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Sheena Chestnut Greitens Profile picture
Sheena Chestnut Greitens
@SheenaGreitens
National security, China/Asia, dictatorship & democracy. @UTAustin @TheLBJSchool @ClementsCenter @StraussCenter. Nonres fellow @CarnegieEndow. RT≠Endorse.
Junior_prompt_engineer Profile picture Shultz Lu Profile picture 2 subscribed
Mar 27 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
A couple of thoughts about this PRC Foreign Ministry readout of Xi's meetings with "representatives" of the US private sector & academic community, & the potential stakes for longer-term US-China diplomacy. 1/n
mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_66280… First, "representative" this is not. These appear to be senior visitors attending the China Development Forum, but the lack of gender/ethnic/age diversity is pretty glaring -- and unrepresentative of the true range of expertise or policy perspective on China in the US. 2/n
Nov 6, 2023 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
If consistently implemented, this will mark a real change in South Korean treatment of defectors in 3rd countries. Short thread: North Koreans in 3rd countries are often told by those countries they are ineligible for asylee/refugee status, because their birth ostensibly entitles them to citizenship under ROK law, so they should go there. 2/n
Nov 17, 2022 • 14 tweets • 10 min read
Delighted to (finally) share this new piece in @AsianSurvey on "China's Response to War in Ukraine." A short thread: (1/n)
doi.org/10.1525/as.202… Image @AsianSurvey The article surveys PRC interests going into February & its behavior since, across 4 dimensions: informational, diplomatic, economic, & military. China's been most supportive of Russia in informational & then diplomatic spaces; econ behavior's been mostly self-interested. 2/n
Oct 26, 2022 • 9 tweets • 6 min read
A few thoughts/some historical context on this SCMP story on the prominence of security officials in the new party lineup. Short thread: 1/n
sc.mp/pffu?utm_sourc… First: it's atypical in past 30 years for the most senior security official to come from Ministry of State Security. MPS (police) background is much more common. My guess is that reflects Xi's view of internal & external security threats as deeply interconnected. 2/n
Oct 3, 2022 • 14 tweets • 5 min read
New piece in @ForeignAffairs this morning on Xi Jinping's Global Security Initiative, & why I think it's likely to be a significant shift (over time) in Chinese foreign policy:
foreignaffairs.com/china/xi-jinpi… @ForeignAffairs It was easy to miss GSI's significance when it was announced in April. We'd heard a lot of the phrases from the Chinese political system before. Plus, the world was pretty focused on Ukraine. So why does it matter? 2/n
Mar 6, 2022 • 13 tweets • 7 min read
If @Dalzell60 is right that Russian *use of tactical nukes against Ukraine* is the bar for Beijing to shift its diplomatic stance, he's making the point that @EvanFeigenbaum & @JohnDelury have been making (& that I agree with 100%): China is leaning hard toward Russia right now. @Dalzell60 @EvanFeigenbaum @JohnDelury Seriously: China abstained (ie free-rode on Russian veto at the UN), & only did *that* after the US agreed to drop Chapter VII reference. It DID vote against the IAEA resolution.

The most consistent diplo statement they've made has been "NATO/US is to blame." 2/n
Mar 3, 2022 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
I don't think the issue is exactly lack of available off-ramps - I can think of plenty - but of ones Putin would be willing to accept & that don't involve conquering or dismembering Ukraine.
imho, personalist dictatorship + nuclear weapons make off-ramps harder. Yes, we need to think about conditions under which we'd pull back sanctions & make that offer. Yes, we need to think about conditions for negotiation. All true. But we also need to accept that Putin gets way more than "a vote" in this situation. Which is.... not good.
Dec 8, 2021 • 24 tweets • 9 min read
Reminder: the most basic definition of democracy is "a system in which parties lose elections."
(You have to actually alternate parties in power to be sure that one party won't balk & try to hold onto power at the point of a gun.) 1/2 The legislature has to be popularly elected. The chief exec has to either be popularly elected or elected by legislature that was (parliamentary democracy). There has to be more than one party, & they have to alternate in power. That's the basics (Przeworski et al definition).
Oct 13, 2021 • 17 tweets • 4 min read
I've been thinking alot about this fascinating reporting by @dakekang on Xinjiang. It's really important to understand that absence of visible repression doesn't mean a loosening of state control. Visible violence often means state doesn't have other options. 1/n @dakekang First, it's a measurement issue: mass public violence is easy to measure. A knock on the door or a disappearance at night is harder for outsiders to see and observe, esp when info is censored. This came up a LOT in my book. 2/
Jul 19, 2021 • 10 tweets • 4 min read
A LOT of non-democracies have elections.
This is why my Democracy & Dictatorship syllabus has a whole section on "why authoritarian regimes have features that look like democracies (courts, legislatures, elections, etc)": I mean, North Korea has *elections*:
Jul 15, 2021 • 10 tweets • 4 min read
This is a really, *really* bad take. Supporting a dictatorship is the opposite of supporting "Cubans' right to choose their own government." From a political science standpoint, Cuba's lack of democracy is not up for debate. Here is the country's score on two different global democracy-authoritarianism rankings: ImageImage
Jul 12, 2021 • 9 tweets • 4 min read
For those watching protests in Cuba: mass protest is necessary, but often not sufficient to get democratization. History/polisci/statistics tell us that a lot will hinge on elite & police/military response to the protests. Most autocrats (65%) fall to other elites; @MilanSvolik calculated that only about 20% of dictatorships end via popular uprising or transition to democracy.
And about 1/2 of autocracies that do fall are replaced by other autocracies. Democracy is hard, y'all.
May 17, 2021 • 4 tweets • 3 min read
So @BrankoMilan your "impression," again, is sth political science has been saying since at least.... 2002? Try Levitsky & Way, which has been cited a mere 7000x (2002 article + 2010 book). This is not a new take. No-one thinks autocracy is just "failed democracy." 1/2 This is why the opening paragraph of my book reads the way it does. Because what you @BrankoMilan seem to think is new is pretty darn conventional wisdom as of at least 5-8 years ago. 2/2
May 16, 2021 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Hi again, @BrankoMilan, there is not good empirical justification for this statement, only an unfamiliarity with the relevant bodies of scholarship. There is a LOT of comparative work integrating non-Western welfare, citizenship, electoral regimes, etc. I teach a global course on "democracy & dictatorship." Here's the opening week on how we measure/define democracy, which uses metrics/tools explicitly designed to avoid over-reliance on Western conceptions.
May 4, 2021 • 10 tweets • 7 min read
Excited to share a new article in Journal of Korean Studies (@JournalKorea) on how geopolitical considerations shape the citizenship claims of North Koreans, as well as the ROK state's response to those claims:
dx.doi.org/10.1215/073116… It's pretty common to hear "North Koreans get automatic citizenship in South Korea." That idea's been used to turn down NKoreans seeking resettlement in other countries. But in practice, claiming citizenship status is much more difficult than the phrase "automatic" implies. 2/
Apr 21, 2020 • 12 tweets • 4 min read
MO becomes first state to sue China (in Eastern District of MO) for coronavirus losses (est. $44B). Case assigned to Judge Limbaugh. See ago.mo.gov/docs/default-s… /1 State of Missouri AG's office claims China's activities meet 2 exceptions to Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA): commercial activities & non-commercial tort exceptions. Also, suit names party (CCP), not just PRC (gov't) agencies, maybe for that reason? /2
Apr 21, 2020 • 15 tweets • 6 min read
North Korea is the only dictatorship I can think of to pull off two hereditary successions in a row. Kim’s child (that we know about) is under age 5 (someone check w/Dennis Rodman). So that pathway seems unlikely.... /1 We know he has health issues. We know he missed a recent big public holiday (Kim Il Sung’s birthday, 4/15). That’s it for now. His sister has been elevated, but her authority is familial, personal - not institutional. Female family succession in autocracy *very* rare. /2
Jan 6, 2020 • 11 tweets • 19 min read
Delighted that our @Journal_IS article is now online. It asks: why did China change strategy in Xinjiang in early 2017 and start detaining Uighurs & others in massive numbers for involuntary re-education? What prompted the strategy shift? Thread: @Journal_IS Common explanations focus on domestic factors: ethnic unrest, changing minority policy, & regional leadership. There is extremely smart stuff on this by @adrianzenz @jleibold @JimMillward @dtbyler & others. But we think there's one more important dimension. /2
Sep 4, 2018 • 13 tweets • 3 min read
Happy Tuesday! Lots of debate and opinions recently on how scholars are responding to pressure from China - but until now, no data/systematic evidence. To change that, @rorytruex and I did a survey of 500+ academics who work on China. Here's what we found: /1 Repression of foreign scholars doing research in China is rare, but real. Here are the stats:
18% have had a publication censored in China;
26% have been denied access to an archive;
9% report have “invited for tea” to explain their work to the authorities. /2
May 21, 2018 • 9 tweets • 19 min read
Last week, two bills passed the MO General Assembly that are great news for kids in foster care & for foster care & adoption in Missouri. You can read a summary here: facebook.com/FirstLadySheen… We spent most of last year meeting with advocates from all over the State of Missouri to hear about what needed to be done differently. I'm grateful to everyone who played a part in that research process. /2
May 18, 2018 • 13 tweets • 4 min read
Delighted to see the Missouri General Assembly pass both #SB819 and #SB800! We worked hard last year to develop many of these measures and to collaborate with #moleg to pass them. Together, they do a LOT for foster care & adoption in Missouri. Here's a (partial) rundown: /1 Every Missouri child should be in a safe, stable, loving home. Provisions in SB819 & SB800 protect kids from abuse/neglect; support foster parents caring for kids in crisis; make MO a great state for adoption; & recognize the God-given potential of MO's foster children. /2