In yesterday’s markup of the National Defense Authorization Act, the House Armed Services Committee voted for three reforms that would help to prevent some of the improper uses of National Guard forces we’ve seen in the past year and a half. 1/14
First, the committee rejected an amendment that would have stripped @EleanorNorton’s D.C. National Guard Home Rule Act from the NDAA. That legislation, championed on the committee by @RepAnthonyBrown, transfers command of the D.C. Guard from the president to D.C.’s mayor. 2/14
As my colleague @josephanunn and I have explained, that’s a long overdue reform. Presidential command of the D.C. National Guard is a relic from an era before D.C. had any local government. 3/14 justsecurity.org/74098/why-d-c-…
Presidential command of the D.C. National Guard also creates a gaping loophole in the Posse Comitatus Act, handing the president a domestic military police force to use at will without having to follow the rules set by Congress. 4/14
Presidential command also means the mayor has to get permission—and go through layers of federal bureaucracy—to use D.C.’s National Guard for any purpose, including to protect public safety in the district. On January 6, that led to delays that may have cost lives. 5/14
Second, the committee voted for an amendment by @RepSherrill clarifying that a governor can’t send her (non-federalized) NG forces into another jurisdiction without that jurisdiction’s consent. Put bluntly, a state can’t militarily invade another U.S. state or territory. 6/14
Last June, that’s exactly what happened. The governors of 11 states agreed to a request by Trump to send their Guard forces to D.C. to police protests, over Mayor Bowser’s objections. Nothing like that had ever happened before. 7/14
The amendment’s opponents argued it would bar presidents from using the NG to enforce civil rights laws in recalcitrant states. @RepSherrill easily knocked down that strawman. Presidents have express legal authority to federalize the Guard in those circumstances. 8/14
…or in this letter to the House Armed Services Committee, signed by 32 organizations from across the ideological spectrum. 11/14 brennancenter.org/our-work/resea…
Finally, the committee voted for an amendment by @RepEscobar that prohibits the use of private funds to finance inter-state deployments of the National Guard, unless the deployment is for emergency or disaster relief purposes. 12/14
Sorry, Governor Noem – next time you want to send the South Dakota NG to the Texas border for a publicity stunt, the voters who pay taxes in your state will have to foot the bill, not a wealthy political donor. 13/14 npr.org/2021/06/30/101…
Congratulations—and many thanks—to @EleanorNorton, @RepAnthonyBrown, @RepSherrill, and @RepEscobar for their hard work on these important reforms! We're a giant step closer to enacting protections against political abuses of our National Guard forces. 14/14
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Today, @BrennanCenter is launching “9/11 at 20”—a series of ten essays offering a high-level critique of national security policies over the past two decades and a vision for our country’s approach to national security in the future. 1/5 brennancenter.org/9-11-at-20
The essays address a range of issues, from racial profiling to secret wars to the future of the Department of Homeland Security. The authors include past and present members of Congress, former senior executive branch officials, legal scholars, and Brennan Center experts. 2/5
The first two essays, posted today, include a call from former senator and current @ACSlaw president @RussFeingold for Congress to reclaim its role as an equal branch of government in national security policy… 3/5 brennancenter.org/our-work/analy…
The bill has three parts. The first part would inject life back into the War Powers Resolution, a 1973 law that was meant to constrain presidential warmaking but has utterly failed to do so. 2/18
The WPR required presidents to notify Congress when U.S. military forces are engaged (or will likely become engaged) in “hostilities.” It mandated an end to such hostilities within 60 days if Congress did not authorize them. 3/18
Anyone who is concerned about government surveillance practices should stop whatever they’re doing and read this statement by Travis LeBlanc, a member of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (@PCLOB_GOV). 1/19 washingtonpost.com/context/statem…
His statement, released with redactions after the gov’t performed a declassification review, is a devastating takedown of the PCLOB's classified 2020 report on “XKEYSCORE,” a tool the NSA uses to process communications obtained without a warrant under Executive Order 12333. 2/19
The NSA doesn’t need a warrant to conduct surveillance under EO 12333 because the data is collected overseas and Americans can't be targeted. But no one denies that EO 12333 surveillance “incidentally” sweeps up Americans’ communications and data, likely in massive amounts. 3/19
Another day, another FISA Court opinion approving a program that sweeps up millions of Americans’ communications, despite finding that the FBI has failed to comply with the rules meant to protect Americans’ privacy. 1/25 intel.gov/assets/documen…
To refresh your recollection, here’s my Tweet thread on the last FISC opinion (issued Dec. 2019) approving Section 702 surveillance in the face of widespread violations of privacy rules by the FBI and NSA:
Basically, the 2019 opinion chided the government for its violations, but the court approved the surveillance on the condition that the government implement new training and record-keeping requirements…3/25
This statement by two PCLOB members suggests that PCLOB decided to abandon its original plan to conduct oversight of EO 12333 apart from its three "deep dives." In other words, they're not pretending the April 2 report constitutes EO 12333 oversight. 1/5 documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents…
I suppose it's good that they recognize that. But why did only two members join this statement? The report itself should clearly state that PCLOB decided against pursuing a general EO 12333 oversight project, and the report is intended merely as an explainer for laypersons. 2/5
Moreover, PCLOB apparently concluded that a "very broad oversight review" of EO 12333 would be too resource-intensive. That might be true. But there are certainly discrete questions PCLOB could have explored (and still could!) that would produce enormous value... 3/5
The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) has issued its long-awaited “capstone report” on Executive Order 12333, which was six years in the making. All I can say is: what a colossal disappointment. 1/18 documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents…
PCLOB can create value in two main ways: (1) by disclosing information about counterterrorism programs/practices that wasn’t previously public, and (2) by assessing the civil liberties implications of CT programs/practice and making recommendations. 2/18
PBLOB’s 2014 reports on the NSA’s bulk collection of Americans’ phone records (the “Section 215 report”) and on Section 702 surveillance served both functions. The EO 12333 “capstone” report serves neither. 3/18