I’ve just been catching up with Jackson Hole’s symposium. It had some great papers. But, of course, the attention went to Jay Powell’s speech. Most people liked it. But, reading it today, the speech has made me nervous about US inflation. Here is why. 🧵 ft.com/content/ced452…
I mostly agree with Powell that (1) much of the recent increase in inflation is relative prices not pure inflation, (2) these price changes seem temporary, (3) no pick up in wages so far, (5) global forces are favorable. But not with his discussion of (4) inflation expectations.
Powell started with “as long as longer-term inflation expectations remain anchored” we'll be fine. But I expected that to be followed by: “here is what I will do to anchor them”. Expectations depend on *his* policy choices. They're not some exogenous force federalreserve.gov/newsevents/spe…
I didn't expect Powell to follow with just “Fed will keep inflation close to our 2% objective”. I wanted to hear him loudly affirm his commitment to it. That he'll do whatever it takes to keep the inflation anchor. In short, that we can trust and not change our expected inflation
Instead Powell reported that an index-the CIE-is steady. I’ve done some research on dynamic factor models applied to inflation. Recently, I’ve thought hard about how to combine expectations data from markets and surveys. The CIE is, imho, a flawed measure ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/1…
(Why? Briefly, the CIE throws together some data series that are different in what they measure, ignores how they relate to each other, leaves out some crucial pieces of data, and calculates correlations that are likely unstable over the last 25 years.) bit.ly/3DsPCJa
In household surveys, there is a very large increase in both expected inflation as well as disagreement over the last 12 months. In markets, options prices show a very large increase in the prob. of an inflation disaster. Is the anchor lost? No. But the anchor has drifted a bit.
Later Powell stated that the 1970s saw runaway inflation because after the oil shocks "the public had come to generally expect higher inflation". I disagree, this is not what the data shows. (On Thursday 9/9 I will present new research on the topic.) brookings.edu/project/brooki…
Finally he concludes by saying that “we now monitor inflation expectations so carefully”. I hope so, I thought so, and I continue to believe so. But the speech dented my confidence a little bit. ideas.repec.org/h/bis/bisbpc/1…
Imho, the FOMC has been moving in the right direction in the last few months. My median expectation is still that US inflation is under control. But Jackson Hole's speech did no assuage my mild inflation fears. Instead it intensified them.
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The bread-and-butter of analyses of whether the public debt is sustainable is the government budget constainrt:
Public Debt + PV(govt purchases + transfers) = PV(tax revenues)
(PV is for present value using a discount rate.)
2/14
The cruel side of this equation is that if investors think it won’t hold, because debt is too high, then the discount rate spikes, and the PV of tax revenues crashes. It becomes more likely that country can't pay for the debt. The self-fulfilling nature of sovereign defaults
3/14
** MMT is the new supply-side economics
Forty years ago, some economists started from an uncontroversial (but important) result: a lower tax rate raises the tax base, so revenues won't fall as much. But then they ran with it, predicting tax rate cuts could raise revenues.
1/13
The 80s supply-siders went to the limit and came up with a motto: lower taxes will lower deficits as a norm, not an exception. Many economists shouted this was backwards. It was an implausible limit case. Textbooks called them "charlatans and cranks" or "silly".
2/13
In 80s debates, supply-siders would often fall back to "you don't understand me", repeating "Laffer curve!" endlessly, or stating vacuous accounting identities about how the government collect taxes. Their extreme prediction was repeatedly proven wrong by theory and data.
3/13
*** What is automatic about the automatic stabilizers?
The discussion on the US extending the extra $600 in unemployment benefits has been couched in terms of automatic stabilizers. But if Congress needs to do something about it, how is this automatic? on.wsj.com/33qIhdj
The CARES Act was a discretionary policy; why is repeating it now automatic? The Act by law expires now; isn’t extending it the opposite of automatic?
Like many other non-boring economic concepts, “automatic stabilizers” is used to mean different things bit.ly/2EIYi42
A strict definition of an automatic stabilizer is “The fiscal stabilizers are the rules in law that make fiscal revenues and outlays relative to total income change with the business cycle” The rules make eligibility or size depend on individual conditions personal.lse.ac.uk/reisr/papers/1…
The German constitutional court ruling from ten days ago has gotten a lot of attention for its legal and political implications. Here is my take on the economics from reading the ruling.
[1/13] bit.ly/2Z6FPGK
Most of the ruling is criticisms by the German court (GFCC) of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), and defenses of the GFCC imposing its power. The political & legal implications are serious. The ECB got caught in the no-man's land of this fight.
2/13 on.ft.com/2zLsPfm
The main economic argument is that QE ignored the principle of proportionality. Some have ridiculed its application: the Treaty says the primary goal is price stability giving it a disproportionate weight. I disagree, I think the German court is right
3/13 bit.ly/2XfAiLN
People discussing whether it is going to be a V, U, L, ... recession. I say neither. Sticking to the alphabet, it will be an ABC recovery.
De-trended (and smoothed) GDP will take the shape in this picture:
It's already obvious that freezing the economy causes a sharp fall (A). Once lockdown relaxes, surely there'll be a rebound; some of those constrained will go back to work and spend (B). And, full recovery from a deep scarring recession will very likely take some time (C)
[2/7]
To me, the question on the recession/recovery is not its shape. Rather, the questions are:
-- How deep will A be?
-- How far up will B be?
-- How long between B and C?
An ABC discussion would be better focussed than the VLU debate.
[3/7]
When a country faces a large sudden expense with strains on economy and financial sector, the government massively borrows. Debt markets can't absorb new debt, so the central bank steps in. Is debt being monetized and will inflation soon follow?
[1/12]
The Fed, the Bank of England (and many more) have been buying lots of government debt. To pay for it, they credit the account of banks at the CB. So the banks:
- buy bond from Treasury
- sell it to CB
- get an IOU from CB as digital entry in deposit account at the CB.
[2/12]
No currency is printed. The CB has assets (the government bonds) and liabilities (the deposits of the banks). Its balance sheet blows up. In modern times, we call this quantitative easing (QE). The CB chooses the interest rate to pay on deposits.
[3/12] bit.ly/3cqnyYs