July 31: Su-35S crash in Khabarovsk
Aug 11: civilian Mi-8 crash in Kamchatka
Aug 14: Russian Be-200ES crash in Turkey
Aug 17: Il-112V crash in Kubinka
Aug 18: MiG-29SMT crash in Astrakhan
Aug 23: MiG-29SMT catches on fire on the ground in Astrakhan
Aug 27: Su-24 crash in Perm
An Ansat helicopter also made a hard landing on August 23rd. TASS reports that the Su-24 crashed immediately after take off and Interfax reported that both crewmembers ejected safely. Just a really bad month for Russian aviation. 2/ militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=… tass.ru/proisshestviya…
For those asking why there have been so many accidents and crashes this month, I'm not sure, but the training op tempo is likely higher in August and other summer months than during other periods of the year. 4/
After the Su-35S crash in Sakhalin on July 31, the Russian military removed many of its important components and set it on fire to destroy it. This reportedly led to a large forest fire. 6/ vk.com/milinfolive?w=… sakhalin.info/news/211149
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Some initial conclusions from the Zapad 2021 exercise. The most notable difference between Zapad 2021 and Zapad 2017 is that Russia conducted two Yars ICBM launches during Zapad 2017, one at the beginning and end. We didn't publicly see any nuclear weapons used during Zapad 2021.
Does that tell us something about how conflict termination could occur in a conflict with NATO? Is Russia more confident in its conventional deterrence vis-a-vis NATO? There wasn't any escalate to deescalate either. Or would this be reading too much into the exercise? 2/
The Russian MoD said that a Tu-95MS bomber took part in the exercise, but as part of the OPFOR and reportedly focused on testing Russian air defenses. There didn't appear to be any strategic bombers involved in delivering simulated nuclear strikes. 3/ function.mil.ru/news_page/coun…
Pretty crazy story out of the town of Liski near Voronezh today. A man in tactical gear attached an explosive device to the door of a police station and detonated it. He appears to still be on the loose. t.me/zvezdanews/557…
Photos from a SOF shooting tournament in Tulsa with former SSO commander Alexey Dyumin and current SSO specialists. Interestingly, this is the first time I’ve seen SSO specialists wearing gray uniforms and berets. Will they be known as the Gray Berets now? t.me/ok_spn/14438
The cap badge is of the SSO's emblem. It also appears Dyumin is playing around with one of the specialist's berets. 2/ myslo.ru/news/tula/2021…
Obviously, I meant Tula, not Tulsa. Also in attendance was Alexander Matovnikov, another former SSO commander and Dyumin's deputy; Sergei Dyachenko, Deputy of FSO and a former Alfa officer; and Andrei Merzlikin, who received the Hero of Russia award in Tajikistan in 1993. 3/
Thread: The Zapad 2021 operational-strategic exercise has begun in Russia and Belarus with the opening ceremony at the Mulino training area in Nizhny Novgorod (one of the primary ranges for the exercise). The last Zapad exercise occurred in 2017.
The operational-strategic exercise is the most important training event each year for the Russian military, and it rotates between Russia's four main military districts. The past three:
-Southern: Kavkaz 2020
-Central: Tsentr 2019
-Eastern: Vostok 2018
2/
The Northern Fleet was upgraded to a military district last year, but there is no indication it will get its own operational-strategic ex. It typically conducts a simultaneous exercise with the annual exercise and appears to be even more incorporated into this year's Zapad. 3/
Another high-profile Russian military corruption case. Major General Ruslan Alakhverdiev, the Deputy Chief of Engineering Troops, who was responsible for their procurement, was charged with taking bribes worth at least 8 million rubles from contractors. iz.ru/1219084/alekse…
Alakhverdiev has reportedly played a key role in the development of Russia's engineering troops, who have undergone a series of reforms in part influenced by Syria, including the development of assault sapper units and UGVs. 2/
He reportedly took bribes from construction companies that worked on defense contracts (presumably, he helped steer contracts to them). He also used a subordinate to work at his dacha, which was a common issue in the 1990s and early 2000s with senior Russian officers. 3/