Frances is talking to @CommonsDCMS tomorrow, so she should have opportunity to bring this message of privacy and safety to people who would benefit from it.
This is deeply bizarre of @FrancesHaugen - she is arguing that if Facebook willingly surrenders its ability to spy on user content — including on behalf of, say, the Chinese Government — then it cannot protect those users *FROM* the Chinese Government.
She is literally proposing that Facebook should act in a supranational manner, and in the process should deny users from having message privacy.
I don't think she has thought this through terribly well; not to mention that one of the documents she leaked IS LITERALLY ALL ABOUT THIS, I KNOW BECAUSE I WROTE IT.
A question for @FrancesHaugen at @CommonsDCMS tomorrow: should Facebook be responsible for protecting #EU citizens from state-sponsored malware being deployed by @GCHQ?
If you want to read the unexpurgated DT article, this appears to have the content: archive.md/9qVz3
Here is a point which really does demand being driven home tonight:
Anyone who tells you that they know how "Facebook Messenger with Default End-to-End Encryption" will behave, is fibbing; especially re: anti-abuse features.
Hot on the heels of #ChatControl and in the name of “identity” and “consumer choice” the EU seeks the ability to undetectably spy on HTTPS communication; 300+ experts say “no” to #Article45 of #eIDAS #QWAC alecmuffett.com/article/108139
If you would like to see more discussion regarding:
Regulation: EU Digital Identity Framework — including #eIDAS and #QWAC
When Signal and WhatsApp have fled the surveillance of the #OnlineSafetyBill, what app will still be around for politicans, journalists, and actual normal people to use, securely.
@JohnNaulty @matrixdotorg Let's be clear: we are talking about the evacuation of the entire Signal and WhatsApp userbase / niche, from the United Kingdom.
That's a lot of people.
WOW:
- No Signal
- No WhatsApp
- No iMessage
- No Facetime
@jamesrbuk called it #internexit; the UK will be extraordinarily isolated from the rest of the internet.
A big part of the the reason for the existence of that API was because the European Union wanted to enable people to access their data; so they created the problem, complained when the inevitable leaks happened, and are now reinventing it
Could be the attached, but my suspicion is that this is going to be another CYBER! DARKWEB! CYB3R! SYBER! CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA‼️BRAIN CONTORL! YOU SAW AN ADVERT AND SO A RUSSIAN ARTIFISHIAL INTELLIGENCE APP MADE YOU VOTE FOR UKIP! … thing.
Plucky spooks in Cheltenham but dressed for speed-dating in 2015-era Shoreditch, battle "Russian influence operations" that Nadine Dorries will soon cite as rationale for the #OnlineSafetyBill.
Token American subplots help sell the series to the US.
Back in 1991 I published an open-source password cracking tool which defined the state of the art for the next 5+ years, so much so that echoes of it can be found in all major password crackers of today.
Some folk criticised me for doing this, choosing words like these to do so:
I know that in general it's bad form to take a single quote out of context and use it to critique an entire essay (concerned.tech) — but I do feel that this time it's deserved.
The concerned-dot-tech essay has had extensive technical debunking, e.g.: