Thread by @adrianzenz

NEW evidence implicates Xi's inner circle in Xinjiang's re-education campaign:
Central gov't institutions headed by top Politburo figures had multi-year close involvement in planning & approval of re-education in "vocational centers".
My report: /1
jamestown.org/program/eviden…

Between 2015-17, Beijing's National People's Congress (NPC) was closely consulted for the March 2017 Regulation on Deradicalization that legalized & preceded the internments, & approved its 2018 revision that bluntly defined Vocational "Centers" as "re-education institutions." /2

This key Regulation standardized & legitimized the re-education detentions, mandating "centralized" "re-education" involving "behavioral correction".

It immediately preceded the internments in 03/2017 (see e.g. charts from my 2018 report for the correlation)./3

Also involved were the Central Committee Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group, and the the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA). /4

For the Oct-2018 revision that inserted the mandate that re-education takes place through "vocational training centers," key Xinjiang officials made a "special trip" to Beijing to present the revisions to the NPC legal committee.

The NPC gave its "approval" & made amendments./5

This crucially implicates a core central government institution in the process of "legalizing" and legitimizing the internments./6

China's Politburo Standing Committee consists of only 7 members, with Xi 1st ranked and Li Keqiang 2nd. The 3rd and 4th ranked members head two of the institutions closely involved in drafting/approving the re-education legislation: /7

1. The chairman of the NPC Standing Committee (currently Li Zhanshu, 栗战书) to whom the Legislative Affairs Commission reports, is the third-ranked member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). /8

2. The head of the Central Committee Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group (currently Wang Yang, 汪洋), is the fourth-ranked member of the PSC, and also chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). /9

This figure illustrates the role of the Politburo Standing Committee as China's top decision-/policy-making body. /10
(Source :sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R41007…)

When introducing the 2017 Regulation (that legalized "centralized" re-education), Xinjiang's authorities gave a press conference on March 31, 2017, right before the internment campaign, and made the following blunt statement: /11

"[It was] emphasized that the Regulation … constitutes the implementation of the central government’s policy decisions and deployments, especially to implement the important instructions and requirements of General Secretary Xi Jinping…" /12

This was followed by stern admonitions:
"...strengthen ... inspection of the implementation of the Regulation, increase the intensity of conducting thorough investigations, ... punish at every turn, discover problems, deal with them seriously, [in order to] create deterrents"/13

In November 2018, at the peak of the internments and after the revised Revision admitted the existence of "vocational centers" for "transformation through education," a leading Xinjiang official made the following blunt statement:

/14

"[C]arrying out Vocational Skills Education and Training work [the camps] in accordance with the law [the revised Regulation] is an important measure to implement the CCP Central Committee’s strategy of governing Xinjiang, with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core." /15

When the adverse impact of the internments on XJ economy and society was peaking, key intellectual groups in XJ were likewise told that the campaign represented an implementation of the will of the central government - likely to legitimize it (& show resistance is futile): /16

In late 2018, Xinjiang University lecturers visited the camps and presented their findings to colleagues and students. Their collective response is recorded as follows: /17

"Everyone [all present lecturers & students] believes that the establishment of the Vocational Skills Education and Training Centers is a major measure taken by [Xinjiang] to implement [Beijing's] CCP Central Committee’s strategy of governing Xinjiang…" /18

Up to now, such statements linking the camps to the central government might have been viewed as mere platitudes. However, w/ the new evidence, it is clear that they are sincere, legitimizing the camps as implementing Beijing's will (rather than being a local excess). /19

Xi himself gave a non-published speech in March 2017 at the Two Sessions, weeks before the internments began. The report discusses the context, evidence and circumstances surrounding this speech. [I'll do a separate thread on that later] /20

Report link: jamestown.org/program/eviden… /21