Would add to this excellent thread the point that using Article 16 as a response to complaints about Article 10 (as suggested by @eastantrimmp in the debate on the Subsidy Control Bill on Wednesday) is a non-starter.
The (relevant) threshold for using it is “serious economic difficulties that are likely to persist”. But it’s hard to see how such an argument could run in relation to Article 10.
The bottom line on Article 10 is that it requires certain measures to be approved by the Commission. But the Commission is able to take account of any “difficulties” to NI’s economy that the measure is designed to deal with in deciding whether to grant approval.
It’s therefore very hard to see how a “serious difficulties” case could get off the ground as a justification for using Article 16 to suspend the operation of Article 10.
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Two main points about the current government’s proposals to revisit “retained EU law” (the mass of mainly technical but often important EU law that remains in force in the UK).
1. The somewhat hand-waving, “let’s seem to be doing something Brexity”, suggestion of changing its status vis-a-vis domestic legislation is simply unwise, for the reason well-summarised by Peter.
A critical devolution issue is local government finance: if you want seriously to devolve power to local level, you have to give it its own tax base, immune from Westminster’s tendency to grab power by fiddling around with finance.
And also immune to its tendency to concentrate all restrictions on public spending on local government, in the hope that Westminster will avoid responsibility for the consequences.
For electoral reform specialists, this is a problem with the German (and Scottish and Welsh) system, as explained here. Essentially, that system fills ~1/2 the seats by FPTP, and then allocates the other half (list seats) so as to achieve an overall proportional result.
This is how it worked in Scotland last time: the SNP wins almost all the FPTP seats (fans of FPTP: note) but gets hardly any of the list seats, so as to bring its overall seat total to just under 50%.
But FPTP is easily capable of throwing up even madder results than that: in a multi party system, a party may win almost all the FPTP seats with ~30% of the vote, efficiently spread around, with the opposition split.
As Article 16 of the Protocol is in the news, a quick thread.
This is Article 16.
By paragraph 1 the Article applies only if there are “serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties that are liable to persist, or to diversion of trade”.
(To summarise my view in one tweet: if you combine (a) turning a fundamentally political question into a question of constitutional law with (b) a constitution that is ludicrously impossible to change, the result is, inevitably, a complete mess.)
(See also: gun control and restrictions on campaign spending by billionaires.)
Thoughtful and well-informed piece by @tconnellyRTE about the current stand-off over the Protocol. Worth pulling out and emphasising his point that the current U.K. government doesn’t seem to have thought beyond the July Command Paper: a point I can illustrate.
My example to illustrate that comes from @jamesrwebber’s and my article on the UK government’s proposal on A10 (State aid) - which generally supported its position that A10 needs to be looked at again in both sides’ interest, and is over the top given the TCA subsidy provisions.