Very unpopular take, but backed by facts.
And I care much more about facts than opinions.
House prices are NOT expensive, when measured as one should reasonably do: in real terms, assuming a 10% down-payment and the remaining 90% financed with a fixed-rate mortgage.
1/4
The median US house price has gone up 2.4x times since 1990.
In real terms, we are looking at a whopping 70% price increase over the last 10 years.
But houses are not paid for 100% in cash.
The median home buyer finances 88% of the house price with a fixed-rate mortgage.
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What's really relevant is how much these mortgage installments weigh on your net monthly income.
The red line in the chart measures just that, with the index = 100 in 1990 for comparison.
So how can (mortgage payments / real wages) be pretty low if house prices are high?
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The gold standard (black box) prevented govt to inject large qty of resources in the private sector (big deficits w/o plans to tax back) and banks to create tons of money (strong lending)
Constraining credit creation conflicts with the very human nature - ''I want all, and now''
After '71 (orange box), credit expansion is a completely elastic process - we can freely expand/contract the amount of money in the system.
Obviously, we choose to expand credit very often.
But sometimes deficit hawks prevail and we ''put deficits under control'' (black arrows)
Keep in mind the pace of change matters - decelerating credit creation is enough to slow down YoY GDP and earnings growth.
When you go into net surplus, you are actively draining resources from the private sector.
When the Fed buys bonds, the asset side of banks balance sheet is changed from
x bonds to
x reserves
Both are assets & have good regulatory/liquidity treatment
But bonds earn you coupons and expose you to market risks and volatility
Reserves don't
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If the Fed buys bonds from non-bank financial institutions (e.g. asset managers), their asset side will be changed from x bonds to x bank deposits
Similar story: bonds earn you carry and expose you to interest rate/convexity/credit spreads risks and vol
Bank deposits don't
2/4
Fin.Inst. need to earn coupons to survive
They also have to be exposed to market risks on the asset side to match/hedge the risks on the liabilities' side of their balance sheet
A pension fund holds long duration liabilities and needs long duration assets to hedge risks
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''Who's buying bonds at nominal yields below foreseeable inflation rates?''
I get this question a lot.
The short answer is: regulatory driven price-takers (pension funds, insurance companies, bank treasuries etc).
The more detailed answer in the thread below.
1/n
Let's start from Bank Treasuries.
After the GFC, regulators introduced the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). It forces bank to own a stock of High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) to counter sudden strong outflows of deposits.
Cash and bonds are both HQLA.
Bonds often yield > cash. 2/n
You can't compare a 10y bond with overnight cash.
For a Bank Tsy, O/N cash = CBk depo rate. The term structure for the CB depo rate is the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve.
10y bonds should be compared to 10y OIS swaps.
Treasuries pay you OIS+30 bps on avg.
You buy them. 3/n
Inside money and outside money.
That's your easy way to think about what operations are (at least short-term) inflationary and which ones are asset price inflationary only.
Inside money never reaches the real economy.
Outside money does.
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If the govt spends money it does not plan to collect taxes for, new outside money has been created.
A bank making a new loan literally credits your account out of nowhere (no deposits or reserves strictly needed, just capital and willingness to borrow/lend).
Outside money.
2/10
Can you see how this might be short-term inflationary? Expansion of credit or net govt spending boosts aggregate demand temporarily. Ceteris paribus and with a small lag, this pushes prices up. 2020 is a prime example: massive credit creation + supply bottlenecks = inflation
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