Have to agree that the focus on the Electoral Count Act seems to have come at the expense of other subversion risks.
The most serious subversion threats start much earlier in the process, with certification standing out as the key nexus point democracydocket.com/news/how-the-g…
My April piece on subversion is not exhaustive by any stretch, but it does surprise me how often some of these threads--certification, eligibility challenges, partisan boards--are overlooked, given how they simply follow from actual 2020 efforts nytimes.com/2021/04/06/ups…
None of this is to say that the Electoral Count Act is irrelevant, but my pretty strongly held view is that the dangers were already allowed to progress to a far, far more dangerous place than 2020 for the ECA to become the relevant factor
One possible middle ground in framing--though not really in substance: certification standards could be construed as an element of whether electoral votes are 'regularly given'
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A simple thought-experiment. What happens if you simply run the 2012 to 2020 trendline forward to 2028?
Obviously there's no reason to expect this, but it is something to consider given the case that recent electoral trends are an unmitigated catastrophe for Democrats
The downside for the Democrats--part of the 'apocalypse Senate' case--is that the Democrats only win 23 states here, down from 25. That said, they're above 49 in two more states so it's not hugely different than the status quo.
The better news for Democrats: the electoral college-popular vote gap basically evaporates, as Texas becomes a singularly important near-US average tipping point state, sort of like NY at various points pre-New Deal
A lot of the conversation about the fate of the Dems centers on the post-12 era, but this is a reminder that 08 was an inflection point as well--when Dems really did choose the relatively liberal, activist-backed candidate (even if he was tactful about it)
Obama won a decisive enough victory, with a great Dem showing downballot. So there's not a lot of reason for Democrats to dwell on how things might have gone differently there.
But choosing the mobilization candidate at that moment is a real historical turning point
Even crazier is that the actual 'persuasion' alternatives--Clinton and Edwards--clearly posed some huge risks for Democrats of their own in hindsight!
One thing that's interesting to consider is how changing demographics have undermined the traditional way of thinking about racial gerrymandering.
The traditional thinking is premised on a world where nonwhite voters are a distinct minority.
As a result, vote dilution claims center on a district-by-district analysis, where you look for areas where nonwhite voters could represent a majority, identify cracking/packing, etc
Today the demographic picture is a lot different.
Now, nonwhite voters--collectively--represent a majority or near majority of some states.
That district level analysis winds up making it harder to state the obvious about a racial gerrymander.
Since it's @davidshor weekend here on Twitter, I thought I'd add some focused thoughts on one way of thinking about the Shor case: what would happen if the Democrats tried to go back to 2012?
It's oversimplified, but in the absence of a fuller program I think it's one of the clearer lenses for thinking about what his ideas mean in practice.
And I think it's fair: he's clear about wishing to go back to 2012 edu. polarization--it's explicit in his power sim
He's also clear in believing that the Obama '12 campaign is the model for Democrats. As far as he's concerned, that was the last time Democrats thought in a popularist--tactical--way, including about salience/messaging on race, immigration, culture
Strange piece and report, perhaps reflecting some of the inconvenience of Trump's gains among nonwhite voters in a high turnout election.
But I'd like to note some of the numbers in the report, which speak to real '20 data challenges
To take an obvious case, this report appears to think that Democrats made gains among Hispanic voters in most states--including Florida!
This is clearly based on pre-2020 voter file partisanship modeling, like party registration or primary vote history, without any effort to incorporate polling or results from 2020