🚨🚨NEW REPORT from @citizenlab: Pandemic Privacy: A preliminary analysis of collection technologies, data collection laws, and legislative reform during COVID-19 citizenlab.ca/2021/09/pandem… 🚨🚨
1) performs a comparative analysis of pandemic data collection technologies 2) finds privacy laws didn’t inhibit Canada’s COVID-19 response, and 3) identifies how proposed privacy law reforms would harm Canadians’ privacy
Core findings:
1) how data was collected to combat the COVID-19 pandemic was unprecedented in terms of the sheer volume of data collected, and retasking of commercial services and systems to facilitate health surveillance
2) Google and Apple dictated how exposure notification apps could work, often in opposition to what public health officials thought was needed. Still, these apps are unprecedented insofar as they facilitate mass, consent-driven, and decentralized exposure notification
3) The health, emergency, and privacy laws in Canada meant that Canadian governments could collect, use, and disclose personal information with few exceptions. In short: privacy laws weren’t why Canadian governments often responded poorly to the pandemic
Canada’s inability to handle information effectively does have precedent: the 2003 SARS outbreak. Despite legislation having been passed to prevent the same failures, they re-occurred throughout the current pandemic.
4) There is a worrying divide between what information the law authorizes government to collect, use, or disclose without obtaining consent and what some Canadians think are infringements of their privacy rights
The trend that sees lawfulness and perceived legislative legitimacy separate is something that needs attention. It doesn’t just apply to privacy laws, of course, and more broadly speaks to a need to restore and repair elements of Canada’s democracy.
5) During the pandemic, the federal government introduced new commercial privacy legislation. While the trend for governments to introduce privacy-infringing privacy legislation isn’t new (😮💨) it is deeply worrying
Moreover, the Canadian legislation would have lacked a human rights grounding and, by reaffirming old exceptions to consent while introducing new ones, could have significantly and negatively impacted Canadians’ right to privacy
There’s a lot more in the report. In addition to my amazing co-authors, I want to thank @irenepoet and @tamir_i for their peer review, @rizhouto and @MilesJKenyon for their comms assistance, and the rest of @citizenlab for their support.
The full report, “Pandemic Privacy: A preliminary analysis of collection technologies, data collection laws, and legislative reform during COVID-19” is at: citizenlab.ca/wp-content/upl…
Earlier this year, Canada's National Security Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) announced it experienced a 'cyber incident. @NSIRACanada is responsible for, amongst other things, reviewing the operations which have been undertaken by Canada's intelligence community. #cndnatsec
At the time there was very little public information, which led me to raise a serious of questions of what unclassified or Protected (as opposed to Secret, Top Secret, or Top Secret SI) information might have been accessed by a third party. See: christopher-parsons.com/questions-surr…
Encrypted Phone Firm Ciphr, Used by Criminals, Moves to Cut-off Australia vice.com/en/article/k78…
It's really interesting that Ciphr is expanding to include a 'Lite' version that may significantly expand their user base. Why might an organization that ostensibly markets its services criminals do this?
1) The more people using the service who are not potential criminals may increase costs to LEAs who want to insert a backdoor into the application somehow. If they can scale then there may be a public interest argument to *not* backdoor this Ciphr, unlike An0n.
Stanford professors urge U.S. to end program looking for Chinese spies in academia reuters.com/world/us/stanf…
The FBI has a track record of laying charges against American faculty for inappropriately working with Chinese institutions. But it’s critical that observers recognize that a large number of these investigations are subsequently dismissed.
Canada is adopting American methods of scrutinizing academics, with an expected focus on Asian (and specifically Chinese) collaborators. We will likely see similar charging behaviour, harassment, and bias against scholars based on ‘national security’ concerns and investigations.
This announcement has the potential to really gum up academic research protocols by disincentivizing researchers from doing certain classes of work in Canada due to adding bureaucracy or fear of security review and its consequences.
Funding in Canada is often hard to come by and so researchers are naturally disincentivized from publicly complaining about problems in obtaining funding. But they do talk quietly and create whisper communities of ‘problem funders’.