A friend recently dropped off an old @CarnegieRussia brochure, and while it’s from well before my time at the CMC, I couldn’t help but share the nostalgia! (Russia hands may find this amusing. Or not. Caveat emptor.)
First things first: Alexei Arbatov never changes. Ever.
What we learned yesterday: nothing we didn’t know, if we were paying attention.
What we’ll learn this weekend: whether European leaders have been paying attention.
(A 🧵)
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It was abundantly clear that the US administration would be guided by the following “principles” (I use the word hesitantly):
1️⃣🇺🇸 transactional interests trump all others
2️⃣ The velocity of exit from 🇺🇦 trumps the quality of exit
3️⃣ Normalization with🇷🇺 is a priority
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Following from these “principles” are 3 logical conclusions:
1️⃣ 🇺🇸 is unperturbed by the geo-strategic consequences of its exit from 🇺🇦
2️⃣ 🇺🇸 feels it has greater leverage over 🇺🇦 than 🇷🇺
3️⃣ the only route to a rapid exit is thus for 🇺🇦 to make maximum concessions
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There is very real reason to worry about the dynamic emerging between Washington and Moscow when it comes to Ukraine. But there is also very real reason to believe that Ukraine and Europe can create a better outcome.
(A rather long 🧵, obviously)
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First, let's start with the bad news: The Trump administration is handling the start of this process just about as badly as it is possible to do. There is no way to sugar coat that, nor should anyone try.
I'll focus on three low-lights.
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Low-light 1: After Waltz and Kellogg spent weeks talking up a strategy of "maximum pressure" on Russia and building trust in Europe and Kyiv, POTUS threw that out the window by announcing unconditional bilateral talks with Putin.
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Yashin, Kara-Murza and Pivovarov have been abundantly clear that Russia’s war is criminal and that Ukraine should win. They went to jail for that clarity. Criticizing them for not repeating it is disingenuous.
But they need to understand the genuineness of Ukrainian anger.
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The nuances of the Russian opposition’s arguments on sanctions and Russian public opinion cannot bring security to Ukraine, and Ukrainians justifiably worry that a focus on dreams of Russian democracy will distract from helping Ukraine win the war.
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Indeed, the West has a bad habit of taking shots in the dark on Russian politics rather than focusing on shoring up Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, as I wrote here:
Increasing chatter that we may see a large prisoner exchange--perhaps as early as today--involving a number of the Russian political prisoners who have gone missing in recent days, plus Evan Gershkovich, Paul Whelan and others.
The question is, why now?
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I'm on record saying I didn't think an exchange was terribly likely, because I thought the Kremlin would (a) hold out for maximum benefit and (b) avoid giving Biden a win. Obviously, I can be wrong -- I don't know (and have never pretended to know) Putin's inner thoughts.
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On the second, more minor point, with Biden now out of the race, giving him a win may not seem as consequential for the US elections, as a Biden win doesn't necessarily translate into kudos for Harris.
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I don’t know who needs to hear this, but this is not the end of Trump. To paraphrase Churchill, it’s not even the beginning of the end. And to be honest, I’m not sure that it’s the end of the beginning.
Any jubilation is misplaced, I’m afraid.
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Trump’s response to these verdicts is the logical continuation of his response to the election. In that regard, I’m not worried about people storming the courthouse. The capacity of Trumpworld for violence is, I think, overrated.
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A violent challenge to the system requires an appetite for risk and a degree of solidarity that I don’t see in Trump’s supporters. The Jan. 6 prosecutions and the lack of aftermath make that clear. But the non-violent risk is almost worse.
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For context and insight, it might be useful to go back to something @gbrunc and I described in "Putin vs the People", about how Putin understands and utilizes crises and tragedies: