This should not be surprising, nor is it unprecedented.

The Biden administration has had success diplomatically engaging with the Taliban over the Doha Agreement and Kabul airport.

Keeping those lines of communication may be the best way to secure U.S. interests moving forward.
Nor would this move necessarily mean recognizing the Taliban. The U.S. maintained a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan from 1979 until 1989, even though it did not recognize any party as the legitimate government.

See, e.g., this 1990 memorandum:

2009-2017.state.gov/documents/orga… Image
People associate diplomatic relations with some sort of moral approbation, but that's not the case.

States sometimes sever diplomatic relations, but that's usually saved for circumstances where diplomacy is seen as no longer paying dividends, not just a sign of distaste.
Frankly, lines of communication can be more important with rivals than with allies. And that's what diplomats help ensure.

The past week has shown that things can be accomplished by engaging with the Taliban, however difficult.

It's smart for the U.S. to keep that option open.

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More from @S_R_Anders

16 Aug
My unsolicited two cents: the White House has been too focused on defending the policy logic of withdrawal and not focused enough on empathizing with and accepting responsibility for the human consequences—or laying out a way to minimize them moving forward.
There are strong counterterrorism and strategic cases for withdrawal, which the admin has made ably for months.

But even those who agree with them are now focused on the political and humanitarian consequences of how it was executed, which clearly exceed what was anticipated.
There are too many admin soundbites of overly optimistic projections about post-withdrawal Afghanistan to ignore. Nor does the U.S. appear to have effectively planned for this contingency.

The only thing you can credibly do is own those mistakes and examine why you made them.
Read 21 tweets
26 Feb
Some observations on the Biden administration's response to recent attacks in Erbil and Baghdad, including last night's airstrike in Syria—all of which reflect a much needed return to a more considered and sustainable Iraq policy. ...

defense.gov/Explore/News/A…
Threats from Iran-backed militias are a deadly reality for U.S. personnel in Iraq, and will be for the foreseeable future.

But how the United States deals with these threats has major ramifications for the bilateral relationship, and other U.S. interests there.
The Biden administration is clearly making it a priority to maintain and restore the conditions allowing for the U.S. and Coalition military presence in Iraq.

That's a good thing legally and politically, and a necessary corrective from the Trump administration's policies.
Read 30 tweets
31 May 20
This is just not legally possible, under any of the existing legal regimes used to designate terrorist groups.

Here’s why...
The regime for designating Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) requires that they be “foreign organizations,” which ANTIFA decidedly is not.

casetext.com/statute/united…
And the regime for designating Specially Designated Terrorist Groups (SDGTs) relies on IEEPA, which can only be used against threats that originate “in whole or in substantial part outside the United States.”

ANTIFA doesn’t.

casetext.com/statute/united…
Read 9 tweets
3 Oct 19
This packet appears to have been the subject of the long-celebrated tradition of bureaucratic hot potato.

Let me explain...
Giuliani hands it to Pompeo early in 2019 during the push for Yovanovitch’s removal.

Pompeo doesn’t know what to do with it (though Yovanovitch is eventually removed) and hands it off to 7th Floor subordinates...
They are similarly uncertain what to do with it, so eventually give it to the Office of the Legal Adviser (“L”) because it “looks legal”.

L sits on it for awhile, but as it relates to potential misconduct—by Yovanovitch or those targeting her—they CYA by passing it to the IG.
Read 7 tweets
5 Aug 19
“[T]he administration has made clear that it cannot, under existing congressional authorities, intervene to protect the Kurdish fighters.”

Interesting—because that’s not exactly what the Trump administration has said in the past...
washingtonpost.com/national-secur…
In Syria, the U.S. has previously claimed that the AUMF authorizes it to take defensive action on Kurdish allies’ behalf, specifically against the Assad regime and its partners.

Why does the same theory not apply to attacks from the Turks?
assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4411…
One possible explanation is that this “collective self-defense” theory has been framed as narrowly applying to imminent self-defense.

But it’s not clear why that logic wouldn’t extend to at least some defensive action here.
scribd.com/document/39003…
Read 9 tweets
15 May 19
This op-ed by Secretary of State Pompeo and the U.S. Ambassador to Israel is complete nonsense, legal and otherwise.

wsj.com/articles/inter…
First, states do not "sign on" to U.N. Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). UNSCRs are not treaties. Where binding, their terms apply to all U.N. member states by virtue of the U.N. Charter, regardless of whether they've consented to them specifically.
Second, the authors misattribute "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" to the preamble of UNSCR 242. In fact, the preamble of UNSCR 242 is simply "[e]mphasizing" this well-established principle, which is rooted in Art. 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
Read 9 tweets

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