Thread by @EveKeneinan

“If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor.”

This is easily shown to be FALSE.

Thus: A accuses B of wronging her. C does not know whether A’s accusation is true or false.

If B did wrong A in the manner accused, there is a situation of injustice.
If not, then A has falsely accused B, and there is a situation of injustice.

C being neutral is not unjust.

The neutrality of C is the foundation of DUE PROCESS. Neither A nor B have any claim on C’s allegiance, so long as C is in a state of ignorance regarding the particulars, even though C knows that EITHER A OR B has acted unjustly, and so there is ‘a situation of injustice.'

Another case: A and B dispute over B’s use of land that A claims B has no right to. A asserts the presence of an injustice. B denies any injustice.

C again does no wrong or injustice to A if C remains neutral. A’s *assertion* of an injustice is not sufficient to establish one.

Being neutral is, in fact, required by the virtue of justice when (1) it is unclear WHETHER there is a situation of injustice, or (2) where the injustice lies (if it does), or (3) regarding the nature of the injustice.

“If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor.”

Attempts to make “oppression” structural instead of an action generate paradoxes: ⬇︎

Let A be a black man and B and white woman. It may be claimed that A oppresses B because men oppress women; it may be claimed that B oppresses A because whites oppress blacks.

By the principle, it is MORALLY EVIL to side EITHER with A OR with B OR to remain neutral.

Since we ought to instantiate the virtue of justice and “ought implies can”, and since the principle under investigation yields an obligation that cannot be fulfilled, it is not a true ought.

“One ought to side with the oppressed one” is pseudo-moral principle, because it fails to consider that oppressed persons can do wrong — and do do so, and indeed often appeal to their oppression is a spurious justification of their wrongdoing.

Let A be an “oppressor” and B be “oppressed.” If B falsely accuses of A of a great moral evil, B is both morally culpable for a lie and also for slander and bearing false witness. B will one day answer to God for their act — and “I was oppressed” will not exonerate.

If someone is in a state of being-oppressed, they are indeed in a situation of injustice and may take action to undo the situation — but in such matters only *proportional means* are ethically justified.

For example: If, on a hot day, A is impeding B from taking a drink at a water fountain, B is not therefore justified in murdering A as a means to satisfying his thirst.

Neutrality may also be enjoined by reason when there is a long history of mutual injustice, for example, in a longstanding FEUD. Family A and family B may have a long list of *justified* grievances against one another, but C may well be justified in remaining NEUTRAL.

“You know what? You assholes can fight it out. It’s none of my business.”