Was digging through court records related to Vault 7 and found this tidbit. The FBI used the wifi at Starbucks to download the leak. #OBTS
If you want to better understand how government agencies, such as the CIA, create and use cyber tools, there are some helpful bits in the #Vault7 court records. Here's one example. #OBTS
Makes sense for the CIA (and others, really) to have a code library of basic components in a state that can be readily used. #Vault7#OBTS
The CIA also wanted to have the ability to track what code is being used, where. Which also makes sense. Good to know about potential ramifications of re-use. #Vault7#OBTS
Not everyone's a fan of reading WikiLeaks in Starbucks. #Vault7#OBTS
The CIA DevLAN network, which hosted the data we know of as #Vault7, was shut down on March 7, 2017, the day WikiLeaks published the first part of the series.
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Well, @signalapp launched stories and here’s what that looks like.
If you share a @signalapp story with just one person, replies will appear as a typical message. For a story shared with a group, replies appear as comments on the story.
I have no idea what happens with replies if I share a story with all my @signalapp contacts, I suspect it’ll be similar to the 1:1 example above. The majority are what I consider professional contacts. I’ll keep my stories to Instagram and Facebook.
If you’ve never experienced a sudden, traumatic job loss, let me tell you it’s fucking awful. While it’s tempting to dunk on this site’s new owner, I’m thinking it may be more helpful to share the resources I used in late 2019. 1/6
I spent time doing things for me. When I was sad, I picked up a book or podcast and played some Tetris on my Switch. When I was angry, I focused on movement that required power and strength—like pole dancing. 2/6
I muted some accounts and keywords on various social platforms, avoided most news about workplace harassment and layoffs, and also took a break from the journalism/security work I’m passionate about (don’t worry, that’ll come back). 3/6
On September 14, the European Parliament’s inquiry committee to investigate the use of #NSO’s Pegasus and other spyware organized a hearing on the use of spyware in Poland. You can watch the recording here. multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/webstreamin…
The inquiry committee traveled to Tel Aviv in July to meet with various people, including #NSO's co-founder and then-CEO @Shalevhulio. He argued that NSO is a company that at least tries to work on regulation, while competing with many others who are not.
The inquiry committee was informed that #NSO's Pegasus had been purchased by 14 member states in total, and that the licenses of 2 EU member states were terminated because of non-compliance with the user agreement.
Pretty excited for this talk by @patch1t about a one-click macOS takeover, starting out mentioning P0’s iMessage exploit and NSO’s Pegasus spyware. #HITB2022SIN
The story of CVE-2021-30657 was one of my favorite talks at #OBTS last year, esp. the way @cedowens, @jbradley89 and @patrickwardle talked through the steps to finding the initial flaw.
When I worked at the @nytimes, I had a manager who for two years told me that I’m difficult, nasty, fragile, territorial, controlling. He always told me this in person, in private. (thread)
He told me that I don’t care about other people. That no one wanted to work with me. That people were "more relaxed" when I was away. I respected him. Believed every word he said, every time. I even internalized it, tried to fix it. It was a full year before I told HR.
I simply thought that if I changed, he'd stop. If I did everything right, he'd approve. If I fit in, everything would be OK. That if I used the right words, at the right time, in the right way, he would not lash out.
Former intel analyst charged with disclosing classified information to a reporter, the indictment illustrates challenges/risks with journalist/source comms. justice.gov/usao-edva/pres…
P5 outlines comms: analyst researched reporter, attended reporter's book event, searched for classified info re: reporter's beat, texted friends about the event + meeting reporter, reporter emailed analyst article about Snowden, analyst and reporter exchanged texts, emails, etc.
Indictment suggests the analyst and the reporter communicated via emails, texts and in-person meetings prior to using encrypted comms. Book event in April 2013, reporter suggested Jabber in September. Could be they used encrypted comms sooner without this being highlighted here.