Thread by @morcos_pierre

I saw many comments explaining that the US-Australian-UK deal is the result of France preaching for European strategic autonomy ("You got what you wished for"). This is a complete misconception of France’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific. A 🧵👇

France’s approach to the Indo-Pacific has never been about autonomy but about *inclusivity* and *multilateralism*.

While being clearheaded about the challenges posed by China, France has always been mindful of not fueling the growing rivalry between Washington and Beijing in the region.

As stressed in the recently updated French Indo-Pacific strategy, this 🇺🇸🇨🇳 rivalry "has extended to the military sphere". "The risks of uncontrolled escalation are [therefore] great in this region, which lacks crisis regulation mechanisms".

Against this backdrop, France has promoted for years an "open and inclusive" Indo-Pacific by building regional partnerships and by promoting multilateralism.

When it comes to partnerships, France has developed diplomatic and military ties with key countries of the region (notably 🇮🇳, 🇯🇵and, once upon a time, 🇦🇺). As explained by @Rory_Medcalf and @MohanCRaja, these "middle power coalitions" are ways of building regional resilience.

Regarding multilateralism, Paris has been active in various fora. In the Indian Ocean only, France is chairing this year the Indian Ocean Commission, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium and has joined the Indian Ocean Rim Association last year.

France has also been a strong advocate of a greater European role in the region. Not to single out the EU but to harness EU tools for the benefit of the region (trade, connectivity, research, rule of law, maritime security).

One final and essential point, France has *never* seen itself as equidistant between Washington and Beijing. Paris considers the 🇺🇸 as its ally while China is defined in the French strategic review as a "systemic rival, an economic competitor and sometimes a diplomatic partner".

Over the past months, the French military has actually intensified its cooperation with the U.S. armed forces. Let me give you four striking examples.

1. Early 2021, France deployed for the first time one of its nuclear-powered submarines in the region. The Emeraude sailed through the South China sea, trained with local navies and did port calls in Perth (Australia) and Guam (United States).
scmp.com/news/china/dip…

2. In April 2021, the Australian, Indian, Japan and U.S. navies trained with France in the Bay of Bengal in the French-led exercise La Perouse.
navy.mil/Press-Office/N…

3. In May 2021, France participated in Kyushu in an amphibious exercise with the United States and Japan aiming at testing their ability to defend remote islands.
asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Inter…

4. Finally, last July, the French air force was able to project for the first time three French Rafales from France to Polynesia in less than 48 hours, with one stop in California. The Rafales then trained with U.S. F-22s in Hawaii.
breakingdefense.com/2021/07/inside…

To make a long story short, this is highly misleading to imply that France’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific was the core reason behind Australia’s decision to abandon the submarine project.

Paris was not pushing Canberra away from Washington, quite the contrary. Armed forces of the there countries regularly trained together. The U.S. industry was part of the Franco-Australian submarine program. And there were increasing diplomatic alignment between three capitals.

Now, all this progressive but major convergence is jeopardized because of opportunist and short-sighted calculations. [End]