The data wasn't deleted, it was backed-up (well, probably).
I did my own forensics analysis of the Mesa County servers. Retention rules would demand that data be backed-up externally. Thus, seeing data deleted locally wouldn't mean anything.
I can't confirm they were backed-up properly, or if the backups were deleted elsewhere. There's suggestions of connecting to both a NAS and an external drive, so I see hints they were.
I just know that "retention" would imply "external storage" from the server.
The way that Dominion "updates" work isn't "software updates" like you and I are familiar with. Instead, an "update" of this server applying a whole new system image, which wipes out whatever was on the server beforehand.
Thus, every Dominion "update" wipes out whatever logs or election data are on a system. Thus, the only way a Dominion customers has to abide by "data retention" rules is external backups, which a forensics investigation of the system can't prove happened.
For all we know, they attach a USB drive and copy a system-image right before attaching a different USB drive and writing the new, updated system-image. No matter how you interpret things, a forensics of the these images will not prove "data was deleted".
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You have two choices:
#1 fall back on the "experts have debunked it". I'm an expert, I've debunked it.
#2 spend considerable amount of time understanding the issue so that you can competently debate it and answer questions, which frankly, isn't worthy your time
The short answer is this: the forensics investigators looked only at the C: boot drive, not the D: data drive were records are preserved. Thus, they could not have said whether or not records were correctly preserved according to state law.
Secondly, it's not a valid forensics report, because among other things, they violate forensics ethics by not putting their name on it and redacting information without disclosing the fact of redaction to the reader.
So one of the funny things from that "Mesa County Dominion deletes files" report is the screenshot they take of the report produced by the FTK Imager.
It's missing a line of text: the name of the examiner who created the image. The name was "cjh" which many claim is Conan Hayes
With the magic of cryptography, we KNOW for certain the name was deliberately removed in that graphic. That's because the MD5/SHA1 hashes confirm this is the SAME system image that was posted online during Lindell's Cybersymposium.
Yes yes, I know, both MD5 and SHA1 are broken and it's possible to create two files with the same hashes, that SHA2 needs to be used to actually be certain. But it still would require participation of the person who created them -- not something done after the fact.
1/ One of the problems with hacking is that you are always certain you are going it in the sub-optimal, least elegant fashion.
Such is the case in my examination of those disk images from the Mesa County election computer. A natural question is to grab password hashes.
2/ The standard free utility for examining a disk image is "Autopsy". There are more expensive commercial offerings. Autopsy has a lot of really cool plugins. I assume it would have one for password hashes, but I can't find one.
3/ So I do it the inelegant way. I simply go through the filesystem and extract the SAM, SECURITY, and SYSTEM registry "hives" (aka. files in registry format).
When the leaders threatened violence against me because they wanted the table I was sitting at, they reason was "because we are all in this together" and thus my individual desire must be subordinate to the group desire.
It was a weird world where facts didn't matter. For example, signs claimed the 1% didn't pay taxes, when in fact the top 1% of income earners earn about 20% of the income and pay 40% of income taxes.
I remember being in line a the nearby Starbucks while the Occupy guys behind me were strategizing how they could get the police to arrest protestors, such as walking in the middle of the street.
3/ The indictment shows how Tech-Executive-1 at a big Internet company directed people at two startups he invested in to go hunting in private databases (like netflow logs and DNS lookup logs) to find dirt on Trump.