New: Citizen Lab has discovered a new NSO "zero-click" attack that circumvents Apple’s 'BlastDoor' security defenses in iOS 14. At least one activist's iPhone was hacked with Pegasus spyware. Apple said it's aware, but no word yet on a security fix.
The new exploit, called ForcedEntry, targeted a Bahraini human rights activist living in Bahrain, and likely hacked by the Bahraini government using an iOS 14 exploit to deploy Pegasus, said Citizen Lab. Eight other Bahrainis were also targeted, including @moosaakrawi in London.
The eight other Bahrainis were targeted with a different, older kind of NSO zero-click that predates ForcedEntry, called Kismet, which doesn't work on iOS 14 (because of BlastDoor). Five of the activists were on the #PegasusProject list of phone numbers. tcrn.ch/2Winnfc
Apple said BlastDoor was "not the end of its efforts to secure iMessage" and pointed to iOS 15, which is slated for released in the next month or so. But Apple wouldn't say if it had fixed the flaw in current versions of iOS 14, or say when — if at all.
NSO issued a statement today, saying two things: 1) Pegasus wasn't involved in Jamal Khashoggi's murder, and 2) it doesn't have visibility into what customers do or who they target with Pegasus.
I asked NSO for clarification (via Mercury, its London-based crisis communications PR firm). Note the key line here: "If we determine misuse." I asked how it determines that without visibility into its customers' data. NSO basically said, "go read our transparency report."
Questions remain: I asked & was referred to the report:
• How would NSO "determine misuse" exactly?
• What evidence does NSO have that its technology was not used to target Khashoggi?
• Does NSO accept it may not have all the evidence to make a conclusive assessment?
Not the point, but I don't feel particularly solid about the security of a site with no discernible password policy or options for two-factor authentication. I just created a Gettr account with the password "password".
New: Peloton's leaky API let anyone pull members' private user account data, even with their profiles set to private. Worse, when the bug was privately reported earlier this year, Peloton ignored researchers past their 90-day deadline.
Leaky APIs have been the source of recent scraping attacks on Facebook, LinkedIn, and Clubhouse. But Peloton declined to say if it had logs to confirm or rule out any malicious exploitation. That's a question regulators will want to ask though.
New: In the latest #JamCOVID development, the Amber Group broke its silence to say absolutely nothing of value, and the Jamaican government continues to point fingers at everyone other than itself.
A quick refresher: Amber Group runs Jamaica's JamCOVID website and app, but it left thousands of travelers' private data on an unprotected and exposed cloud server. Then the government lied about when it first knew about the security lapse. (2/)
Some background on our story yesterday. TechCrunch discovered the exposed data as part of an investigation into COVID-19 apps, and worked to identify the source and notify them of the breach — as we've done before when we've found security issues. (1/)
We reached out Jamaica's Ministry of Health on Saturday (Feb 13) to make contact. We got a response on Sunday from spokesperson Stephen Davidson asking for more information. We sent details of the exposed server that evening. Davidson did not respond. Server remained open. (2/)
During this time we continued to investigate the breach, and on Tuesday (Feb 16) spoke to two Americans whose data was exposed on the server. They helped to narrow down the source of the breach and the owner of the server — a Jamaican government contractor, Amber Group. (3/)
New: Spyware maker NSO Group used real phone location data on thousands of unsuspecting people when it demoed its new COVID-19 contact-tracing system, dubbed Fleming, to governments and journalists, researchers say. That data was exposed earlier this year. techcrunch.com/2020/12/30/nso…
The Fleming demo had an unprotected back-end database, exposing the location data. Researchers at @ForensicArchi examined that data and concluded that it was not dummy data as NSO claimed, "but rather reflects the movement of actual individuals.
You can read (and watch) @ForensicArchi's full technical report here, including the maps, graphs, and visualizations which explain their findings (while preserving the anonymity of the individuals whose location data was fed into NSO’s Fleming demo.)