the opening paragraph of my book reads the way it does. Because what you @BrankoMilan seem to think is new is pretty darn conventional wisdom as of at least 5-8 years ago. 2/2
Many ppl responding, @BrankoMilan, are citing core work in *comparative politics,* not area studies. On your comments re regime type, see Geddes (1999), Geddes, Wright & Franz (2018), or any of the scholarship that uses the NSF-funded dataset they built:
sites.psu.edu/dictators/
Read 4 tweets
16 May
Hi again, @BrankoMilan, there is not good empirical justification for this statement, only an unfamiliarity with the relevant bodies of scholarship. There is a LOT of comparative work integrating non-Western welfare, citizenship, electoral regimes, etc.
I teach a global course on "democracy & dictatorship." Here's the opening week on how we measure/define democracy, which uses metrics/tools explicitly designed to avoid over-reliance on Western conceptions.
Here's a week on elections & other political institutions under autocracy, where key Q is to what extent these institutions serve same functions under dem/autocratic systems, & to what extent functions differ.
Read 4 tweets
4 May
Excited to share a new article in Journal of Korean Studies (@JournalKorea) on how geopolitical considerations shape the citizenship claims of North Koreans, as well as the ROK state's response to those claims:
dx.doi.org/10.1215/073116…
It's pretty common to hear "North Koreans get automatic citizenship in South Korea." That idea's been used to turn down NKoreans seeking resettlement in other countries. But in practice, claiming citizenship status is much more difficult than the phrase "automatic" implies. 2/
Acquiring effective South Korean citizenship is difficult, protracted (multi-stage process before NKorean resettlers are accorded full rights of citizenship), & contingent, especially when trying to claim that one should be treated as an ROK citizen *abroad.* 3/
Read 10 tweets
13 Apr
I think this is the wrong question.
CIs were, by design, embedded in US universities in ways that other countries' outreach hasn't been.
What justifies giving Confucius Institutes continued *preferential* treatment in US higher ed--that eg Alliance Française etc do not get?
If Hanban (or its successor org) want to fund teaching Chinese language, give $ to the university & let the university do the hiring/curriculum independently, w/o donor influence. That's how eg Korea Foundation-funded faculty lines work - but not CIs.
Or if Chinese side wants to keep control over personnel, programs, & curriculum, set up a nonprofit like Alliance Française & operate outside the university context. That's another valid option.
Read 4 tweets
11 Apr
I've now taken a look at the original report from Internet 2.0 (source of NYPost & ABC reporting) on surveillance in Shanghai. Per @rpotter_9's request, here're my thoughts on the report itself. Overall take: a good illustration of dynamics we've seen before. Thread: 1/
First, some context: Shanghai has a population of ~23million people. ~40% are migrants, meaning they're harder for PSB to track using regular tools like hukou. The database appears to cover several thousand people. It's actually very (to me surprisingly) selective. 2/
Report says this is not the full back-end Shanghai PSB database, but a subset. pdf actually doesn't give the area of focus, but media reports have suggested it was named "Uyghur terrorist" & is terrorism-focused. Says "shows willingness to use the term terrorist more broadly." 3/
Read 19 tweets
11 Apr
Every American/foreigner in China has their passport scanned at airports (& every hotel) & provided public security. Unclear from @nypost writing if/how this list departs from routine practice.
I’m more puzzled that it *only* has ~600-some.
Language describing this as “unprecedented” is misleading; MPS having this info has been routine as long as I’ve been going to China.
If there’s a reason why this subset was extracted & placed on a special list, *that* would be interesting & important to know.
But also, uh, the thousands of Uyghurs - & what this list actually indicates about their treatment - seems equally important. But again, the article doesn’t say enough for us to find out. Frustrating.
Read 8 tweets

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