We can often rely on SPF/DKIM/DMARC, which are important security technologies for email which help validate that the email was legitimately sent from the infrastructure it claims to have been sent from.
However, many organizations have not bothered to configure this.
In the case of Google, failing to pass certain checks as a sender will result in your email landing in SPAM instead of the intended recipient's inbox.
Here is an overview to help you understand these technologies and how they work together.
When analyzing a domain for malicious content, never browse to a domain you don't know from your own "naked" browser.
Instead, you can use Startpage's IXQuick Proxy ("anonymous view"). This can limit the site's ability to harm you. Some features on the target site may not work.
A safer way to protect your own system while browsing to potentially malicious websites is to use a "sandboxing" environment.
A simple and cheap/free way to set up a sandbox is to install VMWare Player, then install a virtual machine.
The intent behind the VM is for you to conduct all potentially harmful research on that version of Windows, instead of your normal everyday host operating system.
For folks who want to learn more about Linux or hacking tools, Kali is but a download away.
Going back to the .eml analysis, we can see the tool has extracted two URLs and two domain names.
The first one appears to be legitimate, but how can we tell? Their website looks like a Wordpress template, and indeed it is!
We're able to quickly identify that by right-click/viewing the source, as well as by navigating to the domain[.]com/wp-admin, which is the default URL for the admin page of Wordpress installations.
This is only relevant because threat actors also use popular web dev frameworks.
Indeed, many "phishing kits" which are sold on the "dark web" and hacker forums are packages which would allow a bad actor to deploy a phishing campaign without a lot of effort.
Here is some more info about how phishing kits work.
Calling the phone numbers, which are in the right area code, yields nothing but a recorded line and mailbox. They're supposedly closed on Sundays. So how else can we potentially determine these folks are legitimate?
Maybe we can look for other references to their website.
Searching for the phone number led to a local news site which has previously featured this facility in the context of covid testing
Also, a basic search also reveals aged Facebook, Instagram, Yelp, Nextdoor accounts...
These are all positive signs that while the site uses popular frameworks and looks a little wonky, it wasn't built anytime recently, which would be a red flag.
In fact, by using a basic "whois" search, we are able to identify the domain was first registered in 2015.
This is another good sign, as many domains used for phishing are rapidly auto-generated, registered, and dropped. Domain age is often a significant indicator of badness.
It seems likely the domain is legit, yet we still have no explanation for why they are sending from a Gmail address.
A Google search for the address in quotes yields nothing. Perhaps this medical facility is doing some "shadow IT" by sending email from an off-domain account?
The other domain we know exists is "formezone[.]com", since they added a reply-to for this address, meaning when you hit "reply" in your email client, "info@formezone[.]com" would be loaded in the To: field instead of the address that actually sent you the email.
The email is also listed on their website. The domain itself only hosts an "under construction" page.
Running a whois search on that domain and examining the registration details leads us directly to the web developer, who is local to the medical facility.
An automated check we can run on the site is to pass it through URLScan. If you see a bunch of red text with a verdict of "potentially malicious", the site could still be legitimate, yet hacked and serving malware.
Now that we can conclude this site is likely legitimate (feel free to also check with VirusTotal), let's turn our focus to the other URL which was identified by the .eml analyzer as having been included in the email message.
It's a Google Calendar template link.
"Malformed" links are often used to cause a target application to behave in a way that is out of bounds with what the developer of the app intended, and are sometimes a way get into a system
Using an event link generator, we can easily see the link is not malformed, looks normal
Searching the body of the email for images (png, jpg, img, etc), I've found one single image being loaded from the website in a simple way; not a tracking pixel.
With this, you will still send your IP address to the website, but not in connection to a specific campaign
The way marketers get folks to "enable external images" these days is by adding so much visual content to the email, it becomes unreadable without loading the external images.
If you're concerned about tracking pixels, you would do best to never load any external images.
Here you can see an example of what it looks like to generate an email pixel and tracking URLs. Note the uniqueness of the image filename and domain URL.
So we've legitimized the content of the email and the place it was sent from.
The only open question is why they're using a Gmail account and the answer is likely because it's somehow convenient for the sender!
In this case it appears someone mistakenly used my email address.
I thought I'd show you some of the mental steps used to review a message for signs of maliciousness.
I hope this was helpful for those of you who want to look deeper but not sure where to start.
Feel free to drop any questions you might have!
Cheers 🍻
One more tiny disclaimer — this is in no way the total spectrum of analysis which can be applied to an email message!
These are just a few of the basics which felt applicable to this email message in particular.
Update: the medical facility typo’ed my email when they sent the confirmation.
There is another Jacqueline Singh out here in NY, and she uses an email address which is essentially mine, but with numbers on the end. They forgot to include the numbers.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
This is a thread about how we are manipulated by powerful marketing depts to pay more for common items
I need children’s Tylenol for my almost-2 year old. Did a search at my retailer. Two different products from the same company show up.
Let’s take a look at the packaging.
1/
The differences between these products:
> pricing (40.36%)
> volume differs (50%)
> inclusion of a baby syringe which is included in every package of “infant” pain reliever, of which every parent has many; throws out dupes
> age of child (range + visual photo)
> “dye free”
2/
The most important part, dosage, is exactly same. 160mg per 5mL.
Q: As a parent, what would lead me to purchase a 40% more expensive product to receive half the volume, actually making it 180% more expensive per ounce — if you fully disregard the cost of the syringe?
Imagine gaining asylum from a small country’s govt & locking yourself in a room in their embassy for 7 years and calling it a human rights issue because you’re too afraid to face the charges for crimes you almost certainly committed while hacking & inciting hacking
Now imagine succeeding so throughly in convincing enough people that you are a “political prisoner” and “freedom fighter” that the most corrupt outgoing lame duck president the US has ever had considers you for a pardon for cheap political points
I fed a tiny portion of one of Dan Geer's speeches into GPT3 and it spat out infosec truisms? wtf
Do NOT read this thread unless you want to feel attacked about infosec by this damn AI
"Attack surface" is the area of attack, and it is a truism that
the smaller the attack surface, the lower the risk. The
opposite is also true: The larger the attack surface, the higher the risk.
This is why I say that total data surveillance is an offensive
strategy for defensive purposes.
I reached out to Katelyn & brought her some questions about any potential involvement with the harassment I have been experiencing since I announced my recent role.
I had heard some weird stuff and wanted to connect with her to be sure.