Thread by @FinestYew

Thread on the 1965 SSG drop that has subsequently become a quite the meme

TL;DR:
SSG commandos were dropped into Punjab & attempted to capture airfields. Was a hilarious failure with groups of civilians, NCC cadets & support staff capturing & destroying most of the "elite" units

Contrary to the present, the Pakistani Army in the recent past had quite a few competent officers. Two of them (possibly) the best in the Army would play a role in the creation of the SSG.

One of them was the "father" of the SSG; Maj Gen AO Mitha, who instrumental in creating a special force that had 'teeth'.

He was beloved by those who served under him but would be stripped of his medals (HeJ) and pensions without due cause post the 71 war; a scapegoat.

The other was another legendary officer Colonel Syed Ghaffar Mehdi, MC. Born in India to one of the 12 Syed Clans, he fought in WW2 on the Burma front, where he earned a MC.

He was a straight talking, no nonsense, force of nature who transformed the SSG from a guerilla force to the proper commando force we know it to be today.

Planning:

The initial air assault operation was conceived by the PAF Chief Air Marshal Asgar Khan as a contingency plan in the offing that India decided to invade.

The actual execution of the plan was left to the Group Commander of the SSG, who at this point in time was Col Mehdi. Col Mehdi had persistently opposed such an operation, pointing out the many flaws in the operation.

He had pointed out that the enemy airforce would need to be crippled & that any force dropped behind enemy lines would be operating in extremely hostile territory given that the populace wasn't too keen on supporting them.

Inspite of this, he argued, if the element of surprise & accurate information were in Pakistani favour, he spelled out the prerequisites for SSG involvement.

These were
a) The operation would have to be mounted early at night.

b) They must be dropped on the target or extremely close to it.

c) Exfiltration would occur via aircraft landing on the captured airfields, or via rendezvous with a helicopter, due to the vast distances from friendly lines to the target area.

d)An accurate and up-to-date analysis of the target, its characteristics, size, shape and dimensions of its defences, and peculiarities of the general environments in which the target existed would need to be provided.

Aside from exfiltration, most of the plan made sense.

*This is where it goes horribly wrong*

On 22 July 1965, Air Marshal Asghar Khan retired. The new C-in-C, Air Marshal Nur Khan, had too much to catch up on & left the planning to Gp Capt Dogar and Col Mehdi.

Col Mehdi, a man who suffered no fools, fell out with the Army C-in-C, for opposing the utilisation of commandos in OP GIBRALTAR. On 31 August, he was replaced by Lt Col Abdul Matin.

Nuts & Bolts:

Dogar & Matin decided upon the 4 airfields of Adampur, Ambala, Pathankot and Halwara as the targets.

(Ambala would be dropped a day before the attack)

C-130s would drop 3 teams of 60 commandos each. Every team was to have one wireless set for base/ air communications of their progress. 2 days rations (five meethi rotis each) and Rupees 400 in Indian currency were also given to each commando.

Exfiltration of the commandos was almost an afterthought.

(Seeing how this is a sh!t show?)

The Pathankot team comprised 64 personnel including three officers.

The Adampur team comprised 55 personnel including three officers.

The Halwara team comprised 63 personnel including three officers.

"Oy Vey! We f*ked up":

On the 6th of September, when the airfield assault team was put on short notice, it was found that a lot of personnel were actually missing! A shortfall of 40%!

Men from Unit HQ, Group HQ & rear companies were all thrown together into motley teams.
(Who cares about Unit Cohesion? Lol)

A lot of the men had not had joint training, didn't know each other or their officers & hadn't done refresher para drops.
(Recipe for success eh?)

The maps issued were hopelessly outdated, which caused more confusion as this was just a few hours before emplaning. (Big Oof!)
The team leaders needed more time to explain everything to their teams.

At PTS, there was absolute pandemonium as the riggers tried to complete the checks on 182 main and emergency sets of parachutes in blacked-out conditions.
(That sounds awesome)

The mission, unsurprisingly, had to be delayed with TOT (time on target) extended to 00:00 hours.

"You thought that was all?":

At 23:30 they discovered that the PAF had struck Pathankot which meant that air & ground defences were now on full alert. Instead of calling off the attack, they would be dropped 3-4 miles from the target.

Emplaning occurred at 00:30 hours, and by 0235 hours, all drops had been completed.

At 0400 hours, Gp Capt Dogar informed Lt Col Matin that, “the para drops were complete, and that the team leaders had unanimously rejected the plan for retrieval by C-130s and would be exfiltrating on their own."

Let the f*ck ups begin!

Pathankot:
On landing they discovered that they had been dropped 8km SW of the airfield, just next to a major canal which ran parallel to another one.

The major waterway was the Upper Bari Doab Canal, while the minor one was a later distributary not marked on their outdated map.

The first KIA of the was the team’s wireless operator who parachuted straight into a canal, and drowned along with his equipment.

No contact would be established with HQ and the fate of the group members was known only after the POWs were repatriated.

The team leader, Major Butt was able to regroup only 25 of his men, and started headed east towards the airfield through boggy terrain. Immediately after crossing a bridge over the first canal, they encountered Indian troops.

Company Havaldar Major Abbas Ali, along with two of his mates, engaged the Indians so that the rest of the party could continue its advance.

In the ensuing firefight, Havaldar Major Abbas Ali and Lance Naik Muzaffar Khan were killed, while Sepoy Shah Nawaz Khan was seriously wounded. (All three were awarded Tamgha-e-Jur’at).

Butt’s party was able to cross the second canal, and carefully negotiated the crop fields which had started to fill up with farmers for the day’s work. The airfield was now a mere 1,000 yards away.

The Indian troops were in close pursuit, and seeing that no sanctuary was available for cover at the crack of dawn, Major Butt decided to head north-east towards Kangra Hills.

While heading towards the hills not far from Chaki River, Capt Bunyad’s party encountered enemy fire. A firefight ensued, but when the party found itself out of ammunition and completely surrounded by Indian troops, it was left with no option but to surrender.

Major Butt’s party was also encircled by defending troops near Pathankot-Jalandhar Road, and after a two-hour firefight, it also had to surrender. (Major Khalid Gulrez Butt was later awarded a Sitara-e-Jur’at.)

Seeing the mission headed nowhere, Capt Azad’s party decided to abort, and turned west to escape. The party was able to evade the Indians for four days, but was apprehended while crossing River Ravi just a few miles from the border.

Only a party of fifteen men, led by Naib Subedar Muhammad Azam, was able to make it back to Pakistan from amongst the Pathankot group. Of the remaining men, 45 were captured (including six seriously wounded), and four were KIA.

Adampur:
Most of the 55 commandos discovered that they had landed in the midst of a village, in the vicinity of fields with tall crops. Barking of dogs gave away their presence immediately.

It took almost two hours to extract and regroup. In the meantime, the team leader Capt Durrani, managed to put together 49 men, and by 04:15 hours they were ready to launch the operation.

The airfield was about 3km away, but shortly after the group started to move, it heard the noise of jet engines, signalling that aircraft were starting up for the day’s missions.

It was first light, and soon the aircraft formations started to get airborne. Capt Durrani decided to put off the operation for the following night, and broke up the group into smaller parties to hunker down for the day.

With an infantry company searching for the commandos, it was not long before they were completely surrounded by regular troops, police, armed villagers, and dogs. Fierce fighting took place and there were many casualties.

In view of the enemy becoming fully alert, it was decided to abort the mission and all survivors were told to escape in small teams.

The three officers (Cpt Durrani, Ashraf and Ahmed) were able to evade search parties for the next four days, living on nothing but raw corn cobs and sugar cane.

After covering a distance of 80 Km their luck ran out, and they were apprehended just 22km short of the border while crossing River Sutlej. In all, 42 men were captured (including three seriously wounded), 12 were KIA, and only one managed to escape.

Halwara:
Like Adampur, the commandos landed in the midst of houses and fields with tall crops. Assembling the group was a problem, as no one was able to spot the signalman’s torchlight due to various high obstructions in the line of sight.

Search parties of regular troops, and police in armoured cars and jeeps were all over the place; at dawn, light aircraft also joined in the search from the air. Most of commandos could not make it to the airfield, and got scattered while trying to evade the Indians.

A few small parties were able to ambush troops from Punjab Armed Police, and muleteers from the animal transport company in Ludhiana, that had been hastily mustered. One commando party managed to blow up a bridge.

Subedar Allah Ditta managed to lead his team almost to the boundary of the airfield, but was surrounded and a firefight ensued before the group ran out of ammunition; he was later awarded the Sitara-e-Jur’at for his brave leadership.

In another encounter, Lance Naik Mukhtar Ahmed fought till the end when surrounded by one of the hunting parties. He was posthumously awarded the Tamgha-e-Jur’at.

Cpt Hazoor Hasnain was able to regroup a team of 6 men, and headed for the airfield from where jet noise could be heard. Reaching the 14 feet high perimeter fence, they discovered that the tightly woven wires could not be cut, as none of them were carrying any wire-cutters.

After a while, a PAF bomber flew overhead and discharged its bomb load on the runway. The AAA opened up and the sky was lit all around. The air base was now fully alert, and it was daybreak. Hasnain decided to call off the mission, and the party of six prepared to escape.

Only Capt Hasnain party was able to escape. Capt Hasnain was later awarded a Sitara-e-Jur’at. Besides Hasnain’s party of six which escaped, 53 men were captured (including four seriously injured), and four were KIA.

Consolidated losses from a total of 182 commandos were: 140 captured (including 13 seriously wounded), 20 KIA and 22 escaped back.

End of thread.
Source:indianpolitics.co.in/special-servic…

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