Imagine if FB owned AWS (or something with a similar footprint) right now.
“The Internet was designed to survive a nuclear war” has always been a myth, but it’s wronger than ever after decades of quiet centralization.
A really bad takeaway from this would be “look how badly FB was engineered”. They no doubt made some (serious) errors, but they’re about as technically good as anyone is at their scale.
I get that you don’t like Facebook. Their product (when you can get to it) is toxic. But that’s not a valid technical critique of their reliability engineering. They had bad failures today, but it remains to be seen exactly what went wrong and what can be learned from it.
I don’t feel sorry for Facebook, the company with the toxic, exploitative social media platform. (And I look forward to tomorrow’s whistleblower hearing).
But that’s entirely separate from whether their infrastructure was well engineered.
I really hope that tomorrow’s hearing stays focused on FB’s business practices (for which they have much to answer), and also that there are future public inquiries into the failure here (from which there’s also much to learn)
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I knew this was coming eventually, but it finally happened. I asked a class today, as I periodically do, “how many people here have a landline phone at home” and the answer was zero.
“Plain old telephone service”, used to mean the once ubiquitous 48V,20ma local loop. The kids today think it means a cellphone with no data service.
That Apple origin story about Woz and Jobs financing the company by selling Blue Boxes for making free long distance calls requires a lot more explanation than it once did.
There’s going to be all sorts of analysis of the AZ “audit” report that’s being officially released tomorrow, which is more attention than it deserves. But at least this exercise in low-rent clownery reached the same conclusion about the outcome as the adult audits did.
Again - and this is the critical take-away here that I fear will be lost in the noise - the “Cyber Ninja Audit” has nothing in common with the rigorous Risk Limiting Audits recommended by experts (and which should be done after every election routinely).
Meaningful election audits are a well-defined process that provides quantifiable assurance that the reported outcomes match the ballots cast. The AZ fiasco, on the other hand, was an open-ended attempt to cast doubt on a valid outcome. And it failed even at that.
“I used to respect you but then you were mean to my blockchain voting idea”.
Just a suggestion. If I post a link with for a good starting point for learning about improving election security: nap.edu/catalog/25120/…
and you respond with a “solution" that contradicts several of its recommendations, I’m going to assume you’re unserious.
It’s fine to disagree with the experts. But if you propose something that contradicts the experts consensus without engaging with their recommendations or explaining what you think they're wrong about and why, you’re likely to be disappointed with the response you get.
If you’re demanding hand marked paper ballots and not also demanding routine post-election risk limiting audits, you don’t understand what you’re demanding.
Want to understand how to meaningfully improve election integrity? Start here: nap.edu/catalog/25120/…
How ballots are marked is meaningless if the tally system is compromised. Fortunately, Risk Limiting Audits are a recognized, reliable way to ensure correct election outcomes even if the tally system is maliciously tampered with, but they aren’t yet routinely done in most states.
The laser focus by some activists on demanding hand-marked ballots (which are already used in a large number of states) is unfortunate given that RLAs are at least equally important but much less common.
Election security is really simple if you just ignore the requirements and the logistics.
Examples of election things that are very convenient to ignore:
- Ballot secrecy
- The US constitution
- State and territorial election law
- Funding
- Voters with accessibility needs
- Usability
- Election logistics
- Geography
One of the most common misconceptions about US elections is that they’re the same across the country. In fact, there are over 5000 election jurisdictions (mostly counties) in the US, governed by 50+ state/territorial election laws. Each one does things a little differently.