[Thread] 1/ I did another Twitter analysis. This time I searched for tweets using the term 'Tunis' (in Arabic). This is somewhat agnostic, so anyone mentioning '#Tunisia' will be analysed. The results are striking, & you give a clear image of polarisation. Will explain more
2/ What this image shows is to distinct clusters (the pink one, and the green one). Each cluster represents a community, a group of accounts that tend to interact more with each other. The fact they are separate indicates there is little interaction between the communities >
3/ What is evident is that the green community is essentially 4-5 Saudi nationalists (halgawi, s_hm2030, monther72, cressfiles) & their retweeters, while the pink cluster is mostly 2 Mauritanian/Qatar - (mshinqiti. Turkialshoub commentators/journalists and those retweeting them.
4/ Because 70% of the content is retweets (pretty common on Twitter), we are not actually looking at lots of unique content. (See work by @AndrewMLeber and @abulkhaezuran for more on elite-driven twitter discourse). What that means is we can quickly see the position of the two
5/ 'camps' by just seeing what tweets from these influencers is being retweeting. It's clear the pink (Qatar/Mauritanian) community oppose the coup, while the green (Saudi) community support it. That's presumably what everyone expected from this. In terms of most influential
6/ accounts in the sample, it's dominated by Saudi accounts. The top ten influential accounts are based in Saudi, the UAE, Egypt, and one in the UK (Bahraini-British amjad taha). This is quite similar to what we saw from the hashtags 'Tunisians revolt against the brotherhood'
7/ In terms of where users report themselves to be, Saudi is top, followed by Egypt, and then Tunisia, with UAE in fourth place. This kind of makes sense re UAE as its population is smallish but it has a core group of high profile influencers.
8/ So the interesting thing about this visualisation shows a number of things
a) Twitter discussions about Tunisia within the timeframe of the analysis are dominated by influencers from Saudi, Egypt, and the UAE
b) the majority of those active describe
9/ themselves as being based in Saudi
c) There is a clear geopolitical split between Saud/UAE/Egypt accounts and those perceived to be sympathetic to Islamism, Qatar-based or Saudi opposition. The former support the coup while the latter oppose it
d) Twitter narratives about
10/ non Gulf-countries are dominated by Gulf countries, with information availability favouring the Saudi/UAE/Egypt nexus..
e) the narrative that portray the coup as a popular revolt against the Muslim Brotherhood is ascendant as a result of this
11/ It's depressing seeing how these events activate latent tropes that contribute to polarisation. As the image demonstrates, there is not so much as a debate as entrenching of opinions and megaphoning of those one agrees with.
12/ Some notes about sample - unique accounts, 11,000 - individual interactions - 17000, timeframe '7.20 am - 12pm UTC 28th July. Anyway, I think that's it for now.
Now go forth and speak (nicely) to someone you disagree with! Remember to listen - unless they're a bot of course
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1/ 🧵This graph shows X posts by impressions in the first six hours after the Magdeburg attack. Specifically these are posts falsely attributing the attack to an Islamist terror attack or a Syrian, or using it as an opportunity to attack immigration or muslims #disinformation
2/ The usual suspects are there - that is, the anti-Islam disinfluencers (routine spreaders of disinformation). As you can see, one of the most widely viewed is @visegrad24 - who shared at least 6 posts falsely claiming the attacker was an Islamist
3/ The posts falsely claiming that the attacker was a Muslim or Islamist gained at least 38,000,000 views. False claims that he was Syrian resulted in around 8.4million views (remember this is just an approx 6 hour period).
🧵1/ I analysed the headline and lead paragraph of 536 English news articles including the terms "Maccabi" + "Amsterdam" and classified them using Claude 3.5 Sonnet to determine how many framed Israelis as victims or non-Israelis as primary victims (as well as both).
2/ The results are fairly striking. 65% of articles frame Israelis as the victim, while only 5% frame Non-Israelis as victims. 24% are neutral while 9% framed both groups as victims. Quite clear the media emphasised violence as anti-Israeli and antisemitic, especially early on
3/ There isn't much evidence too of corrective framing at this point, although a small increase in neutral framing a week after the incident. Israeli victimhood was categorised as emphasis of violence initiated by non-Israelis, and focus on anti-Israeli or antisemitic violence
🧵 1/ Part of understanding what is going on in Amsterdam is also to understand the coordinated anti-Arab, anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant campaigns run with huge amounts of money targeting Europe. Here's a short private Eye article about an investigation I did with @SohanDsouza
2/ Here's a write-up by @karamballes on the campaign in @BylineTimes "Disinformation Campaign on Social Media Reached More Than 40 Million People – but Meta ‘Alarmingly’ Hasn't Revealed the Culprits' bylinetimes.com/2024/08/30/qat…
@karamballes @BylineTimes 3/ ...How a covert influence campaign helped Europe’s far right
Our findings about the shadowy multi-platform operation attacking Qatar and stoking Islamophobia to further its far-right agenda in Europe and beyond call for immediate action. aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/…
🧵🚨1/ This is nuts. After mysteriously deleting a package covering the Amsterdam protests, Sky News have put up a new version. The new version completely changes the thrust to emphasise that the violence was antisemitic. See the opening screenshot change below
2/Even the tweet accompanying the video has changed. It has explicitly shifted from mentioning anti-Arab slogans to removing the phrase "anti-Arab" and using antisemitism. It also removes mention of vandalism by Israeli fans. An extremely clear editorial shift!
3/ They have also inserted into the video, right after the opening footage of Dutch Prime Minister condemning antisemitsm. This was not in the original video.
1/ If you break down the BBC's live reporting of what happened in Amsterdam, you can see the disproportionate attention it pays to Maccabi fans and Israelis as victims, with far less attention paid to the actions of Maccabi fans. Here are the sources interviewed.
2/ In terms of mentions of Arab, Dutch or other Ajax fans, there is very little emphasis on Arab safety, with the majority of coverage focused on Maccabi fans as victims. There are vox pops with fans, but very little interaction with non-Maccabi people.
3/ The language used to describe the attacks on the Maccabi fans is also much stronger, ranging from pogroms to brutal and shocking. Similar terms aren't use for the anti-Arab racism.
🚨1/ This New York Times piece is wild. Let's go through it.
Firstly, the lede is an emphasis that attacks in Amsterdam were based on antisemitism, yet it cites no evidence of this, but DOES cite evidence of anti-Arab chants.
2/ The claims of antisemitism are based primarily on the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, who tweeted that the attacks were antisemitic. Note - the Dutch Prime Minister didn't call out anti-Arab or anti-Palestinian racism from Maccabi fans.
3/ The piece links to an Amsterdam police statement to talk about the violence - although the police statement doesn't mention anything about antisemitism.