#SMD2021 the Mid-Range Capability will involve multirole launcher that can fire Tomahawk or SM-6. "We actually have a missile on the rail that can do offensive or defensive fires simultaneously."
RCCTO head Thurgood shows some photos of the LRHW delivery and describes the DE-MSHORAD shoot-off.
Slide on 2-prong high-end DE solution. IFPC to have a kinetic and nonkinetic element, which will feature the mobile 300kW HEL and fixed HPM.
Thurgood brought pencils to the podium to underscore bottom line: "Pencils down." RCCTO is "not interested in being late."
"When I started this job, I had as much hair as Ronny did. And now I look like General Myles."
Thurgood: Each Mid-Range Capability launcher can hold 4 missiles, and "It can also hold a Patriot right out of the factory, it can hold a PrSM...The Mark 41 launcher that we got from the Navy is really a versatile launcher."
Keeping track of Army's popular names presented at #SMD2021.
LRHW: "Dark Eagle"
MRC: "Typhon"
IFPC-HEL: "Valkyrie"
IFPC-HPM: "Thor"
Relevant reading from @tomkarako:
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Key details in the White House "Iron Dome for America" missile defense EO: 1) High-level callout to HBTSS. With two demo satellites in orbit, HBTSS will transfer from MDA to Space Force in 2026. The language implies a need to preserve fire control requirements...
...something we repeatedly argued for last winter. There was a real danger that high-fidelity hypersonic tracking would be made into a reach goal. So this is an important intervention from the top.
2) Space-based interceptors. Prior NDAAs often called for studies, but tech is changing. Launch costs, a major expense, are down 10x, and satellite unit costs also seem to be declining (look at the megaconstellations). Some issues with punch-through, but we'll see what comes.
Old news, but man, RU munitions look ancient:
🧨 Obsolete through-hole construction (wire leads connect components to board surface)
🧨 Thin, slathered-on encapsulation compound (red, used to insulate/protect parts)
🧨 No potting (filling empty space w/ shock-cushioning plastic)
For comparison, some early 2000s NDIA slides on the U.S. GMLRS system electronics. SMT instead of through-hole components, which are hermetically sealed in metal and plastic potting material.
Lot of gold in the replies. The broader significance here: these choices have disproportionate impact on the whole design. They limit maneuverability: under 100G maneuvers, each 4-gram capacitor becomes nearly a pound, stressing the leads. Potting helps you survive that.
USAF Chief Scientist Victoria Coleman later noted ARRW was "the most mature weapon that we have" Disclosed prev. unreported successful Tactical Boost Glide flight test on Dec 8, 2020, over the Pacific, "an amazing day." Was coy on whether ARRW was fully zeroed out
Progress continuing on HACM, Congress and Global Strike Command apparently "huge fans and can't wait" for it to be in inventory. flight test next year will happen in Australia. This is why AUKUS matters.
Here's the top-level portfolio from Dr. Weber on current hypersonic acquisition programs.
[1/3] Real vs. AI-generated images: check out the Fourier patterns yourself. At right: the FFT output, which captures info on repeating patterns in images. You can generate them easily with ImageJ, as I've done here.
Fake:
Left: the infrared scene data we imported into our simulation. Right: a more detailed pic of the hypersonic model, with diff temps assigned to the leeward & windward sides, leading edges, and rear. It's not just distance; the diff in viewing aspects are modelled in.
It won't just be IR. @tomkarako and I have prev said that hypersonic weapons have unique kinematic vulns. But they also have unique, exploitable signatures. We don't model those, but see slide from Dr. Iain Boyd—complex interactions on vehicle surface => novel plumes & sigs.
There's so much buzz around new missiles; rockets are inherently attention-grabbing. But over time, you learn that it's everything upstream—the sensors, battle management systems, comms, command & control—that matters most. defensenews.com/opinion/commen…
But those things are murky. There's no easy way to prove to adversaries that you have software that speeds up your targeting cycles, or EW/cyber that bogs up theirs. Russia could see Ukraine's meager missile stocks, but couldn't see the murky stuff that actually wins wars.
Massive stakes on the assumption that deterrence works. As wars are increasingly decided by the murky stuff, that gets harder. The fact Russia was caught unprepared represents a failure of deterrence; their failure to understand they'd lose, our failure to show why we'd win.