'Evergrande is an economic time bomb for China and potentially Australia'
If the Chinese construction and manufacturing boom ends up in serious trouble that affects Australian exports to China. Puts recent debates relating to China and Australia in context news.com.au/finance/busine…
See also the UK urban property market
The weak link in the AUKUS deal to protect Australia is Australia
The debate of the last few days replicates many problems in analysis and punditry over EU and EU neighbourhood issues that are my area of research. Suddenly a mass of generalist scholars and analysts grab a new development without digging into wider regional and economic contexts
That's not to diminish the AUKUS deal as a great arms deal for some UK manufacturers specialised in sub design and shipbuilding, or that it doesn't incrementally enhance a set of pre-existing relationships between states. Just a lot of context seems to get glossed over.
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Sounds a bit like Bulgarian or Romanian Prime Ministers visiting Ankara to see whether off ramps or face-saving measures can be worked out so the EU can avoid a row without budging on the Customs Union or EEZs
EU leader meets difficult neighbouring state leader X to scope out off-ramps that enable neighbouring state leader X to adjust to EU demands without losing face is pretty standard EU politics stuff. Sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn't
A healthy outcome of this mess would be Paris and every other European military player coming to terms with the fact that no European state has the reach to be a substantial security actor in the Indo-Pacific and focus finite resources on problems closer to the EU's borders
The EU has geoeconomic reach on a global scale but its institutions and states (along with UK) only have military resources to be primary actors in regions around Euro-Atlantic and Med areas. Compared to regional powers in the Indo-Pacific even France there is at best second rank
So much UK and France posturing over the Indo-Pacific that apes US strategic fashions reflects hankering to be seen as one of the big boys rather than hard-headed calculation over what European states can do outside their regions and whether a US approach is in European interests
All those EU strategic autonomy gotcha takes that have journos in stitches from a country that can't get a functioning border system together capable of running basic checks on goods from the EU
The Australian nuclear submarine programme to deter China will be financed by an Australian economy dependent on China worldstopexports.com/australias-top…
The shock in Paris when it turns out that EU strategic autonomy means Europe's strategy is determined in Brussels
Before writing that thinkpiece about how the UK can leverage its partnerships to assist a US strategy, first step back and ask what exactly in that US strategy is in UK interests and what is not.
I somehow doubt pushing an aircraft carrier around the South China Sea that gets pulled back into Europe the moment there is a crisis nearer to the UK's home waters will keep PLAN awake at night.
And before setting out whether the EU is well-suited or not to great power game around the South China Sea, worth asking whether this is even a game that an EU or UK facing a lot of problems closer to home should even be playing.
It was clear the UK had manoeuvred itself into a shit position which gave the EU overwhelming leverage five years ago. Westminster rules do not apply to geopolitical power struggles.