The 43K false negative test error is not minor. If you consider an R=1 & even 1 generation of infection (likely more, considering the 35 day period over which errors occurred), it's likely that >43,000 more people got infected which means a significant no of avoidable deaths.🧵
It's not enough to say 'people will be notified but site names won't be released'. This is a huge issue- there needs to be transparency with the public & we need to know numbers underestimated in different regions so we can correct regional trends.
https://twitter.com/kallmemeg/status/1449511461013839884?s=20
We also need urgent transparency on where the 43,000 figure comes from. How do we know the extent of the problem, and how sure are we that this doesn't extend back further, or more samples were not affected? There needs to be an urgent independent enquiry.
It is not sufficient for members of the UKHSA to lead this enquiry. There is little public trust in these organisations currently - for good reason. There needs to be independent assessment of how this happened- including awarding a contract to this lab, to restore public trust.
Any inquiry must look at the onward impact of missing 43K cases - how much more transmission did this lead to over the period this was missed. How many hospitalisations. How many deaths? How many completely preventable cases of long COVID? Why did it take so long to detect?
When an error costs lives, you need to do more than say it's been rectified because we've notified people. That's simply not enough, when the error has no doubt cost lives.
How exactly will the UKHSA determine false negatives. What about PCR tests that didn't have comparable LFDs? Does the lab have samples going back 35 days that can be re-tested? Can we get clarity on this - hard to have trust in a process that isn't being conducted transparently.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
