And apparently Naval Base Guam isn't one naval base, it's 12!
And the Naval Hospital is a "base", too!
Even by the source document's absurd standards, the number of "bases" is 439, with 300+ yet smaller facilities called "lily pads", or even "unconfirmed".
Oh hey, the New Sanno Hotel in Tokyo is a "base", too. It's a hotel. For US military and govt, but it's a hotel.
Anyone care to guess if "Yokohama No Dock Navy" and "Yokohama North Dock" is double-counting basically the same thing?
This is what two "overseas U.S. bases" looks like.
Ok, enough, you get the idea.
Sad thing is, there're reasonable arguments to be made that we have too many bases, or that they're in the wrong places, or aren't set up to do the right things. But bad data trumpeted in support of an agenda IMO isn't a great way to make the point.
Last week saw the publication in @ForeignAffairs of this article by Zhou Bo, a Senior Fellow at a Tsinghua University think tank and a retired Senior Colonel in the Chinese PLA.
The gist is that mostly due to US pushback at the rise of the PRC, the US-PRC relationship has deteriorated. But the two nations should talk more & work together where they can.
IMO the article has many misleading statements and half-truths, and serves as propaganda.
Zhou starts by stating the Chinese government experienced "surprise" at U.S. competition and is determined to "fight back", as if China was only reacting to an unprovoked American reaction to a peacefully-rising China.
Anyone know what this NOTAM off of Baja California is about?
Is the Russian Federation firing rockets to impact off the west coast of N America? If so, what rockets?
Ok, did a bit more looking into this this morning - bottom line, I think it's an impact area for a humdrum Russian space launch.
There's another NOTAM impact area at the same times in the Barents for Russian space launch activities.
If you connect the dots from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, to the Barents impact area, to the East Pacific impact area, they're all almost in a straight line.
So I imagine this is for a launch from there, with the stage booster drop into the Barents, and the 2nd into EastPac.
PRC FERRY UPDATE: the Bohai Ferry BO HAI BAO ZHU has deviated from its normal route across the Yellow Sea, and appears headed south.
Of note, it's transmitting a false AIS destination - that it's operating from Dalian to Yantai - when it's clearly not headed to Yantai.
At the same time, its sister ship Bo Hai Zhen Zhu now appears headed to Xiamen, after loading near Nanjing and then heading up to Ningbo, though it doesn't appear it moored at Ningbo.
As a reminder, both ferries are part of the PLA-associated Bohai Ferry Group.
Now that the 2023 ship launch numbers are in (or at least my best guess of them), it's time for an update on the last 10 years worth of PLA Navy shipbuilding, and how it compares the production from the U.S. and allied navies.
These estimates will generally cover ships launched from 2014-2023, and will include ships useful in high intensity combat/power projection: subs, carriers, amphibious assault ships, surface combatants, ocean going fleet auxiliaries (e.g., tankers), and mine warfare ships.
First, let’s look at hull count. By my estimate, the PLAN launched 157 warships over the years 2014-2023. As always, these numbers are from open source data for ship launches which China doesn't always publicize, so don't @ me if you have a niggle with them. 🤷♂️
UDPDATE: a few months back I provided this update on one of China's shipyard construction projects - the expansion of Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard—a major supplier to the PLA Navy, building mostly frigates and amphibious assault ships.
So yesterday I decided to grab some imagery (from @planet via @SkyWatchApps) to see how things were proceeding. I expected to see continued construction progress.
What I didn't expect to see is that THEY ARE ALREADY BUILDING SHIPS THERE. 😯
There have been rumors in the media that this new yard would start construction of a new class of amphibious assault ship - the Type 076. And it looks like that might well be the case. scmp.com/news/china/mil…
This is an interesting & engaging article by @james_acton32 on counterforce vs. counter-value nuclear targeting. Which targeting philosophy to follow (or even what they mean) is a question on which reasonable people can and do disagree. warontherocks.com/2023/11/two-my…
That said, I think the "myths" that the article centers on and debunks in discussing the issue are a bit of a straw man - in that IMO few people who know anything about nuclear targeting/policy actually believe them.
Let's look at the evidence he puts forward in support of Myth 1. First, there's the primary link describing the them...
Oops, broken link!
Now, this happens. Authors can't control web site changes. (Most links for my older articles are broken.) But this article is 1 day old. 🤷♂️