And apparently Naval Base Guam isn't one naval base, it's 12!
And the Naval Hospital is a "base", too!
Even by the source document's absurd standards, the number of "bases" is 439, with 300+ yet smaller facilities called "lily pads", or even "unconfirmed".
Oh hey, the New Sanno Hotel in Tokyo is a "base", too. It's a hotel. For US military and govt, but it's a hotel.
Anyone care to guess if "Yokohama No Dock Navy" and "Yokohama North Dock" is double-counting basically the same thing?
This is what two "overseas U.S. bases" looks like.
Ok, enough, you get the idea.
Sad thing is, there're reasonable arguments to be made that we have too many bases, or that they're in the wrong places, or aren't set up to do the right things. But bad data trumpeted in support of an agenda IMO isn't a great way to make the point.
I have great respect for retired Adm. Dennis Blair's service as PACOM commander & DNI.
That said, I think his new @ForeignAffairs article significantly underestimates how much the cross-Strait military balance has changed in the years since those roles. foreignaffairs.com/china/mirage-c…
To be clear, I agree with some of Adm. Blair's conclusions.
An amphibious invasion would be quite difficult (though not impossible). Military options short of invasion are unlikely to achieve Beijing's political objectives, and continued allied investment remains essential.
But as I read the article, I kept finding myself thinking: that doesn't seem right.
He says that U.S. and allied leaders must not be complacent; but this article seems just the thing to inspire such complacency—despite the PRC military threat many have come to appreciate.
...at most times and most places, without significant fear of attack. The U.S. does not currently appear to have Sea Control of the SoH, and if anything Iran appears to be executing Sea Denial based on the lack of traffic.
Regardless of the SoH, due to the internationalization of shipping even if the U.S. did control the SoH, that does not mean a blockade of China. Ships can change flags, cargoes can be rerouted or even sold en-route.
From @USCC_GOV testimony today: U.S. naval intelligence assesses the PLA Navy is shifting from mostly-diesel-electric to ALL-NUCLEAR submarine construction.
Other highlights: while the U.S. submarine industrial base struggles to meet it production goals, the PRC's submarine production capacity has increased 2-3X since 2010.
I’m excited to share that @ChinaMaritime has just released a short paper I co-wrote with Mike Dahm titled “Flooding the Zone: The Use of Civilian Landing Craft (LCTs) in PLA Amphibious Operations”.
This paper follows the surprising observation last year that the PLA appears to be using civilian “LCTs” - a civilian derivative of WWII landing craft - to go straight to the beach in practice landing exercises.
...first up, China's nuclear warhead totals. This year's report says that warhead production has slowed, with a total in the low 600s, but that the PLA is still on track to have 1000+ warheads by 2030.
Regarding China's early warning capability, we get a lot more specificity than I've seen before: that China now has IR warning satellites that can detect and warn of an incoming ICBM within minutes.
Last week saw the release of the 2025 China Military Power Report (CMPR). For those not familiar, this is DoD’s Congressionally-mandated unclassified update on the Chinese military. It’s an annual feast of open-source data.
So, here are few thoughts (Part 1) on the report:
I'll focus on those things that I thought were most noteworthy: significant changes from previous reports, reveals of information not previously seen in the open-source world, etc.
Where there is a point of comparison I'll have the new report on the left, older on the right.
The new report is fairly different: for one thing, it clocks in at 100 pages to the previous report's 182.
From the top, the preface differs: the 2024 report's reads mostly like an intel product, where there's more proclamation of administration policy in the new one.