1/4 The PBoC has finally commented directly on Evergrande-related turmoil, criticizing the company for its “poor management”, while playing down the potential spillover effects to the financial system, which they say they can control. scmp.com/economy/china-… via @scmpnews
2/4 They're probably right, but as I've argued before, domestic financial contagion wasn't the main risk from Evergrande. The regulators have had plenty of practice managing domestic financial contagion before, and as long as the banking system is still... carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancial…
3/4 largely closed and the regulators credible, this was never likely to be a problem.
The bigger risk, in my opinion, is the domestic economic contagion through the financial-distress behavior of different sectors of the economy, all seeking to protect themselves...
4/4 from the risk of property-sector insolvency. On Monday we'll get the September economic data, and then we'll get a chance to see how Evergrande might have affected the real economy.
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1/11
Kevin Rudd makes some important points in this article, but he also writes: "The implications for the global economy from such a scenario are very real. China represented 28 per cent of all global growth between 2013 and 2018 — twice that of the US.
2/11
A significantly slowing Chinese property market would mean slower global growth, with a particular impact on commodities that service construction."
3/11
Rudd may be expressing a confusion — one that many others have too — between China's share of global growth and China's contribution to global growth. It is true that China has accounted for the biggest share of global GDP growth in...
1/6 "It is harder to predict what will happen to home prices in China. If they do decline far or over any length of time, expect to see much bigger problems emerge for banks and for consumers as negative wealth effects spread among the urban population." theguardian.com/world/2021/oct…
2/6 As @georgemagnus1 suggests in his article, this is probably the biggest problem the Chinese economy faces. The past 1-2- decades have seen the creation of an extraordinary amount of bezzle, i.e. fictional wealth created by... carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancial…
3/6 the systematic capitalization of expenses and by the overvaluation of housing, infrastructure and other assets. The total amount is probably comparable only to the amounts created in Japan in the 1980s or the US in the 1920s.
1/4 Good article. It notes that business profits in Germany have risen 8.1% a year since 2004 (versus 1.5% annual increases for France, and 2% annual decreases for Italy and Spain) whereas nominal wages in Germany grew by less than 3% annually.
2/4 German growth, in other words has been accompanied by a substantial transfer of the benefits of growth from workers to businesses, which of course is also why domestic German demand is so weak and Germany began running such large trade surpluses.
3/4 The author also notes that in pre-euro days, DM appreciation didn’t derail German exports but, unlike under the euro, allowed German imports to rise in line with exports – which is of course the sign of a country in which workers retain their share of productivity increases.
1/4 In September once again Chinese exports grew faster than expected and imports slower than expected, to generate a $66.8 billion trade surplus, among the highest monthly trade surpluses China has ever recorded. reuters.com/world/china/ch…
2/4 This means China is running a trade surplus roughly equal to 4.7% of its GDP, and the rest of the world a trade deficit roughly equal to 1.0% of its GDP.
3/4 Every month for the past six months, using an incremental sector-by-sector approach, analysts have incorrectly predicted slower export growth for China and a smaller trade surplus. It should be clear by now that this is the wrong way to look at trade and trade imbalances.
1/5 Aggregate financing (TSF) was up RMB 2.90 trillion in September, and if this was well below expectations, as Caixin claims, it is only because expectations were unreasonably high.
2/5 In fact TSF rose by 1.0% in September (an annualized 11.7%), which is a little bit higher than the average monthly increase this year. For 2021, TSF is up nominally 8.7%, which is equal to roughly 11.7% on annualized basis.
3/5 This is lower than the 2020 growth rate, but higher than previous years. If TSF for the next three months continues to grow at this pace, China's debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of 2021 will rise by roughly 3-4 percentage points over 2020.
1/10
Chinese and foreign analysts who have made similar claims over the years as this Xinhua Commentary never distinguish between types of "bearish" views. But their approach, if taken seriously, would actually makes things worse for China.
2/10
While I agree that those who have predicted imminent political, financial or social collapses have gotten it wrong — mainly because they failed to understand the structure of the Chinese financial system — for well over a decade the most sophisticated critique was not...
3/10
that China was about to collapse (which was always very unlikely) but rather that the Chinese economy was locked into an unsustainable process, and that the longer it took to adjust, the longer and more difficult the adjustment would be.