Thread by @GeringTuvia

There are a few key points and caveats about China's military ambitions in Djibouti and elsewhere that I'd like to add here, that were not included in the report:
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https://twitter.com/GeringTuvia/status/1416651020365701120

That CN has become more aggressive toward its neighbors and repressive at home, and the ambitious nature of the BRI potentially threatens US predominance, does not necessarily mean that any steps beyond its traditional frontiers are less legitimate than the traditional powers' 2/

Beijing's top priority is to ensure that its growing number of citizens, troops, assets, and investments are no longer reliant on foreign forces for protection, particularly assets in BRI countries. Just look at the recent terror attack in Dassu for reference. 3/

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations and MOOTW are also a way for China to boost its soft power, which is inextricably linked to its national security strategy (screengrab). 4/

In that sense, the Chinese base in Djibouti is more akin to the Japan Self-Defense Force Base next door than the five-times larger US base in Camp Lemonnier, as @AGhiselliChina points in "Protecting China's Interests Overseas", an idea shared by my teacher Prof Yitzhak Shichor 5/

Concerns over China's blue-water capabilities are likewise premature. China has made great strides at globalizing its military but still has a "long march" ahead of it before its aircraft carriers can challenge the US overseas. 6/

Shipbuilding is only one variable in overseas joint operations. Other variables, including a joint doctrine, training, logistics support, and command and control structures may take decades to develop. 7/

The PLA's lack of global combatant command structure, limited strategic airlift and sealift, smaller network of large overseas bases rooted in formal military alliances, and limited experience with foreign languages and cultures, will confine it to its periphery (screengrab). 8/

It is important to note that there are other, more tangible, Chinese threats to ("blunt") US hegemony, as cogently argued in @RushDoshi new book "The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order". 9/

They cover China's current Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the South and East China Seas, including the world's largest submarine force and sea mine arsenal, as well as its first anti-ship ballistic missiles. /10

Some Chinese and US observers (screengrabs) have considered Djibouti a "window of opportunity" for Sino-US military cooperation, for example in MOOTW, conflict mediation, and humanitarian assistance. /11

However, given that top US and CN generals have been incommunicado as of July 2021, as well as the Chinese army's assertive behavior in Djibouti, and the entrenchment of the Indo-Pacific strategic competition framework, friction is more likely to persist in the Horn of Africa/End