One for my MEV friends: I always said that EIP-1559 has no impact on MEV, but is that true? Assume we are still in PGA world and no bundles
1. in EIP-1559, the goal is for many txns to have the same priority fee (1-2 gwei, wallet default) 2. miners tend to group same-fee txns
3. as a front/backrunner, how do you communicate your target position to miners? Using less gwei would put you behind the entire batch (bad case) or even out of the block entirely (worst case). Using more gwei would put you ahead of the entire batch (bad case)
4. If the above were true (and remember only PGAs no bundles), then EIP-1559 would effectively lead to batch settlement instead of ordering by gas price which makes front/backrunning harder.
However:
a) It depends on how miners group their txns. Standard used to be by gas price, but what breaks the tie between same price txns? Can either be randomized or first-seen.
b) If it‘s first-seen, backrunning changes from a bidding war to a latency war. Think a seeing a 1 gwei txn and then immediately sending the miner your own 1 gwei txn as well. So backrunning MEV only changes but isn‘t removed.
c) We naively assumed that there are no bundles, but this thread shows by both searchers and miners
*want* this txn type to exist. When they can communicate exact ordering preferences, the total value of the block goes up, at the expense of the users.
So bundles will always be invented, only question is they are invented as a private/proprietary sidechannel between some searchers/miners or globally available for all. So IMO futile to long for a pre-bundle world.
Summary: I posited that EIP-1559 effectively batches many txns, breaking the way searchers used to express ordering preferences in a PGA. Do you agree/disagree? Share your thoughts
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- actively ignores due process: this could never pass EIP process
- power grab & attempt to shoehorn rent into core protocol parameters by a rogue team + VC investors
I am watching very closely who supports this & have alrdy updated my priors accordingly.
I was offered to invest in this before it launched & declined immediately. Horrible project
Why do many hacks and rugpulls coincide with overall market downturns?
Same reason crime explodes in an economic depression.
People stop seeing the market as a long-term positive-sum game. Instead, they switch into survival mode, taking with force what the market „owes“ them.
For most people, this means making self-destructive moves, like using high leverage to „make it all back in one trade“.
Others are willing to take from other people - by force.
There are two important takeaways from this:
1) In theory, smart contracts allow us to build applications that require no trust in the developers.
In practice, there‘s a near endless number of governance apologists, telling you that this or that loophole is necessary.
My workflow: 1) Establish an encrypted channel between Argent and a Defi app via Walletconnect. This only needs to be done once for each app. 2) Make all my txns on desktop 3) Review and sign the txn on the Argent mobile app, which acts as a 2FA
A smart-contract wallet, as the name suggests, is an on-chain contract. It has one signer key and several guardians (think of those as an on-demand multi-sig setup).
The signer key is generated in the Secure Enclave of your phone, and it can never leave from there.
@AviFelman, who is Head of Trading at BlockTower. Avi is not just a great trader, he also wrote the terrific CryptoAM turned TowerWatch newsletter (discontinued in 2020). For Deribit Insights, Avi will pick up the pen once again. blocktower.substack.com
@benjaminsimon97, who does research and investment analysis for Mechanism Capital, one of the most successful Defi funds. Ben is a strong writer with two guest articles on Deribit Insights already under his belt.
One of the most common questions we get around EIP-1559 is how predictable the price of getting into the next block will be. Or in other words, how often will you able to pay the current basefee + minimum tip compared to the system degrading to today’s first-price auction (FPA)?
First, a quick excursion: Why do blockchains need to put a price on scarce resources anyway? 1) To maximize user welfare (allocate resources to those who gets the most utility from them) 2) To minimize the social cost txns have on other nodes
To cap the social cost, Ethereum currently puts a hard gas limit of 12.5m on blocks. As of right now, the marginal price of each unit of gas is around 120 Gwei. In other words, at a marginal price of 120 Gwei, there is 12.5m gas worth of demand to transact.