Nor would this move necessarily mean recognizing the Taliban. The U.S. maintained a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan from 1979 until 1989, even though it did not recognize any party as the legitimate government.
People associate diplomatic relations with some sort of moral approbation, but that's not the case.
States sometimes sever diplomatic relations, but that's usually saved for circumstances where diplomacy is seen as no longer paying dividends, not just a sign of distaste.
Frankly, lines of communication can be more important with rivals than with allies. And that's what diplomats help ensure.
The past week has shown that things can be accomplished by engaging with the Taliban, however difficult.
It's smart for the U.S. to keep that option open.
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My unsolicited two cents: the White House has been too focused on defending the policy logic of withdrawal and not focused enough on empathizing with and accepting responsibility for the human consequences—or laying out a way to minimize them moving forward.
There are strong counterterrorism and strategic cases for withdrawal, which the admin has made ably for months.
But even those who agree with them are now focused on the political and humanitarian consequences of how it was executed, which clearly exceed what was anticipated.
There are too many admin soundbites of overly optimistic projections about post-withdrawal Afghanistan to ignore. Nor does the U.S. appear to have effectively planned for this contingency.
The only thing you can credibly do is own those mistakes and examine why you made them.
Some observations on the Biden administration's response to recent attacks in Erbil and Baghdad, including last night's airstrike in Syria—all of which reflect a much needed return to a more considered and sustainable Iraq policy. ...
Threats from Iran-backed militias are a deadly reality for U.S. personnel in Iraq, and will be for the foreseeable future.
But how the United States deals with these threats has major ramifications for the bilateral relationship, and other U.S. interests there.
The Biden administration is clearly making it a priority to maintain and restore the conditions allowing for the U.S. and Coalition military presence in Iraq.
That's a good thing legally and politically, and a necessary corrective from the Trump administration's policies.
And the regime for designating Specially Designated Terrorist Groups (SDGTs) relies on IEEPA, which can only be used against threats that originate “in whole or in substantial part outside the United States.”
In Syria, the U.S. has previously claimed that the AUMF authorizes it to take defensive action on Kurdish allies’ behalf, specifically against the Assad regime and its partners.
First, states do not "sign on" to U.N. Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). UNSCRs are not treaties. Where binding, their terms apply to all U.N. member states by virtue of the U.N. Charter, regardless of whether they've consented to them specifically.
Second, the authors misattribute "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" to the preamble of UNSCR 242. In fact, the preamble of UNSCR 242 is simply "[e]mphasizing" this well-established principle, which is rooted in Art. 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.