1/13
Very good article by @greg_ip on the tradeoff China must make between debt and growth. He notes that as China tries to repress investment in non-productive areas, “If this ultimately funnels credit to more productive uses, that would be... wsj.com/articles/everg… via @WSJ
2/13
positive for Chinese growth in the long run.” He then suggests that Beijing might find it harder than ever to do this because of its recent efforts to “to rein in market forces, steer the flow of capital and restrict how entrepreneurs and investors make profits.”
3/13
He’s probably right, but I would add that even without these recent efforts, funneling credit to more productive uses was always much easier said than done. In the first place the amount of investment that has to be funneled from less productive uses, like...
4/13
property and infrastructure, to more productive uses, is huge – perhaps 10 to 20 percentage points of GDP or more – so that even in the best of cases it isn’t obvious that this amount can be absorbed.
5/13
But what makes it worse is that there is no evidence that the most productive enterprises in China have been starved of financing in the past several years. China saves so much more than it invests domestically that it exports large amounts...
6/13
of savings for which it cannot find a domestic use. Increasing that amount of savings (by reducing the amount that goes to non-productive investment) might simply mean that China has to export even more of its savings.
7/13
The point is that in recent years, growth in business investment – which one would assume on the whole tends to be productive – hasn’t been especially brisk, and at times private businesses have seemed more interest in disinvesting than in investing.
8/13
This shouldn’t be a surprise. Sustainable private-sector manufacturing is directed mainly towards exports and domestic consumption, and while the former has done well, the latter, which matters much more, hasn’t.
9/13
It’s easy to get excited about the amazing opportunities in high tech, but remember that high tech is a very small part of the economy. There is a limit to how much new investment it can absorb productively.
10/13
This becomes even harder if Chinese businesses with growth potential didn't already have plenty of access to capital. Three years ago a former student who had done extremely well in his nearly ten years in private equity visited me and told me he was leaving PE because...
11/13
it had become too crazy. The competition to find viable investment opportunities had become so fierce that anyone who dressed reasonably well, he said, and could Power Point, could easily raise millions. He was leaving PE (with quite a lot of money) to go to the other side.
12/13
Every country at this stage of the development model, in which malinvestment has become a major source of growth, has proposed to resolve the problem by shifting from non-productive investment into more productive areas, but I can’t think of any who pulled it off.
13/13
This doesn’t mean China cannot do so, but it does mean we should be skeptical. The points Greg Ip makes should perhaps make us even more skeptical.
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1/14
Very thoughtful (as usual) piece by @adam_tooze on observing the Evergrande observers. He asks, at the end, "What if this is actually what a shifting of economic gears looks like?"
2/14
I think Evergrande is more of a premonition of the shifting of gears than the beginning. What typically seems to happen with the high-savings/high-investment development model is that countries start off with many years of high growth and low debt, but as they close...
3/14
the gap between actual investment and desired investment (i.e. the amount of investment they can productively absorb), rather than adjust the model they typically maintain high investment rates.
1/4 Damned if you do, damned if you don't: "At least eight cities in mainland China have come up with measures to prevent developers from offering excessively cheap homes to stabilise the market and prevent a collapse in prices." scmp.com/business/china… via @scmpnews
2/4 The article lists many ways in which local officials fear that lower housing prices would be harmful to the economy, including its adverse impact on local government revenues. They are right, of course, but the alternative – ever rising prices – is worse in the medium term.
3/4 This problem emerged over a decade ago, or at least that's how long I have been writing about it, but even when it finally became clear to everyone that soaring housing prices were a problem, the costs of resolving it always seemed higher than...
1/6 This FT article suggests that foreign investors can help prop up the US Treasury market as the Fed begins to cut back on its bond buying, but I disagree. I would argue that this idea of foreign "support" of the US bond market is based... ft.com/content/47551b…
2/6 on viewing US debt incrementally, rather than systemically.
3/6 rich, this paradoxically does not lead to more US savings but rather to more US debt among lower income Americans. I argued in my 2013 book that this is because US investment is not constrained at all by scarce savings, and so more savings cannot result in more investment.
1/5 Good article on the consequences of reducing housing speculation. The housing market is so distorted that there is no question Beijing must act, but after having postponed action for so many years, whatever it does is likely to be costly.
2/5 I think, for example, that it will be very difficult for them to stabilize property prices, even if stabilizing them at such painfully high levels were the right thing to do. Highly speculative markets rarely stabilize: they either rise or decline.
3/5 On the other hand, if prices start to decline, Beijing would either have to put in measures that made it difficult to sell, or risk a rapid drop in prices.
1/4 Another useful article by Zhou Xin. Among other things he estimates that Evergrande's on- and off-balance sheet obligations may amount to as much as 3% of China's annual GDP. That's a lot of debt. scmp.com/economy/china-… via @scmpnews
2/4 But none of this is new. Many of us have know for years (some of us for over a decade) that the property-development sector was creating a very serious imbalance in the Chinese economy, and this includes a number of regulators and policy advisors.
3/4 So why didn't Beijing act sooner to reverse the problem? Perhaps because, as Albert Hirschman used to point out, the constituencies that benefit disproportionately from unbalanced growth are often powerful enough politically to block attempts to reverse these imbalances.
1/9 The idea that more efficiency in financial markets is by definition a good thing is based on an unrealistic model of financial markets in which the only thing that drives capital is a search for productive investment in the real economy. ft.com/content/983bc6…
2/9 If markets are inefficient enough – i.e. frictional costs high enough – to distort the flow of capital to its most productive use in the real economy, then it makes sense to implement policies that lower fictional costs. This can only improve the capital allocation mechanism.
3/9 But at a certain point frictional costs become so low that they have almost no impact on the way capital is allocated to productive investment. In that case, lowering frictional costs further only benefits speculative, high-turnover capital and the derivatives market.