South Africa 1) Why the need for intelligence? The following is a concise but excellent summary:
2) The next phase, specifically for provincial offices, is to enable accountable operational and analysis environments determining processes at play with concerning indications of intentional securitization and support for such calls.
3) From hereon with, determine issues to be registered, monitored, and investigated. Tactical early warning then gains a formalized and a substantiated framework, steering away from vague generalized scenarios. Imprecise early warning creates confusion and the client in panic.
4) And best to keep the following in mind (situational knowledge and insight)
5) Intelligence management (provincial and national) at this point is of utmost importance in how to use and engage provincial and national clients on red flags. Added, know the client's resilience and institutional capacity to counter threats.
6) The management challenge is how to control the jackasses who don’t understand the risk and do as they please. Hence, intelligence is about national interests of South Africa: nothing more nor less.
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Mozambique 1) Dear followers, allow me to provide broader context on questions pertaining to funding for SANDF deployment in Cabo Delgado. SAMIM is operational in a vast area with about 1000 soldiers - Macomia, Muidumbe, Mueda, Nangade, and Quissanga.
2) Rwanda deployed in a smaller area, focused on MdP and Palma. Taking the above into account the small numbers of deployments, I cannot see how clearance operations will be completed by January 2022.
3) SAMIM deployment is to counter an insurgency with regional security implications. This is much more than just breaking the insurgent momentum. The ISCAP claim to credit in Uganda serves as a reminder that the insurgency is a conveyer belt for an echo chamber expanding.
Mozambique (Quick Take-Aways on signification trends in Cabo Delgado) 1) Insurgents are reverting to 2017/2018 tactics, with one concerning difference: they are better trained, more sophisticated weapons, and access to FADM planning, allowing pre-emptive planning. The MdP legacy.
2) Assessing the last two months, insurgents are yet again expanding the operational theatre (From Nangade to Quissanga), forcing SAMIM deployments into a battlefield of expansive deployments way beyond capabilities.
3) A noteworthy increase in brutality against civilians with frequent reports on beheadings. This tactic instills fears and warning on collaboration with counter forces. Attacked at Kagera, 8km east of Mahurunga, 6 males were beheaded.
Mozambique
Advisory Note: #SADC do not be held captive with prevailing hype, photo of weapons and arms fades taking into consideration actual capabilities and an occasion of official visits. I
Insurgents are relying on their grandest ally: time. Leaders disclosed nothing new and there are several not mentioned.
Step back and just answer one question: does current "stroll in the park" victories accompanied by skirmishes correlate with what we know about their capabilities and capacities?
Securitization of piracy in the Mozambique Channel. A justified narrative or fear mongering?. @GI_TOC evaluates insurgents' "maritime capacity" concluding with risk appraisal.
Map Credit: CIMSEC
2) 31 Dec 2010: The Mozambican flagged Fishing Vessel VEGA 5, which was previously reported missing by her owner, is now confirmed as being pirated in the waters between Mozambique and Madagascar. eunavfor.eu/mozambican-fis…
July 2020, five girls who had been abducted by insurgents during the attack on Mocimboa da Praia town fled from the camp where they were being held. Once free, they told of men and boys being given military training by the insurgents.
Photo by Laura Monahan
@news_pinnacle reported that that “hundreds” of boys are receiving training “far from Mocimboa da Praia.” Contact reports also indicated training of child soldiers. pinnaclenews.net/ainda-vive-se-…