A friend recently dropped off an old @CarnegieRussia brochure, and while it’s from well before my time at the CMC, I couldn’t help but share the nostalgia! (Russia hands may find this amusing. Or not. Caveat emptor.)
First things first: Alexei Arbatov never changes. Ever.
Yashin, Kara-Murza and Pivovarov have been abundantly clear that Russia’s war is criminal and that Ukraine should win. They went to jail for that clarity. Criticizing them for not repeating it is disingenuous.
But they need to understand the genuineness of Ukrainian anger.
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The nuances of the Russian opposition’s arguments on sanctions and Russian public opinion cannot bring security to Ukraine, and Ukrainians justifiably worry that a focus on dreams of Russian democracy will distract from helping Ukraine win the war.
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Indeed, the West has a bad habit of taking shots in the dark on Russian politics rather than focusing on shoring up Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, as I wrote here:
Increasing chatter that we may see a large prisoner exchange--perhaps as early as today--involving a number of the Russian political prisoners who have gone missing in recent days, plus Evan Gershkovich, Paul Whelan and others.
The question is, why now?
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I'm on record saying I didn't think an exchange was terribly likely, because I thought the Kremlin would (a) hold out for maximum benefit and (b) avoid giving Biden a win. Obviously, I can be wrong -- I don't know (and have never pretended to know) Putin's inner thoughts.
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On the second, more minor point, with Biden now out of the race, giving him a win may not seem as consequential for the US elections, as a Biden win doesn't necessarily translate into kudos for Harris.
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I don’t know who needs to hear this, but this is not the end of Trump. To paraphrase Churchill, it’s not even the beginning of the end. And to be honest, I’m not sure that it’s the end of the beginning.
Any jubilation is misplaced, I’m afraid.
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Trump’s response to these verdicts is the logical continuation of his response to the election. In that regard, I’m not worried about people storming the courthouse. The capacity of Trumpworld for violence is, I think, overrated.
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A violent challenge to the system requires an appetite for risk and a degree of solidarity that I don’t see in Trump’s supporters. The Jan. 6 prosecutions and the lack of aftermath make that clear. But the non-violent risk is almost worse.
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For context and insight, it might be useful to go back to something @gbrunc and I described in "Putin vs the People", about how Putin understands and utilizes crises and tragedies:
So many thoughts have been expressed in the time that it has taken me to collect my own, that I'm not sure what this is worth. By the key words are Navalny's own: не сдавайтесь. Don't surrender.
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Navalny is not the first of Putin's political opponents to die. He will not likely be the last. But it is up to those who care to find a way -- any way -- to keep Russia's other political prisoners alive. The pressure must always be on.
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Vladimir Kara-Murza. Ilya Yashin. These names you know, or should know. Evan Gershkovich, too. Or Navalny's own lawyers, Vadim Kobzev, Igor Sergunin and Alexei Liptser. But there are hundreds more.
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This excellent thread from @DrRadchenko is in part a rebuttal to one aspect of my thread yesterday, in which I argued, inter alia, that Putin needs a forever war. Sergey argues Putin needs victory and would be happy for the war to end. It’s worth unpacking this.
First, I think we both agree that Putin needs the war to continue — in some form or another — through the March 2024 presidential election. The Kremlin has predicated Putin’s campaign on this war continuing and will not want to pivot too quickly.
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Second, I agree with Sergey’s point that, from a macro-historical perspective, there is no predetermination here. I also share Sergey’s aversion to monocausal explanations. It was never inevitable that Putin would take this path.
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