[Thread] 1/ I did another Twitter analysis. This time I searched for tweets using the term 'Tunis' (in Arabic). This is somewhat agnostic, so anyone mentioning '#Tunisia' will be analysed. The results are striking, & you give a clear image of polarisation. Will explain more
2/ What this image shows is to distinct clusters (the pink one, and the green one). Each cluster represents a community, a group of accounts that tend to interact more with each other. The fact they are separate indicates there is little interaction between the communities >
3/ What is evident is that the green community is essentially 4-5 Saudi nationalists (halgawi, s_hm2030, monther72, cressfiles) & their retweeters, while the pink cluster is mostly 2 Mauritanian/Qatar - (mshinqiti. Turkialshoub commentators/journalists and those retweeting them.
4/ Because 70% of the content is retweets (pretty common on Twitter), we are not actually looking at lots of unique content. (See work by @AndrewMLeber and @abulkhaezuran for more on elite-driven twitter discourse). What that means is we can quickly see the position of the two
5/ 'camps' by just seeing what tweets from these influencers is being retweeting. It's clear the pink (Qatar/Mauritanian) community oppose the coup, while the green (Saudi) community support it. That's presumably what everyone expected from this. In terms of most influential
6/ accounts in the sample, it's dominated by Saudi accounts. The top ten influential accounts are based in Saudi, the UAE, Egypt, and one in the UK (Bahraini-British amjad taha). This is quite similar to what we saw from the hashtags 'Tunisians revolt against the brotherhood'
7/ In terms of where users report themselves to be, Saudi is top, followed by Egypt, and then Tunisia, with UAE in fourth place. This kind of makes sense re UAE as its population is smallish but it has a core group of high profile influencers.
8/ So the interesting thing about this visualisation shows a number of things
a) Twitter discussions about Tunisia within the timeframe of the analysis are dominated by influencers from Saudi, Egypt, and the UAE
b) the majority of those active describe
9/ themselves as being based in Saudi
c) There is a clear geopolitical split between Saud/UAE/Egypt accounts and those perceived to be sympathetic to Islamism, Qatar-based or Saudi opposition. The former support the coup while the latter oppose it
d) Twitter narratives about
10/ non Gulf-countries are dominated by Gulf countries, with information availability favouring the Saudi/UAE/Egypt nexus..
e) the narrative that portray the coup as a popular revolt against the Muslim Brotherhood is ascendant as a result of this
11/ It's depressing seeing how these events activate latent tropes that contribute to polarisation. As the image demonstrates, there is not so much as a debate as entrenching of opinions and megaphoning of those one agrees with.
12/ Some notes about sample - unique accounts, 11,000 - individual interactions - 17000, timeframe '7.20 am - 12pm UTC 28th July. Anyway, I think that's it for now.
Now go forth and speak (nicely) to someone you disagree with! Remember to listen - unless they're a bot of course
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🧵1/ Israel are attempting to muddy the waters around the killing of an international UN worker in a clearly marked vehicle. They have released a video claiming that "terrorists" are roaming and shooting at a UNRWA compound. There's no evidence that indicates they are
2/ terrorists. The video shows armed men mingling with what are probably UN workers. There is no sense of coercion or animosity in those shots. Crucially, there is no caveat that these people might not be factions or Hamas police protecting aid convoys.
3/ The US has even asked Israel to stop targeting Hamas police officers trying to protect aid. Naturally the video provides no context, and remember the IDF are an organisation that recently murdered multiple aid workers in clearly marked vehicles.
🧵1/ I am somewhat dismayed (though sadly unsurprised) by this extremely disingenuous and callous reporting about Palestinian death figures. Claims that the UN have revised down its death toll are absolutely untrue but have been repeated by right wing outlets but also the CFR 🤔
2/ These media are focusing on these two infographics by the @ochaopt . The one on the left, published 6th May, the one on the right published 8th May. As you can see, total fatalities INCREASE, as opposed to decrease. What the propaganda is seaking to do is barely sophistry
3/All that's happening is the OCHA has added figures for the dead that have been identified. It quite clearly says that the breakdown DOES NOT include 10000 missing or buried under rubble.
1🧵Lots of lessons on how unreliable information spreads. Here, Hen Mazzig makes an unsubstantiated claim about pro-Palestinian protesters 'combing' the street for Israelis in Athens. Someone asks him for a source. Mazzig provides a source that does not support his own claim.
2/ Another subtle aspect of this the hotel. One widely shared tweet stated that 'rioters' were trying to break into an Israeli-owned hotel. In fact, the crowd are outside the Tiare hotel. The event is filmed FROM an Israeli owned hotel (Brown Acropol). This proximity to the
3/ the Israeli-owned hotel is obviously designed to make the 'attack' seem targeted. In fact, the crowd are closer to a different hotel, that is also in the centre of Athens, where there had just been a pro-Palestine protest.
1/ 🧵I just did a quick corpus analysis of 100 New York Times articles published between 1st April - 5th May on US Campus Protests. Findings indicate that the NYT reporting of the campus protests place a large emphasis on equating protests with antisemitism.
2/ A notable finding was that the terms 'antisemitism' & 'antisemitic' appeared around 296 times, while terms such as Islamophobia/c only appeared 9 times. This is a large discrepancy.
3/ Jewish/Jews/Judaism are mentioned 450 times, Muslims/Islam mentioned 72, and Christian/Christianity 7. The second most common collocate (words that appear together often) of the word 'safety' and 'unsafe' is 'Jewish', (the first is students). Other minorities do not appear
🧵1/ Thread on the Islamophobic and antisemitic disinformation about the #SydneyAttack . I downloaded X posts that wrongly stated that the attacker, Joel Cauchi, was either a Muslim or Jewish terrorist
2/ The size of the network was at least 140,000 posts (from X). This time series graph shows that initially, most of the disinformation (red bars) accused the attacker of being a Muslim or Islamist. At about 1700 UTC we see more and more disinfo about the attacker
3/ being Jewish (orange bars). This temporal analysis reflects the fact that there is a notable tendency when it comes to such attacks in Western countries to accuse, without evidence, the perpetrator of being Muslim. To accuse the attacker of being Jewish is less common
🧵1/ Just want to point out a few disturbing elements regarding misinformation in this article - "What's I've Heard From Gaza" published in the @TheAtlantic . I will focus on two specific references that are quite crucial in framing a broader argument about Hamas's actions #Gaza
2/ The article asserts with no equivocation that Hamas killed fleeing civilians on the Al Rashid coastal road in Nov 23. Not only is there no evidence for this, but the link is to an article in the Jerusalem Post, that relies on a tweet from known disinfluencer, @amjadt25
3/ Even if one wasn't to take an Occam's razor approach (i.e. it was probably the IDF since they have killed > 33000 people), then it would make sense to at least report this ambiguously. Reuters, for example, covered the strike, but did not even mention it could have been Hamas