Manchester United staged an impressive comeback from two goals down to move top of Group B and ease some of the pressure that had been building on Ole Gunnar Solskjaer... 🧐🧵
Manchester United initially found it easier to progress possession towards the right, where, owing to Atalanta’s out-of-possession 5-3-2, Aaron Wan-Bissaka came under less pressure when receiving the ball... 🧐🧵
When Atalanta adjusted to start pressing Fernandes - Demiral, from the centre of their back 3, usually did so – Fred withdrew into deeper territory to draw his marker and Shaw pulled wider on the left to tempt his opposing wing-back towards him and played balls in behind... 🧐🧵
In their attempts to reduce the threat United posed from the left, De Roon advanced to press Shaw, and Zappacosta took Rashford, who during the second half attacked from a wider starting position... 🧐🧵
When De Roon was moved into midfield, United found it easier to penetrate because of the increased space that existed in the attacking thirds – particularly during transitions. Cavani, Ronaldo and Fernandes often formed a narrow front three seeking to attack with pace... 🧐🧵
The front two at the tip of Atalanta’s in-possession 3-5-2, Josip Ilicic and Luis Muriel, drifted into the inside channels to draw United’s central defenders into wider positions, at which point they bounced possession into an overlapping wing-back or Mario Pasalic... 🧐🧵
The willingness of Freuler and Koopmeiners to withdraw into deeper territory invited Atalanta’s wing-backs to advance; their front two continued to drift wide, but also then had increased space to withdraw backwards and provide a passing option back infield... 🧐🧵
The more advanced positions Atalanta’s wing-backs took succeeded in drawing United’s full-backs away from their defensive line; Ilicic and Muriel, in turn, targeted the spaces they vacated... 🧐🧵
The increased pressure United applied throughout the second half led to De Roon being moved into midfield, where he operated from the base of the diamond, and Freuler and Koopmeiners moving across to support inside of the overlapping full-backs providing their width... 🧐🧵
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Spain used a 4-3-3 structure and built play patiently from the back, despite Germany pressing aggressively from their 4-2-3-1. They moved the ball around the back line to isolate Thomas Müller, before a centre-back stepped out with the ball into midfield... 🧐🧵
Olmo continued to move inside and Asensio dropped deep, in the process pulling Süle out of his position in Germany’s back line. This helped Spain to build out from the back and get around Germany’s increasingly effective high press... 🧐🧵
Traditionally, full-backs are the widest players in a back four, and as a result they attack and defend mostly in the wide areas. However, full-backs who move inside into central spaces are known as ‘inverted full-backs’. This movement adds an extra presence centrally... ↩️🧐
Although Pep Guardiola is the coach most associated with the inverted full-back, Johan Cruyff used them with Barcelona many years before. Then, he often converted the 4-3-3 into a 3-4-3 diamond, with one full-back inverting into central midfield... ↩️🧐
Manchester United were set up in a 4-2-3-1 shape, but Fred pushed forward from the double pivot to become a number 8 and give them a stronger attacking presence in central midfield. Bruno Fernandes then adapted his positioning, moving into the left inside channel... 🧐🧵
The hosts eventually pushed both full-backs higher, primarily working around the outside of Tottenham’s wing-backs. United’s wingers then came inside, with the freedom to rotate with Fred and Fernandes, as long as both inside channels were always occupied... 🧐🧵
Barcelona were set up in a 4-3-3, against a Madrid 4-4-2 defensive block. Torres moved inside to support centre-forward Aubameyang. De Jong and Pedri widened to support through the inside channels, with Busquets left as the single pivot ahead of the two centre-backs... 🧐🧵
Busquets dropped into defence to draw one of Madrid’s central midfielders up, and Pedri drifted wider to drag the other out. This often left De Jong as the free man to receive in the inside channel when Barcelona’s back line could access him... 🧐🧵
4-4-2 is made up of three distinct lines. The back four including two centre-backs and two full-backs. Ahead of them, a midfield four features two players in the middle and one on each side. Then the front two in attack who provide both height and goalscoring threat... 4️⃣4️⃣2️⃣🧵
In the 1950s, Viktor Maslov developed another variation of the 4-2-4, in which the two wingers dropped back alongside the two central midfielders. So originated the 4-4-2, which worked to overload opposition midfields with traditionally fewer numbers... 4️⃣4️⃣2️⃣🧵