Xi Jinping's essay on "common prosperity" in Qiushi has been published. DeepL translates it pretty decently if you don't feel like slogging through the Chinese. qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2021-…
Early into the essay (from a speech delivered in August), he warns about the dangers of income inequality, political polarization, the tearing of the social fabric, the collapse of the middle class, and the rise of populism in "some countries." Insists China won't go that way.
Says "obvious and substantial progress" will have been made by 2035 toward the equalization of basic public services, and basic realization of "common prosperity" for all the people by mid-century (read: 2049).
He speaks directly to two concepts popularized in recent months: "involution" and "lying flat," both part of the urban middle class youth's critique of the rat-race — the hypercompetitive culture of overwork. Doesn't specifically denounce these: says they'll be "avoided."
Xi seems to be taking a side in the "Cake Debate" (between those who championed growing the cake (or pie) and those who called for its more equitable distribution. He sides with the latter — though seems to want to grow his cake and split it too.
Common Prosperity won't come overnight, Xi says, but will be "long-term, arduous, and complex." Calls for patience and realism, and experimentation (e.g. Zhejiang Common Prosperity Demonstration Area).
Big focus on expanding the middle class, with the aim of creating an "olive-shaped" distribution, with a large middle class and smaller upper and lower classes. Cites hukou reform and solving the problem of education for children of migrant workers.
Long litany of policies intended to address the welfare of the lower class, including social assistance to urban poor, subsidized housing. Repeats now-familiar line about houses being for living in, not for speculation.
Equally long litany of policies aimed at the rich and their "unreasonable wealth," including actively promoting a property tax (finally!), consumption tax, more antitrust enforcement, crackdowns on insider trading, financial fraud, tax evasion.
Lots of social conservatism, too — not overt, but definitely subtextual. "We should strengthen the leadership of socialist core values, strengthen patriotism, collectivism and socialist education."
Rural considerations lower down. "We should comprehensively promote rural revitalization, accelerate agricultural industrialization, revitalize rural assets, increase farmers' property income, and make more rural residents work hard to become rich." Rural infrastructure, too.
Cautions that it can't all happen in parallel, that it has to be sequential. "Not everyone will become rich at the same time, and not all regions reach a level of prosperity at the same time."
So nothing earth-shatteringly new or unexpected. But clearly this thing my colleagues and I have been calling the "Red New Deal" is conceived as interconnected if not holistic. We can stop speculating about that. It's not just ad hoc, dictated only by the political calendar.
They're too modest to post this here but @EvanFeigenbaum and @damienics and others have all written about the significance of the redefinition of the Primary Contradiction in the 19th Party Congress.
I can’t attest to the accuracy of this post making the rounds on Chinese social media. It purports to summarize reforms proposed by Minister of Education Huai Jinpeng, who took office in Aug. Rumors of major changes have been abroad a while but this would be quite extreme. 1/N
Huai was formerly president of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, vice-minister of the MIIT, deputy secretary of the Tianjin Municipal Committee, and secretary of the Party Group of the Chinese Association for Science and Technology. 2/N
Right up top is a new emphasis on physical education, meant to combat “the phenomenon of feminization of boys,” (heteronormative much?) stressing major ball sports. It also calls for the construction of more sports facilities in communities. 3/N
On this week's @SinicaPodcast, leading Taiwan scholar Shelley Rigger of Davidson College discusses her excellent new book 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘛𝘪𝘨𝘦𝘳 𝘓𝘦𝘢𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘋𝘳𝘢𝘨𝘰𝘯: 𝘏𝘰𝘸 𝘛𝘢𝘪𝘸𝘢𝘯 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘭𝘭𝘦𝘥 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘯𝘢'𝘴 𝘌𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘰𝘮𝘪𝘤 𝘙𝘪𝘴𝘦. supchina.com/podcast/how-ta…
We also publish a transcript of our podcast for those who prefer reading. You can find that here: supchina.com/2021/10/14/a-h…
Shelley brings up something that way too many mainlanders fail to recognize and internalize: That Taiwan's colonization from 1895 to 1945 created a vast "psychological distance" from the mainland during exactly the period where modern Chinese nationalism was formed.
There’s a Chinese language Clubhouse room on the Xinjiang camps right now.
Some fantastically candid things being said. One woman asked, earnestly, how to handle the sense of offense, her instinctive defensiveness, as a Han person confronted with allegations and evidence of the atrocity. Absent so far is any overt denial or apologism.
To be sure, there's skepticism and a lot of watering-down and defensiveness – "Well, isn't it right to try to prevent a 9/11?" and the like – but anything nudging people into more of a shared reality I count as a victory.
1/ You’ve probably seen the photo of Trump’s modified speech, where he crossed out “Corona” and wrote in “Chinese.” This was a deliberate provocation, and he said as much even before the pictures were out. He'll doubtless use it again in his upcoming press conference.
2/ But even if Trump is not a hateful bigot – and there’s every reason to believe he is – then at the least, he’s unacceptably tolerant of bigotry and insensitive to how he is fomenting it. He is endangering people who look like my wife, and my children, and many of my friends.
3/ I’ve already heard and read dozens of anecdotes, including several from my own close friends, about incidents of overt racism toward people who look “Chinese” – even though they may be of Korean, Taiwanese, Japanese, or another East Asian ancestry.