So there's been a bit of cross-talk about the shape of the current academic jobs market on this here birdsite today I think a lot of it was very anecdotal and experiential and so a lot of people talked past each other.
I like data, so let's focus on some, with this chart: 1/25
It is a chart of the number of jobs posted to the AHA per year as compared to number of PhDs graduated (from their job report: historians.org/ahajobsreport2…)
I'm focused on history because that was the argument this week, but most humanities look like this; many look worse. 2/25
What we can see pretty clearly is that from 1978 to 2008, the number of job postings and the number of PhDs graduating is fairly well correlated. Economic contractions (e.g. '82-'87 or '02-'04) do cause lower hiring (often on a short delay)... 3/25
But that is followed by bounce-backs ('87-'91 and '04-'08) which make up - or more than make up! - the difference. Presumably in the bad years you would have new PhDs finding themselves 'stuck' on the job market, but they'd be reabsorbed in the good years that followed. 4/25
You can see that in the assumptions that get made by academics who remember these years. I was absolutely still hearing older academics in 2017-2019 assuming that sure their new grads might be stuck adjuncting for a year or two, but that would pass. 5/25
They assumed that because it was true in the job market they remembered.
But that job market is dead. Super dead. Cadaverrific. 6/25
The other comment I've seen is the assumption that, on a year-to-year comparison that the bad years now aren't that much worse than the bad years then or that 2021 isn't meaningfully worse than 2012 was. 7/25
The issue with that is that this is a stocks-and-flows problem. Each year that the number of new PhDs is much higher than the number of jobs, the job market is essentially picking up job-debt, because those PhDs do not go away or poof out of existence. 8/25
Some handful of them, each year, give up and do something else. Of the people I know in that category, very few of them are happy about it. Universities and sometimes departments like to say nice things about alt-ac, but fairly few people in alt-ac WANT to be. 9/25
It's not *none* mind you, some people thrive in alt-ac jobs...but there's a lot of bitterness and broken dreams in alt-ac too, especially since many supposedly alt-ac jobs don't even remotely require a PhD. They're not alt-ac jobs, they're just jobs. 10/25
But of course a lot of a given year's unlucky candidates do not just leave. They get adjunct gigs, or teach high school, or university admin jobs or whatever and then apply again because they want to actually get the job they spent a decade training for. 11/25
There are a ton of scholars on that particular merry-go-round on this birdsite.
That means that each year the job market is bad (blue line below orange line), it is getting worse, because most of the gap from the previous year rolls over into the next. 12/25
So when you are assessing 2019, you don't just want to think in terms of comparing it to another year, you need to be thinking 2019, plus most of the 2018 jobs gap, and the 2017 jobs gap, and the 2016 jobs gap. 13/25
In history, that gap only goes back really to 2008, but in some other humanities disciplines, hiring has been underwater since the 90s. The terrifying thing about the history graph is that for the humanities, history is relatively *better* than most. 14/25
All of that then runs into this year. Obvious there's no data for this year, but signs point to a year probably not meaningfully better than 2019 or 2020. But we know one thing that is likely to be higher: PhDs granted. 15/25
Most departments I have knowledge of either formally or informally did the same thing: they extended all of their PhDs an extra year. Which means both the classes of 2020 and 2021 are going to be on the market this year. Along with a *decade's* worth of job debt. 16/25
Of course everyone thinks they have it hard! We are humans and so we can feel our own hardships but can only observe the hardships of others.
But, my friends, this is why we have data. And the data tells us that, yes indeed the current situation is *different.* 17/25
I understand why it seems like so many academics off of the job market want to believe that current conditions aren't *that* different from what they experienced. It's comforting, it lets them believe that they got their jobs from merit and not luck... 18/25
...that if they were on this job market today, they'd succeed there too. Those kids, they think, just need to stick it out a year or two, like I did! There's comfort there.
But just because something is comforting doesn't make it true. 19/25
Worse yet, that vision provides an excuse not to do anything, to tell one's self that, with a bit of (someone else's) elbow grease, at least the 'worthy' candidates will all find jobs. 20/25
But a system with this much of a mismatch stops being able to detect the best candidates. Given so many candidates and so few hires, departments hire 'for promise' accepting sight-unseen candidates with good pedigrees.
You can see it here: 21/25
It sure seems to me that most departments have at least one disaster hired 'for promise' so this is hardly good for departments either.
Meanwhile good candidates with great CVs languish because they were unlucky in that crucial first year...22/25
...and hiring committees that don't understand what has changed don't give them a second look because they assume that if you've been on the market for 3-4 years you must be bad.
But that's just *normal* now - those candidates are fine! 23/25
Solutions? 1) Jobs-having academics need to abandon the comforting lies for the uncomfortable, data-driven truth. Yes, the job market is different now. 2) Stop 'hiring for promise.' It's a bad strategy that is all about delaying compromises by accepting risk. 24/25
And finally: 3) The market is never coming back. Given that, grad programs need to cut slots, probably by about half. Keeping current numbers is actively perpetuating a system of academic exploitation - and we all know what we think about labor exploiters.
end/25
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Just finished playing an odd little computer wargame, "Highfleet" (it's on Steam because of course it is).
Pretty sure I'll end up talking about it on ACOUP because it is different from most commercial wargames in interesting ways.
Mostly, it forces you to play w/ uncertainty.
So the briefest background is that you play as the commander of a retro-futuristic fleet of air-battleships. Your ships can engage with cruise missiles and aircraft outside of visual range or with traditional artillery or short-range missiles in close combat.
Honestly, don't think real hard about the technology here; it isn't supposed to make hard-sci-fi sense.
The thing is, you generally both trying to find and defeat enemy groups but also avoid detection, because the enemy overall is much stronger than you.
This week on the blog @DrMichaelJTayl1 presents a Defense of the Classics, setting out a number of reasons why we need to work to save Classics (the study of the ancient world) as an academic discipline and the clear benefits for doing so.
This is a perspective I'm very eager to present. Classics has been under a lot of pressure for years now, with funding cuts and shrinking or even disbanded departments at major universities.
It is a discipline that needs to grapple with the real danger of fading away.
That pressure has prompted a lot of classicists to think and argue really hard about what Classics needs to be in a modern university. Those discussions are fair and good.
But debates about what Classics should be won't matter if we don't have a field by the time we decide.
Strategic decision-making in a global framework is tough, especially when any decision you make is going to hurt someone, somewhere.
But I'd argue less difficult is the suggestion that the the USA, that we have an obligation to help as many Afghans get out as we can.
After the Fall of Saigon, hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese (the 'boat people') fled the new regime. We resettled 402,382 of them; there are now 2.2 million Vietnamese Americans, some from that wave of refugees, some not.
And Vietnamese-Americans are great!
I don't see our responsibility vanishing after the last plane lifts off from the soon-to-be-renamed Hamid Karzai Airport. If the Taliban are half as bad as I think it is reasonable to expect, there will be waves of Afghan refugees. Many of them will be people that helped us.
Hey this is a great question about what we're able to know about the sarisa, the Macedonian pike - the key weapon of the infantry under Alexander the Great but also the Hellenistic successors states (the Seleucids, Ptolemies, Antigonids, etc).
Let's start with the archaeology. Reconstructing the sarisa really hinges on a handful of artifacts from a single site - in particular just six damaged metal objects from the Macedonian royal tombs at Aigai.
Here they are (image from Connolly (2000):
2/xx
These were recovered and published by a Greek archaeologist, M. Andronicos; they were recovered outside the tomb, perhaps looted and then discarded; so probably not in their original location of deposition which leaves their relationships to each other unclear. 3/xx
This week on the blog: More Victoria II! We're continuing our look at @PdxInteractive 's industrial revolution Grand Strategy game by asking how it handles war in the period and why - in a game about WWI - the best move is not to fight at all.
This is the post in this series I've most wanted to write, because I think this is perhaps the best example of the promise of a simulation approach to historical gaming...and consequently, despite Vicky2's well established jank, the crowning triumph of Paradox design.
The genius here is that for all of the simplification and abstraction, the game systems do a good enough job of simulating both rising productivity and the rising destructiveness of war to create the same effect we view historically where after a point war doesn't 'pay.'
Apparently in a recent podcast a pair of fairly influential thinkers on what may be fairly called the far-right mulled over the idea that the USA might need an 'American Caesar.'
This is a stunningly awful idea and betrays tremendous ignorance of, y'know - actual Caesar? 1/x
I'm not going to delve into the aboslutely nutty politics of this (for that, see the excellent work of my friend and intellectual historian of American conservatism, @Joshua_A_Tait , e.g.: thebulwark.com/anti-democrati…).
But I do think it is worth discussing Caesar. 2/x
Julius Caesar tends to get a bit of a soft glow in popular memory, in part because it was *profoundly* impolitic for later ancient writers to criticize Caesar strongly when living under the regime set up by his nephew.